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This thesis examines how transnational advocacy networks operate across 
local, national, regional and international arenas. It takes a close look at the nature of 
peasant resistance and civil society in Mali, and explores how these interact with 
campaign and advocacy activities of Northern-based non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). The central argument of this thesis is that these encounters have 
strengthened an elite, while marginalising alternative perspectives. This has 
happened through the collision of actors’ diverse interests, through competition 
between distinct framings of debate, and through differences in modes of political 
participation which reflect the power dynamics of the political arenas in which actors 
are rooted. The thesis is informed by the results of qualitative fieldwork research, 
which was carried out, mainly in Mali, between 2006 and 2008. By identifying the 
nature of connections and disconnections between actors at multiple levels, the thesis 
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Figure 1: Map of Southern Mali with legend. Source: mali-guides.com 2006. 
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Figure 2: This map shows the locations of the main field sites in Southern Mali that 
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In the space of a few years, the international community has seen two very 
different images of Malian political participation: from Malian farmers participating 
in the 2003 and 2005 meetings of the World Trade Organization to Malian civilians 
nearly lynching the interim President following the coup d’état of March 2012. The 
high profile of Malian farmers calling for an end to rich country cotton subsidies – 
part of a global, civil society campaign to Make Trade Fair – appeared to be another 
democratic success story for a country that had been lauded as one of the most stable 
democracies in Africa.1 In the words of the then Malian President, Amadou Toumani 
Touré, ‘between Cancùn and Hong Kong, cotton has become the symbol of the 
African fight for fair and equitable trade’ (Touré 2005, p. 5). But while Malian 
farmer leaders were speaking out at the World Trade Organization (WTO), a 
political crisis was slowly brewing at home. In March 2012, President Touré was 
ousted in a coup d’état just weeks before presidential elections in which he was not 
even standing. The international community – and indeed many in Mali’s political 
class – were stunned by this turn of events. But a recent opinion poll revealed that 
sixty-four percent of interviewees in the capital, Bamako, were satisfied that the 
regime of President Touré (ATT) had ended before the organisations of elections 
(Guindo 2012, pp. 11–12). The 2012 coup d’état inadvertently facilitated the 
partition of the North of Mali, opening the door to regional – indeed, global – 
instability. The coup leaders may not have given their actions much forethought, but 
their deeds nonetheless illustrate the dangers of perpetually brushing domestic 
political crises under the proverbial carpet.  
The Make Trade Fair campaign is part of a trend among non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) towards ‘global campaigning’ strategies, which connect actors 
                                                        
1 See, for example, Le Vine (2004, p. 262). 
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from multiple political arenas in transnational advocacy networks and global public 
relations campaigns. This fresh approach, of course, feeds into, and stems from, the 
growing global social justice movement, as evidenced by the World Social Forum, 
the anti-globalisation protests targeted at the WTO, G8, IMF and World Bank, and 
the mobilisation of a large, international movement against war in Iraq. These 
phenomena have prompted some analysts to speak of new forms of transnational 
activism (Tarrow 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998) and even, tentatively, of an 
emergent ‘global civil society’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998, p. 32; Kaldor 2003). This 
research takes as a case study the work of one of the world’s leading development 
NGOs, Oxfam (its British and American affiliates, in particular). Evolving from its 
shift towards ‘global campaigning’, Oxfam has developed an agenda of promoting 
Southern campaigning and advocacy. This additional move may be seen as linked to 
a belief that in many countries of the global South, the capacities of civil societies to 
campaign and advocate need to be ‘built’. At a time when ‘Advocacy is increasingly 
fundamental to the work of NGOs, particularly in the form of “advocacy coalitions” 
or “transnational advocacy networks”’ (Yanacopulos and Baillie Smith 2007, p. 
310), this thesis questions how transnational advocacy networks operate across very 
different political arenas, and to what extent they contribute to democratic 
participation in governance at multiple levels. This is an enquiry into the nature of 
‘global civil society’, and of its relation to civil society in Mali.  
The idea for this research project came to me while I was working in Oxfam 
in Scotland’s campaigns team. The voices of poor and marginalised people abounded 
in brief citations and sound-bites, but I became aware of a lingering doubt in my 
mind as to how the project in which we all were so earnestly engaged was actually 
perceived by those with whom we thought ourselves in solidarity. I chose Mali as the 
setting for my enquiry not only because of its links to the global Make Trade Fair 
campaign, but also because of its reputation as one of the least Westernised, yet most 
democratised, countries in Africa. Like many other African countries, Mali 
underwent a successful transition to democracy in the early 1990s. A peasant farmer 
movement, which emerged in this period, asserted itself throughout the 1990s and 
2000s in a series of ‘strikes’, refusing to sow cotton or deliver harvests. Since 2002, 
Mali has its own social forum tradition, connected with, but independent of, the 
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World Social Forum (begun in 2001). If ‘the best predictor of activism is past 
activism’ (Tarrow 2005, p. 47), Mali provides an ideal case in which to test the 
possibility of co-ordinated political activism across very different social, political, 
economic and cultural spaces. Similarly, ‘cotton’ is an apt lens through which to 
explore relationships between Malians and transnational advocacy networks, not 
only because the commodity has featured so prominently in international campaigns, 
notably the Make Trade Fair campaign focused on the Doha round of world trade 
negotiations, but also because of the significance of the sector within Mali. Cotton 
comprised forty percent of the country’s export earnings in 2005,2 and the 




The argument of the thesis and contributions to debate 
The central argument of this thesis is that despite intentions and indeed 
appearances to the contrary, the population of Mali’s cotton zone has been to some 
extent further marginalised rather than empowered through the interventions of 
transnational civil society. This has happened through a dynamic interaction of 
different interests, framings of debate, and modes of political participation among 
actors in local, national, regional and transnational arenas. The interests, framings of 
debate and modes of political participation of some actors coincided – sometimes 
intentionally; sometimes unintentionally – and dominated over those of others. 
Actors’ interests variously included jobs, per diems, income, livelihood 
security, debt repayment, food security, nutrition, social status, agricultural inputs, 
health, power/connections, job/campaign success, and organisational funding. 
Debate was framed by different actors in terms of export-oriented cotton production 
or in terms of family farming; in terms of global governance or of national 
sovereignty. Modes of political participation included petitioning, lobbying, 
                                                        
2 UNCTAD (2005) ‘22 Nov 05 – International commodity policy challenges: cotton.’ Source: 
http://archive.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3606&lang=1 consulted on 01/05/07. 
3 UNCTAD (2006, p. 2) ‘An Investment Guide to Mali: Opportunities and conditions, October 2006.’ 
Source: http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20062_en.pdf consulted on 01/05/07. 
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negotiation, clientalism, expectation of consultation, deference to authority, 
representation, elections, social forums, media campaigns, and popular mobilisation. 
This thesis links academic debate on transnational advocacy networks to 
debate on African civil society, thus contributing to a more thorough understanding 
of ‘global civil society’, one which does not exclude or marginalise Africa. The 
thesis points to where to look for different types of civil society in Africa: unions 
may be officially recognised but have little autonomy from government; national 
NGOs may be more autonomous from political interests but are dependent on donor 
funding; social forums may have little direct influence but, like other channels of 
expression that are indirect such as the arts, they may perform functions expected of 
civil society.  
The thesis advances academic understanding of how smallholders in Mali’s 
cotton zone perceive their relationships to the State and capital, exposing some gaps 
in the literature on peasant resistance (for example, Scott 1990; Isaacman 1993). 
Other authors (Bingen 1998; Roy 2010a; Dougnon et al. 2010) have identified one or 
other of three types of consciousness among farmers in Mali. I show that all are 
present and that this heterogeneity goes some way towards accounting for 
differential participation in national and transnational civil society campaigns.  
Above all, the thesis contributes to academic understanding of transnational 
civil society networks through an empirical examination of the roles of power and 
values in this interaction, and by considering some of the (unintended) impacts of 
transnational advocacy interventions on the local and national political arenas in 
Mali. In this way, the thesis contributes to academic debate around the 
‘deconstruction of development’ by arguing that a significant part of the explanation 
for these unintended effects lies in the dominance of international NGOs, which 
structures networks relations and inadvertently facilitates dominating power relations 
in the wider context. 
 
 
The structure of the thesis 
Chapter two examines the literature and shows that civil society is a 
problematic concept, especially when applied to non-Western contexts or to an 
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imagined global arena. It argues that the transnationalisation of civil society activity 
across multiple political and cultural arenas poses particular challenges because it 
involves the mediation of power and values in relationships between civil society 
actors, who are rooted in their own political contexts. In turn, transnational civil 
society networks impact on the multiple political arenas through which they flow, 
often with unintended effects.  
Chapter three argues that Africa’s position as a primary commodity producer 
at the bottom of the value chain is inherently problematic, in a world trade system is 
power-based rather than rules-based. This chapter puts in wider context the policy of 
cotton sector liberalisation considered in chapters five and seven, and the campaign 
against US and EU cotton subsidies considered in chapter six. It shows that 
promotion of export-oriented cotton production in Mali has been accompanied by the 
socio-economic and political differentiation of the peasantry, which offers a partial 
explanation for farmers’ heterogeneous participation in contentious political action. 
Chapter four explains the methodology that was used in conducting this 
research and discusses some challenges encountered. 
Chapter five finds that civil society engagement with the programme for 
liberal reform of Mali’s cotton sector took place almost entirely within the national 
political arena, where the policy-making environment was severely constrained by 
the World Bank following domestic crises. Pressure from the World Bank led to 
increased government co-optation of national farmers’ representatives, giving the 
appearance of farmer participation required by the ‘good governance’ agenda. Staff 
at the West African office of the international NGO, Oxfam, sought to support 
Malian farmers’ associations, but their capacity to act in the global arena was 
constrained by organisational priorities set at their headquarters in the UK, and their 
capacity to be effective in the national arena was limited by their lack of 
understanding of Malian realpolitik. As debate was suppressed within those farmers’ 
organisations deemed legitimate representatives by government actors, social forums 
organised mainly by educated, urban-based activists – with links to radical left-wing 
party politics, transnational activist networks and grassroots constituencies – became 
outlets for counter-hegemonic opinion. Social forums were welcomed by many local 
to national level farmers as opportunities for free expression, but they were 
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disconnected from national – and international – policy-making processes. In this 
case study, an appetite for popular participation in policy-making was not sustained 
through transnational civil society networks.  
Chapter six argues that civil society participation in governance in the global 
arena can undermine democratic accountability in the national arena, through 
competitive agenda-setting and framing of debate. Actors in the global campaign 
against US and EU cotton subsidies responded to opportunities in the international 
arena rather than grounding their analyses in local realities. The campaign was 
driven by the British and American wings of the international NGO, Oxfam, together 
with an elite of West African cotton farmer representatives. Local level participation 
in the campaign was used more to legitimise intervention in the national and global 
arenas than to stimulate genuine debate or increase downward accountability. 
Through the campaign, a new working relationship was forged between cotton 
farmer leaders and their governments but, in the process, the gap between leaders 
and grassroots farmers widened and alternative analyses of the problems affecting 
farmers were further marginalised. Together, the case studies in chapters five and six 
draw attention to a major challenge for transnational campaign networks: not 
focusing on global governance overlooks one cause of policy constraint on 
governance at national level, yet, if not carefully managed, focusing on global 
governance may undermine efforts to improve national governance.  
Chapter seven argues that strengthening civil society participation at local 
level, and between local and national or supra-national levels, can have exclusionary 
effects if heterogeneity within the local arena is not taken into account and if the 
process is framed by policy orientations and political interests emanating from the 
national and international arenas. The formation of market-oriented co-operatives 
and a pyramid of unions of co-operatives represents the latest stage in an historical 
process of disciplining the local arena to conform with the agendas of the State and 
transnational capital. A rural elite now readily collaborates in this process. Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) considered in the chapter are at once less 
formally representative of farmers and more independent of national level political 
interests. They are nonetheless influenced by dominant policy orientations emanating 
from the global North, and they are attracted to work with a form of local civil 
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society and an agricultural commodity that are familiar to them: specifically, market-
oriented co-operatives and cotton. The top-down construction of local civil society 
and framing of development problems is perpetuated by the funding chain and, 
despite some attempts at brokerage by national NGO actors, most of the non-
governmental interventions considered in the chapter do not constitute alternative 
models of development. 
Chapter eight concludes the thesis by arguing that the dominance of 
international NGOs was a significant feature of the dynamic interaction of civil 
society actors across borders, examined in this thesis. The agency of state and civil 
society actors at local and national levels in Mali, and at regional levels in West 
Africa, is highly pertinent to understanding how it happened that the interests of an 
elite rather than the majority of farmers in Mali’s cotton zone were promoted by 
transnational advocacy networks. However, in line with deconstructive critiques of 
development, a crucial element of the explanation for this phenomenon lies in the 
dominance of international NGOs within the networks, which facilitated this 
dominance by other actors in the wider  context.
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Chapter two 
Transnational civil society and African 




The dynamic interaction of civil society actors across borders is the rich 
subject matter of this thesis. In the late twentieth century, the notion of ‘civil society’ 
was invoked in diverse contexts: as a democratic counter to the totalitarian state in 
Eastern Europe; as ‘new social movements’ protesting against neoliberal capitalism 
in the North and structural adjustment in the South; and conversely, as non-
governmental organisations providing services in place of the rolled-back state in 
reformed economies across the world. This diversity of interpretation has led to 
questioning of the usefulness of the term (Kumar 1993; Edwards 2004). It parallels 
the different theories of civil society that have been elaborated – though not 
reconciled – over the years.  
The question of the usefulness of ‘civil society’ as a concept for theorising 
about, and as a means for bringing about, social and political change is particularly 
pertinent in non-Western contexts. Contemporary ideas about civil society have a 
notably Western genealogy (Seligman 1992; Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; Lewis 
2002; Edwards 2004). ‘Civil society’ has taken on highly specific and contested 
meanings in the Western tradition. Thus, attempts to examine civil society in non-
Western contexts through a Western lens risk becoming perilously obtuse. The task 
is all the more confusing in postcolonial contexts, where Western norms and forms 
have partially percolated into society, such that semblances of Western-style civil 
society intermingle with very different logics of civility and social order. The 
phenomena of transnational development interventions and advocacy networks, 
increasingly viewed as features of an emergent ‘global civil society’, make the need 
to get to grips with civil society in non-Western contexts all the more pressing. This 
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chapter examines the literature on global civil society and on civil society in Africa 
in order to identify pathways for exploring the processes and the stakes of 
transnational civil society action. 
Literature on global civil society is largely focused on characterising the 
phenomenon of transnational campaigns and advocacy networks in terms of theories 
derived from Western political thought. While arguing against critics who suggest 
that the very concept of global civil society suffers from inherent Western bias (for 
example, Munck 2006), Anheier (2007) notes that in the literature there has been a 
‘failure to take into account other civil society traditions’ (p. 9), and opts to study 
global civil society as an empirical phenomenon (p. 13). The view taken in this thesis 
is that empirical research shows such complexity and inconsistencies with the main 
theoretical traditions that it is necessary to look to other areas of literature to better 
understand the phenomenon. 
Insights from the literature on international development and non-
governmental development organisations, particularly from the debate around 
‘deconstructive’ approaches to development, help to unpack transnational 
interactions between civil society actors. The debate around deconstructive 
approaches to development also helps to explain the wider impacts of transnational 
civil society action, which may be quite different from the professed aims of 
advocacy campaigns. In turn, this literature draws heavily from the literature on 
power, which is useful for analysing, on one hand, power relations between network 
actors, and on the other hand, the wider fields of power in which actors are situated, 
and from which they enter (or not) into network relations. 
The focus in this thesis, on the wider political contexts in which actors are 
situated, together with Anheier’s (2007) call to take account of other civil society 
traditions, necessitates examination of the literature on civil society in Africa, which 
has been hitherto missing from the literature on global civil society. Insights from 
critiques of the deconstruction of development and from the broader Social Science 
debate around civil society, particularly those that emphasise agency in the context 
of structure, inspire a less deterministic view of civil society in Africa than is 
prevalent in different strands of the literature. Once again, the literature on power 
and on participatory development contributes to analysis of relations between state, 
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society and market actors, through which civil society is constituted over time. Since 
much of the literature on global civil society and on civil society in Africa reflects 
influences from Western analyses and contexts, it is useful at this point to provide a 
very brief sketch of the genealogy of the concept of civil society in Western thought.  
The historical antecedents to the concept of civil society in Western political 
thought are the classical notions of the good society and the active citizenry of the 
ancients (Edwards 2004, p. 6). These were conceived as central elements of 
government: ‘In classical thought, civil society and the state were seen as 
indistinguishable, with both referring to a type of political association governing 
social conflict through the imposition of rules’ (ibid., p. 6). The concept of civil 
society came to prominence during the Enlightenment era, when absolute 
monarchies reigned across most of Europe, and agricultural and industrial 
revolutions were transforming the very fabric of society. Adam Ferguson and fellow 
eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment thinkers posited civil society as a 
counterbalance to the pursuit of individual economic interest (Seligman 1992, p. 26). 
Ferguson’s contemporary, Immanuel Kant, living under absolutism in Prussia, was 
the first to view civil society as a separate sphere from the state (ibid., p .43).  
 
civil society becomes especially ‘good to think,’ and to signify with, at 
moments when conventional connections between the political and the 
social, state and public, are perceived to be unraveling. (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1999, p. 12). 
 
The Comaroffs eloquently compare the emergence of the idea of civil society 
in the eighteenth century – amid the rise of industrial capitalism and the fall of 
absolutism epitomised in the date of 1789, with its re-emergence in the twentieth 
century – amid the rise of neoliberal capitalism and the fall of totalitarian regimes 
epitomised in the date of 1989.4 
In the intervening period, the concept of civil society was subject to different 
reconfigurations (Edwards 2004, pp. 7–9). In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville 
lauded the rich associational life he observed in America as the life-blood of 
                                                        
4 A similar point is made by Harbeson (1994, p. 2) with reference to political transitions in Africa in 
the early 1990s: ‘It [the idea of civil society] has reappeared at a point in history when the capabilities 
of existing nation-states to minimally satisfy the political aspirations of nationalities and ethnic 
communities has never been more in question.’ 
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democracy. The neo-Tocquevillian view sees civil society as a third sector, a sphere 
of voluntary, non-profit-seeking activity, beyond the family, and independent of the 
state and the market. This view is the basis of the ‘good governance’ agenda 
promoted by international institutions from the International Monetary Fund to the 
United Nations since the 1990s. A more critical approach evolved through the works 
of Hegel, who saw civil society as the realm of conflicting, particularist interests; 
through Marx, who saw civil society as representing the interests of the bourgeoisie 
under capitalism; to Gramsci, who saw civil society as the site of struggle between 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces. 
The working definition of ‘civil society’ adopted in this thesis is a realm of 
social activity distinct from the state, the market, and the family, yet at least partially 
constructed through interactions between these other spheres. It is a site of both 
harmony and struggle. In practice, it is a scene where hegemonic/counter-hegemonic 
struggles play out, but conflicts are not necessarily polemic. This conflictual 
dimension, emphasised by Gramsci, is important to consider in empirical research. It 
is not, however, intrinsic to the definition of civil society adopted in this thesis; an 
entirely harmonious civil society is highly unlikely, but not impossible. 
The transnationalisation of civil society activity across very different contexts 
throws up particular challenges in terms of power and values and in terms of its 
unanticipated effects. The main argument of this chapter is that transnational 
interactions between civil society actors are conditioned by actors’ relations to the 
wider political arenas in which they are situated and through which their interactions 
flow. This is a process of mutual constitution, however, as civil society is itself 
shaped over time by the dynamic interaction of historical, social, economic, political 
and cultural structures and agency. The inequality of power relations is an important 
aspect of these processes and a significant feature of transnational networks; but this 
inequality of power relations may be essentialised by overly deterministic analyses, 
or under-emphasised by non-normative critiques of deconstructive approaches to 
development. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section outlines theoretical 
debates around the concept of global civil society and considers their relevance to 
this thesis. The second section examines research on transnational civil society 
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interactions more broadly, and identifies strategies for thinking about issues of 
power, values, legitimacy, accountability and the participation or non-participation of 
actors in transnational campaign networks. The third section explores approaches to 
studying civil society in African contexts. The fourth section gives a brief analysis of 
features of civil society in Mali that are pertinent to this thesis. 
 
 
Global civil society 
The notion of ‘global civil society’ emerged as a way to conceptualise the 
increasingly transnational dimension of civil society activity since the 1990s. On one 
hand, there has been a trend since World War II towards ‘universal’ norms of 
‘human rights’ and increased calls on international institutions to defend them where 
states have failed to do so. This trend has continued but, since the 1990s, it has been 
accompanied by increased opposition, often organised across national borders, to 
policies and practices of international and transnational governance and commerce. 
Classic examples include the Jubilee 2000 campaign for the cancellation of ‘third 
world’ debt by the year 2000; Narmada Bachao Andolan (founded 1989), a social 
movement in India opposed to a World Bank-funded dam project; the Zapatista 
movement which emerged in Chiapas, Mexico in 1994;5 the ‘Battle in Seattle’ 
protests against the 1999 meeting of the World Trade Organisation; the World Social 
Forum, an annual meeting of civil society organisations first held in Brazil in 2001; 
and Oxfam International’s global Make Trade Fair campaign, launched in 2002. 
The increased transnationalisation of civil society action may be seen as a 
response to the increased transnationalisation of economics and politics. Clark (2001, 
p. 18) notes that ‘issues cannot be effectively addressed without concerted action by 
governments throughout the world’ and draws a link between the increased regional 
integration of governance and the rise of global civil society movements. Debates 
over the evolving nature of the world political system continue in the literature on 
Politics and International Relations (see, for example, Hutchings 1999). Marks and 
Hooghe (2004) have contributed the notion of ‘multi-level governance’ in the 
                                                        
5 The Zapatistas timed their uprising against the Mexican state on 1 January 1994 to coincide with the 
coming into effect of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
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context of European integration, to express the simultaneous engagement of state and 
non-state actors in multiple political arenas. Meanwhile, Chin and Mittelman (1997) 
emphasise the economic and cultural – not just political – dimensions of 
globalisation and of resistance to it. A body of literature has grown around the 
phenomenon of transnational campaign and advocacy networks that challenge power 
at multiple levels (see, for example, Keck and Sikkink 1998; Evans 2000; Tarrow 
2005).  
For the purposes of this thesis, the notion of ‘global civil society’ is a useful 
construct for thinking about transnational interactions between civil society actors 
because it helps us to grasp the multi-dimensional character of the phenomenon 
being studied. Indeed, the term ‘transnational’ keeps the focus firmly at the level of 
the nation-state, whereas the very elusiveness of the ‘global’ encourages 
consideration of sub-national, regional and supra-national aspects of civil society 
encounters. However, using the concept of ‘global civil society’ also draws attention 
to the manifold interpretations of the nature of cross-border civil society interactions. 
Transnational advocacy networks and social movements have been alternately 
characterised as ‘cosmopolitan’ or as ‘anti-globalisation’, but neither label accurately 
reflects their diverse discourses, practices or organisational forms. ‘Cosmopolitan’ 
values articulated in human rights discourse have a Western genealogy and, while 
they are sometimes embraced and other times translated and transformed in non-
Western contexts (Keck and Sikkink 1998, p. 211), their dominance in the discourse 
of transnational civil society may also be experienced as a form of cultural 
imperialism.6  
Yanacopulos and Baillie Smith (2007) suggest that Oxfam’s Make Trade Fair 
campaign is ‘useful in highlighting a cosmopolitan ambivalence’: on one hand, it 
emphasised ‘the capacity of civil society to exert political power beyond the nation-
state’, made it impossible to ignore the ‘other’ and emphasised the need for justice; 
on the other hand, many of its supporters were found to understand little of the 
campaign objectives and to wear the campaign’s symbolic white band as ‘a fashion 
statement rather than a political one’, while ‘the level of Southern engagement in the 
“global” campaign was limited’ (ibid., p. 311). In a separate study of Oxfam’s 
                                                        
6 For a fuller discussion of the debate around this point, see Yanacopulos and Baillie Smith (2007). 




Transnational civil society and African contexts: theoretical challenges 
14 
campaign, Berry and Gabay (2009) observe that supposedly universalist discourses 
are in fact rather parochial in nature. They argue that the empirical evidence does not 
support the prevailing liberal-cosmopolitan conception of global civil society, 
typified in the work of Mary Kaldor (2003), which presents global civil society in 
neo-Tocquevillian mode, as ‘an inherently positive phenomenon, contrasted with 
global market forces and the activities of powerful states’ (Berry and Gabay 2009, p. 
341).  
Although Berry and Gabay (2009) lean towards the rival, neo-Gramscian 
perspective on global civil society, these authors find that it, too, is overly dogmatic 
and lacking in empirical accuracy. The neo-Gramscian view regards transnational 
campaigns and advocacy as part of a counter-hegemonic movement against 
neoliberal globalisation (Evans 2000), or, more convincingly, as a divided realm that 
is at once hegemonic and counter-hegemonic (Katz 2006). The neo-Gramscian 
perspective is a useful frame for drawing attention to divisions within global civil 
society. It can be mapped onto different manifestations of transnational non-
governmental activity7 so as to differentiate more hegemonic types of activity, such 
as NGO participation in governance and NGO partnership with business, from more 
adversarial, activist manifestations of civil society activity, which challenge both 
state and market forces.  
The neo-Gramscian view can also be applied to make sense of North/South 
structural inequality within global civil society.8 In this vein, Collins, Gariyo and 
Burdon (2001, p. 147) comment, ‘The greatest challenge for Jubilee 2000 as a 
movement is that it continues to reflect the same North–South imbalances that it 
criticizes in international economic policy, in terms of access to resources, 
information and global decision-making.’ Funding chains are particularly pertinent 
both to the perpetuation of these inequalities and, when they involve donor agencies 
                                                        
7 Anheier (2007) identifies four manifestations within global civil society: (i) the New Public 
Management, through which NGOs participate in governance in partnership with state and inter-state 
agencies; (ii) Corporatization, in which NGOs partner with or imitate transnational corporations; (iii) 
Social Capital, in which social solidarity develops through cross-border networks, including faith-
based ones; and (iv) the Activist manifestation, in which transnational networks and social movements 
resist, challenge and act as watchdogs in relation to both state and market forces. 
8 See, for example, Katz (2006). 
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– as is increasingly the case in the context of the New Policy Agenda – to the erosion 
of the independence of NGOs from government donors (Edwards and Hulme 1996).  
Unequal participation in global civil society also pertains, however, within 
the North and the South. As Pallas (2009, p. 6) notes, ‘the resource requirements (in 
terms of wealth or access) of global networking are such that international civil 
society associations tend to foster an international elite rather than a global 
proletariat.’ Thus, alongside divisions between the global North and the global 
South, there is an even wider gap between the poor and marginalised everywhere and 
those in global civil society who speak on their behalf or in solidarity with them 
(Nyamugasira 1998, p. 4). Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin (2007) note that the  
emergence of international civil society elites through global advocacy networks and 
campaigns ‘raises serious questions as to whose alternatives gain greater visibility in 
these processes’ (ibid., p. 8, original emphasis). 
A challenge to the neo-Gramscian hegemony/counter-hegemony frame arises 
from the sheer breadth and diversity within global civil society. In deconstructing 
development, Arturo Escobar (1995a) sought to ‘maintain the focus on domination – 
as earlier Marxist analyses, for instance, did’ while exploring the discourse of 
development and the ‘most pervasive effects of development’ (pp. 5–6). Critiques of 
this approach are discussed below, but first it is pertinent to note that Escobar went 
on to identify ‘resistance’ to development not as an homogeneous counter-
hegemonic movement but as diverse alternatives to development. In Latin America, 
Escobar (1995b, p. 220) observes the emergence of a ‘discourse of difference,’ 
‘which includes cultural difference, alterity, autonomy and the right of each society 
to self-determination’.9 Indeed, in addition to resource inequalities between actors 
who might take part in transnational networks, there are also cultural differences and 
language barriers.10 Graeber (2005, p. 171) notes a trend in which anarchist 
sympathies and methods of organising have increased among some activists. Some 
reactions to globalisation – such as defending national sovereignty in the global 
South and promoting localism in the global North – lean towards communitarianism, 
                                                        
9 Similarly, Young’s (1990) ‘politics of difference’ envisages ‘equality among socially and culturally 
differentiated groups, who mutually respect one another and affirm one another in their differences’ 
(p. 163). 
10 Note, for instance, the language requirements of participating in global civil society, where English, 
French and Spanish dominate. 
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which would seem to be antithetical to any notion of a global society. How, then, are 
differences to be bridged? Or are they to be bridged at all? 
Inspired by the Zapatistas, Olesen (2004, p. 259) posits a new ‘global 
solidarity’, which can marry the universal and the particular; ‘a form of solidarity 
that emphasises similarities between physically, socially and culturally distant 
people, while at the same time respecting and acknowledging local and national 
differences’. In Tarrow’s (2005) study of contemporary transnational activism, he 
observes ‘domestically rooted activists’ who mobilise around global frames (p. 205); 
a realisation of Cohen’s (1992) vision of ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’. Clearly, 
transnational civil society interactions do not always take these idealised forms,11 and 
many of the actors concerned may not even aspire towards them, but are they even 
realisable? Are ‘domestic’ frames always compatible with ‘global’ frames?  
Scholte (2007) points out that transnational civil society action does not 
merely involve a binary tension between the universal and the particular; rather, 
multiple arenas are implicated in global civil society activity. 
 
every global civil society activity simultaneously has regional, national 
and local aspects. The global qualities never exist independently of – and 
are always filtered through – regional, national and local contexts. 
Conversely, it is also difficult to find civil society operations today that 
do not have a notable global quality of some kind. Purely local, national 
or regional civil society, hermetically sealed from global spaces, is no 
less an impossibility than a discrete global sphere. (Scholte 2007, p. 20) 
 
Add to this complexity Ferguson’s (1990, p. 287) insight, cited in Bending 
and Rosendo (2006, p. 233), that the status of ‘counter-hegemonic’ always depends 
on an analysis of local context, then the extent of the challenges involved in 
transnationalising civil society action begin to become apparent. Transnational 
interactions between civil society actors are affected by the multiple political arenas 
through which they flow, and by the diverse ways in which power operates within 
those many arenas. This, then, prompts questions over the nature of these 
interactions that are constitutive of global civil society, which take place between 
                                                        
11 Fioramonti (2007, p. 137) notes, ‘In Latin America and Asia, most social movements are highly 
personalized entities, often shaped around charismatic leaders. Although presenting themselves as 
loosely organised movements, they are in fact quite centralised in terms of decision-making.’ 
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actors across local, national, regional and global contexts: to what extent and how 
common ground is found; and to what extent, why, and to what effect divisions, 
misunderstandings and unequal power relations persist.  
 
 
Transnational civil society network interactions 
In the literature on transnational campaigns and advocacy networks, some 
authors emphasise processes whereby actors modify their perspectives through the 
experience of interaction, while others emphasise divergence between actors’ 
perspectives. Keck and Sikkink (1998, p. 213) view transnational advocacy networks 
as ‘dense webs of interactions and interrelations among citizens of different states 
which both reflect and help sustain shared values, beliefs and projects.’ Henry, 
Mohan and Yanacopulos (2004), by contrast, point out that network construction is 
an on-going and emergent process which involves contestation between actors. 
Echoing the image of Tarrow’s rooted cosmopolitans, Jordan and van Tuijl (2000) 
observe that actors in transnational advocacy networks ‘primarily act upon incentives 
which emerge in their own space’ (p. 2062). In this way, the wider political contexts 
in which actors are situated can help to explain how actors define their interests and 
perspectives and arrive at their positions, on the basis of which they engage (or not) 
in transnational networks.  
In parallel, actors’ wider social contexts can help to explain differences in 
their values, which also motivate their behaviour. There is a well-established 
emphasis within the discipline of Sociology on the role of values in motivating social 
action and social structure.12 Joas (2000) examines where values come from in order 
to try to bridge the gulf in social theory between those who see the role of values in 
determining social action as all-important and those who see it as insignificant. The 
approach taken in this thesis is to see values as beliefs about ideals, which arise 
through a creative combination of socialisation and the rational individual’s capacity 
to reflect, evaluate and make sense of the world (Joas 2000; Hitlin and Piliavin 
2004). For the purposes of this thesis, values are regarded as one among many 
                                                        
12 This emphasis derives in part from what is now regarded as an inaccurate translation into English of 
Max Weber’s work (Cohen, Hazelrigg and Pope 1975; Turner 2009). 
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motivators of participation in transnational advocacy networks, which are not 
necessarily based on shared values; network actors’ values may converge or they 
may conflict. Actors may have other – for instance, strategic or material – motives 
for participating in the network, or they may believe that they share values but find 
that their values diverge as the network evolves. Rather than assuming that values are 
shared, then, it is interesting to explore what happens when network actors’ values 
differ. Since values are part of complex motives for actors’ behaviour (including 
discursive behaviour), sometimes the role of values is clear and sometimes it is less 
obvious. The focus in this thesis is not on classification of different types of motives, 
but on what happens when actors with different sets of motives interact, or 
potentially could interact within the same sphere of civil society activity. 
Henry, Mohan and Yanacopulos (2004, p. 851) argue that one way in which 
contestation between network actors plays out is quite straightforwardly through 
attempts ‘to exclude opposing views from the frame of public discussion’. 
Universalising discourses are particularly disposed towards hiding differences of 
perspective, as noted above, and to appearing incontestable. Universalising 
discourses may seem to be the cement of transnational network construction, but 
they may become the focus of overt contestation; or they may in practice hide 
contestation between actors, which may be played out through the juxtaposition of 
public and hidden transcripts (Chin and Mittelman 1997, with reference to Scott 
1990); or else diverse perspectives may be accommodated through the use of 
common symbols which nonetheless hold different meanings for different actors 
(Henry, Mohan and Yanacopulos (2004, p. 852). There are parallels between this use 
of common symbols to diffuse tensions and what Mosse (2004, p. 663) describes as 
the ‘mobilizing metaphors’ of policy discourse, ‘whose vagueness, ambiguity and 
lack of conceptual precision is required to conceal ideological differences, to allow 
compromise and the enrolment of different interests, [and] to build coalitions’. 
The role of discourse in shaping transnational development interventions and 
their outcomes has been thoroughly debated in relation to attempts to deconstruct 
‘the discourse of development’, which have put forward the notion that development 
discourse seems self-evident, irrefutable and is largely internalised by local people, 
yet the effects of interventions purportedly based on the discourse are not to the 
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benefit of local populations (Ferguson 1990; Escobar 1995a). If there were continuity 
between policy, implementation and effects, such that negative impacts flowed 
directly from the discourse, this would give rise to a questioning of the discourse and 
its supposedly irrefutable character. Often, however, there is disjuncture between 
policy, implementation and effects. There are what Ferguson (1990) terms, 
‘instrument effects’, or side effects of interventions that are inconsistent with the 
official aims of policy. In Ferguson’s (1990) case study, a development intervention 
in Lesotho became a vehicle for the expansion of state power. The phenomenon of 
‘instrument effects’ has received much attention in the literature on development, but 
not in the literature on global civil society.  
In attempting to explain how these instrument effects come about, Ferguson 
(1990) and other deconstructors of development have emphasised the depoliticising 
effects of development policy discourse, which renders the political, technical (Li 
2007, p. 7). Based on a study of an Oxfam development programme in Tanzania in 
the 1970s, however, Jennings (2001) argues that ‘in a seeming reversal of James 
Ferguson’s hypothesis, Oxfam became a “politics machine”’ (p. 129). Jennings 
(2001) attributes Oxfam’s failure to recognise the contradictions inherent in the 
development intervention – in which ‘villagisation and Ujamaa policy had 
effectively masked a massive extension in the authority of the central state 
machinery and a process of authoritarianism that sought to dominate all aspects of 
rural life’ (p. 109) – to Oxfam’s ‘heavily ideological agenda’ which led the NGO to 
reduce ‘the technical or development aspects to a secondary place’ (p. 131). Jennings 
shows that the instrument effects of transnational civil society interventions are not 
fully accounted for by the deconstructivist thesis of the supposed monolithic 
character of ‘development discourse’. A discourse of development that emphasises 
economic rationality and down-plays the political aspects of socio-economic change 
certainly lends itself to instrumentalisation, yet even when the discourse is more 
overtly ideological as in the case of ‘Ujaama’ – or perhaps, ‘trade justice’ – similar 
instrument effects may be observed, a point made by Bending and Rosendo (2006). 
 
We can also see that if being anti-development became politically useful, 
then movements might call for change in the name of an “alternative to 
development.” Perhaps this is already happening. Any intervention by, 
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for example, northern NGOs to help social movements in the name of 
“alternatives to development” obviously risks repeating just the type of 
anti-politics mechanism that Ferguson described under the name 
“development.” Bending and Rosendo (2006, p. 232) 
 
Jennings’ (2001) analysis does not offer a way to reconcile the findings of his 
case study with that of Ferguson’s (1990) because he misses two points: (i) 
instrument effects are facilitated by the NGO sticking rigidly to its own agenda, 
independently of the ideological character of that agenda; and (ii) instrumentalisation 
may be facilitated by the actions of the NGO and by the character of the discourse 
(whether depoliticising or universalising), but is done by actors in the context in 
question. This approach to analysing the apparent ‘instrument effects’ of an 
intervention marks out a middle path between deconstructive approaches (for 
example, Ferguson 1990; Escobar 1995a), which emphasise the dominance of the 
NGO or of its discourse, and actor-oriented, non-normative analyses (for example, 
Mosse and Lewis 2006), which emphasise the independent agency of all relevant 
actors. 
If NGO staff and other actors in transnational networks do have a propensity 
to stick rigidly to their own agendas, this raises questions of how and why. An 
obvious way in which actors push forward their own agendas, discourses and 
interpretations is through the funding chain. Crewe and Harrison (1998) find that 
power structures supposed ‘partnership’ relationships, not in deliberate, but in 
systematic, ways. They also point out that almost all donors are also recipients. In 
seeking to explain the ‘banal cosmopolitanism’ of Oxfam’s Make Trade Fair 
campaign, Yanacopulos and Baillie Smith (2007, p. 313) note that ‘NGO attempts to 
articulate alternatives is [sic] strongly circumscribed by being embedded within a 
neoliberal aid system and by needing to draw support from constituencies in the 
North whose lives are defined by highly commodified forms of consumption.’ The 
pressures on NGO actors are clear: at stake are their jobs, their performance reviews, 
the perpetuation of funding flows. Indeed, Mosse (2004) approaches the 
phenomenon of ‘instrument effects’ from a different angle, taking issue with the 
assumption that policy normally drives practice, posing the provocative question, 
‘What if, instead of policy producing practice, practices produce policy, in the sense 
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that actors in development devote their energies to maintaining coherent 
representations regardless of events?’ (p. 640), concluding that they do this ‘because 
it is always in their interest to do so.’ (p. 639).  
It would be a mistake, however, to overlook the ‘power of discourse’ either in 
the sense of ‘mobilising metaphors’ that recruit support rather too successfully, 
lending themselves to processes of co-optation, or in the sense of the role of actors’ 
attachment to ideology and values in convincing them that their own interpretations 
are correct, even in the face of evidence to the contrary. There is plenty of scope for 
lack of awareness of what is really going on, especially where there are considerable 
distances between actors as there are in global advocacy networks and given opaque 
or absent processes of negotiation of actors’ perspectives, outlined above, but also 
where covert operations of power are significant features of the political arena in 
question. 
The focus on the discourse of the NGO, the donor, or the developer neglects, 
however, the agency of other actors in the political arenas in which interventions, or 
through which transnational interactions, take place. Bending and Rosendo (2006, p. 
231) point out that the mystery of Ferguson’s development ‘machine’ evaporates 
when one considers the many actors at state level who stand to gain from 
perpetuating the development intervention. This is not to say that they necessarily do 
so with subversive intent. Actors pursue their own agendas, through their own 
strategies, in a field of possibilities in which the development, campaign or advocacy 
intervention is but one: the policy of the intervention is not central to these actors’ 
life choices (Crewe and Harrison 1998; Mosse 2004; 2005).  
 
Escobar’s implicit assumption is that developers develop, while local 
people resist, and arguably that this resistance is the most important part 
of their lives. Developers remain at the centre of the analysis while other 
people’s actions are read merely as responses to the fixed centre, rather 
than as formed and influenced by all sorts of circumstances, many of 
which will be unconnected to development activity. Conscious resistance 
may be easy to spot, but how is it possible to distinguish between 
unconscious resistance and action that is independent of developers? 
(Crewe and Harrison 1998, p. 18) 
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This insight draws attention once again to the ways in which actors may 
participate in the same intervention or discourse for very different reasons. 
Recipients and other actors may participate in the discourse as a strategic move to get 
what they really want, not necessarily because they share the same vision of 
development or of justice as the donor. 
One area of the debate around the deconstruction of development that is not 
addressed here fully is the notion that many recipients internalise the ‘discourse of 
development’ to their own detriment. This thesis does not go so far as to investigate 
whether and to what extent civil society actors and local populations may have 
internalised universalising or activist discourses to the detriment of their real 
interests because, aside from the methodological challenges involved in such an 
investigation, it seems superfluous to the task of explaining the phenomena observed. 
This concept of internalisation as ‘three dimensional power’ (Lukes 2005) is 
pertinent to the thesis, however, in terms of understanding some of the perspectives 
of farmers in Mali’s cotton zone on their relationships with the State and the cotton 
company, which in turn goes some way towards explaining their participation or 
non-participation in advocacy networks.  
In taking on board Crewe and Harrison’s (1998) and Mosse’s (2005) point 
that actors pursue their own agendas within their fields of possibility, this thesis pays 
attention to the wider contexts in which actors are situated rather than focuses solely 
on interactions between international NGO actors and Southern civil society actors 
or local populations. In relation to his case study, Mosse (2005 p. 229) concludes, 
‘the self-reliance model … ignored the project’s own reality … [The project] was a 
powerful external source of patronage interacting with regional and historical 
processes of change.’ This analysis ties in with insights from the literature on 
participatory development, which emphasise the significance of ‘immanent 
development’ in terms of historical and political processes of social change, as 
opposed to ‘imminent development’ as specific interventions (Hickey and Mohan 
2004).13 Hence the focus in the latter parts of this chapter is on understanding civil 
society in Africa and in Mali. 
                                                        
13 Similarly, Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin (2007) draw on Hart’s (2001) distinction between ‘little 
d’ and ‘big D’ d/Development. 
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In the deconstructivist literature, when instrumentalisation is done by local 
populations to divert development interventions, it is usually interpreted as 
resistance. As noted above, Crewe and Harrison’s (1998) issue with the resistance 
frame is that it keeps the ‘developers’ at the centre of the analysis and neglects the 
significance of actors’ own agendas and strategies. The resistance frame has also 
been criticised as ideological populism by Mosse and Lewis (2006), citing Oliver de 
Sardan (2005). Instead, drawing on (Kothari and Minogue 2002, p. 13), they 
advocate taking what they call a non-normative approach: ‘These nonnormative 
ethnographies of aid and development agencies return to questions of agency beyond 
“development as concealed power” in order to “throw light on the complexity of 
practice”’ Mosse and Lewis (2006, p. 15). This approach has involved a focus on the 
function of ‘broker’, facilitating the encounter between external agents of 
development and the ‘local’ populace or intended beneficiaries (Bierschenk et al. 
2002; Olivier de Sardan 2005; Mosse and Lewis 2006). This function, which 
involves political mediation of competing interests and strategic interpretation of 
otherwise incongruent discourses, has significant impact on the ways in which 
development interventions proceed and, by extension, on the ways in which 
transnational network construction proceeds. 
Non-normative approaches have their strengths but also their limitations. The 
resistance frame is problematic, but it does capture an important dimension in 
transnational civil society encounters that may be missed by the non-normative 
approach; that of overall imbalances of power. As mentioned above, when local 
populations divert development interventions, this is often interpreted, in the 
deconstructivist literature, as resistance. A similar process occurs when state or high 
level civil society actors in a southern country instrumentalise an international NGO 
intervention to pursue their own agendas. Inspired by a Foucauldian approach to 
power, tempered by the actor-oriented turn, the non-normative approach would take 
most interest in the parallels between these processes, and focus on examining how 
they happen, emphasising multi-directional operations of power. Under the 
resistance frame, however, both scenarios could be viewed as actors making the most 
of limited opportunities to pursue their own agendas within overall patterns of 
unequal power. But the context of first scenario is an overall pattern of unequal 




Transnational civil society and African contexts: theoretical challenges 
24 
power between local populations and donors, whereas in the latter case, while there 
is unequal power between national level actors and the international NGO (e.g. via 
the funding stream), the national level actors are relatively powerful vis-à-vis local 
populations who may be disadvantaged by their instrumentalising actions. Thus, 
resistance, as one expression of power, is a relational, not an absolute, concept. As 
such, it may be confusing to apply it to relations within networks that traverse 
multiple political arenas. The non-normative approach offers fascinating explanatory 
detail, yet, to play down power inequalities by over-emphasising the multi-
directional workings of power – perhaps in a bid to avoid coming across as 
ideological or populist – would be to overlook an important dimension of real world 
interaction. In analysing Foucault’s theory of power, Lukes (2005, p. 97) argues that 
‘criteria will be needed … to distinguish between dominating and non-dominating 
power and dependency’ and, indeed, that ‘the “Final Foucault” reaches for just such 
a distinction’. 
Non-normative approaches seek to describe and to explain, rather than to 
evaluate. However, the internal workings of transnational civil society networks have 
important implications for their accountability and legitimacy, as Edwards (2001) 
illustrates. 
 
The first set of issues – and by far the most contentious – concern 
legitimacy and accountability: Who speaks for whom in a global 
network, and how are differences resolved when participants vary in 
strength and resources? Who enjoys the benefits and suffers the costs of 
what the movement achieves, especially at the grassroots level? Whose 
voice is heard, and which interests are ignored, when differences are 
filtered out in order to communicate a simple message in a global 
campaign? In particular, how are grassroots voices mediated by 
institutions of different kinds – networks and their members, Northern 
NGOs and Southern NGOs, Southern NGOs and community groups, and 
so on down the line? (Edwards 2001, p. 6) 
 
The approach taken in this thesis is not to view NGO legitimacy and 
accountability narrowly, eschewing the wider context, but to put the wider context at 
the centre of the analysis and to view NGO legitimacy and accountability in relation 
to it. Atack (1999) identifies four criteria of development NGO legitimacy, two of 




Transnational civil society and African contexts: theoretical challenges 
25 
which are formal-procedural criteria, representativeness14 and distinctive values,15 
and two of which are substantive-purposive criteria, effectiveness and empowerment. 
However, Lister (2003) argues that NGO legitimacy should be approached as a 
social construct rather than as a technical issue. She argues that ‘Organisational 
legitimacy is the “reward” for activity which conforms to dominant discourses, and 
illegitimacy is the sanction.’ (Lister 2003, p. 188). She proposes that the question 
which should be posed is, ‘Legitimacy for whom?’, and that attention should be paid 
to ‘the relative “weights” of different stakeholders in determining legitimacy’ (ibid., 
p. 184, original emphasis).  
Within transnational networks, particularly those that are built around 
funding chains, there tends to be too much upward rather than downward 
accountability. Clark (2001) asserts that ‘true accountability should reside as closely 
as possible to the citizens of the country in question’ and, upon considering a variety 
of determinants of NGO legitimacy proposed in the literature, he notes that ‘Only the 
issue of representation brings accountability anywhere near the poor themselves, and 
this is the least developed, least focused-on question’ (pp. 26–27). Representation is 
complicated to instantiate in civil society relations but, Jordan and van Tuijl (2000, p. 
2053) argue, ‘it cannot be denied that NGOs are in fact representing interests when 
they operate with an expertise in a specific political arena and use that knowledge to 
carry a campaign concern to a new level of decision-making.’ They propose that 
accountability in transnational advocacy campaigns and networks should be 
approached in terms of political responsibility to the most politically vulnerable 
stakeholders (Jordan and van Tuijl 2000).  
Viewing legitimacy as a social construct and accountability as political 
responsibility to the most vulnerable stakeholders provides a framework for 
verification of claims to legitimacy and accountability in transnational civil society 
networks, which, Henry, Mohan and Yanacopulos (2004) argue, have been quite 
extensively theorised, but not adequately subjected to empirical investigation. These 
approaches also inspire a research agenda that focuses on the perspectives and 
                                                        
14 Edwards (2001, p. 7) argues that because NGOs are not formally representative, they ‘may have the 
right to a voice, but not necessarily to a vote in global fora.’ 
15 Fioramonti (2007, p. 138) asserts that public perception of the legitimacy of global civil society 
actors is based on ‘widespread belief’ in the justness of their causes. 
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experiences of southern actors, and of the most politically vulnerable stakeholders, in 
the construction of transnational development and campaign networks. 
 
In the transnational networks literature the main and often only objects of 
analysis within the networks are the northern actors, with southern 
perspectives being marginalised and only being of importance when they 
affect the legitimacy of northern actors. In this research southern NGOs 
only appear to be important when they make demands of northern NGOs. 
As such, northern experiences of participation in transnational networks 
are privileged over southern ones, which marginalises their agency. 
(Henry, Mohan and Yanacopulos 2004, p. 850) 
 
This is a valuable insight, and, accordingly, the experiences and perspectives 
of Malian civil society actors and stakeholders in transnational development and 
campaign networks are placed at the centre of this thesis, where they are considered 
in relation to their social, political, economic, ecological and cultural contexts. 
 
 
Civil society in Africa 
It is worth considering the context of civil society in Africa as one of the 
many contextual backgrounds to the transnational civil society interactions examined 
in this thesis. The view taken in this thesis is that there are commonalities between 
civil society contexts across Africa, but that is not to say that there is an inherently 
‘African’ form of civil society. Rather, civil society develops in Africa, much as 
Tarrow (1996) and Fox (1996) argue it does elsewhere, through the dynamic 
interaction of state, society and market forces; there are, in turn, similarities between 
these ‘ingredients’ in the civil society mix across African contexts. However, 
similarities do not give grounds for cultural determinism, which overlooks the 
explanatory power of agency. 
The end of the Cold War sparked a wave of democratisation across much of 
the African continent. Between 1990 and 1994 democratic elections were held in 
thirteen African countries for the first time since independence (Makumbe 1998, p. 
310). The fall of the Soviet bloc stemmed the flow of resources to client states in 
Africa that were already suffering under austerity measures associated with structural 
adjustment. Popular discontent increased whilst the resources that states had at their 
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disposal to feed patron–client networks diminished.16 Witnessing revolutions in 
Eastern Europe and sensing the international climate of support for democratisation17 
gave further impetus to African civil society groups, many of which had been 
mobilising clandestinely under conditions of repression.  
The use of ‘civil society’ as a rallying cry and as a mobilising strategy in the 
democratic revolution lends weight to an approach to thinking about civil society in 
African contexts which David Lewis terms, ‘prescriptive universalism’ (Lewis 2002, 
p. 575): ‘The idea that civil society in Africa is a “good thing” which needs to be 
encouraged and “built”.’ However, over the last two decades, the optimism of the 
early 1990s has been replaced by disappointment as civil society in Africa has not 
developed in the way expected by prescriptive universalists. J. W. Makumbe 
identifies common weaknesses among African civil society organisations as (i) lack 
of autonomy from the state or from foreign donors; (ii) lack of internal democratic 
culture and embeddedness in patron–client relations; and (iii) lack of information and 
experience due in part to the jealous guarding of knowledge as power by ruling elites 
(Makumbe 1998, pp. 311–312). These observations give rise to the approach that 
Lewis terms, ‘Western exceptionalism’, which suggests that the very concept of civil 
society is irrelevant in African contexts and that it is yet another inappropriate import 
(Lewis 2002, p. 576). Makumbe sees the explanation for the weaknesses he identifies 
in civil society as deriving partly from a history of authoritarian colonial and 
postcolonial regimes in Africa. 
One line of argument associated with the Western exceptionalism approach is 
that power in Africa has long derived from entities external to the state, and that the 
external locus of power contributes to a false dichotomy between state and society, 
since ‘the state’ is but an empty shell (Lewis, 2002, p. 577). The constrained policy-
making environment that arises from relationships of aid dependence limits debate, 
undermining effective democracy and vibrant civil society. The deficit of sovereign 
power is further replicated in civil society relations, through the predominance of 
                                                        
16 For a description of this process in Mali, see Fay (1995, p. 22). 
17 In the case of francophone African countries, French President Mitterrand finally turned the tide in 
favour of democratisation with his address at the Franco-African summit at La Baule in June 1990, 
following a number of corruption scandals that had unveiled the patrimonial relations through which 
the French ruling elite had been keeping authoritarian African heads of state in power (Robinson 
1996, pp. 588–589). 
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foreign NGOs. Yet external influence is also a significant channel through which 
civil society in Africa is being encouraged and ‘built’, as called for by the 
‘prescriptive universalism’ approach, notably through the ‘good governance agenda’ 
imposed by multilateral donors. Thus, it is not only external influence that moulds 
civil society in Africa, but internal political processes through which power derived 
from external sources is translated and transformed. There are parallels between this 
argument and the critique of deconstructive approaches to development outlined in 
the previous section, which emphasises the agency of African actors in addition to 
that of foreign donors. 
Another approach that gives over-riding significance to the external origins of 
influence on civil society in Africa asserts that the very concept of civil society was 
introduced to African contexts through the ‘civilising mission’ of colonialism (Lewis 
2002, pp. 580–581). Mamdani (1996) argues that the current debate over civil 
society replays old, unhelpful dichotomies of citizen and subject (Lewis 2002, p. 
581). Thus, the very term, ‘civil society’ is misleading and should be put aside in 
favour of a broader analysis of democracy and politics in historical context, 
according to this ‘wrong question’ thesis (loc. cit.). As do deconstructivist critiques 
of development, discussed in the previous section, the ‘wrong question’ thesis 
attributes too much causal power to discourse, ignoring the agency of actors. It can 
be adapted, nonetheless, to draw attention to how actors employ the discourse of 
civil society to legitimise Western organisational forms of civil society, for example, 
trade unions, over more indigenous forms, for example, age-sets. However, the 
reality is more complex than the frame of a citizen/subject divide would suggest, not 
least because of processes of hybridisation, whereby age-sets are bureaucratised18 
and trade unions are infused with clientalism. Furthermore, while discourses and 
organisational forms derived from the former colonial power continue to be 
mobilised, certain other discourses are employed in a similarly powerful way to 
legitimise and delegitimise, for example, that of Islam in West Africa.19 A broader 
analysis of democracy and politics in historical context as called for by the ‘wrong 
                                                        
18 For example, Crewe and Harrison (1998, p. 166) note the stress on bureaucratic organisation in 
village groups in Luapula, Zambia, which they assert derives ‘from outside influences such as the 
government and aid organizations, and … has now been internalized as a key part of village life – for 
some.’ 
19 See, for example, Rosander (1996). 
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question thesis’ is certainly warranted, but civil society is very much a feature of the 
empirical landscape in Africa – organisations self-identify as ‘civil society’ – so the 
concept cannot be set aside.  
Turning now to arguments that focus on endogenous influences on civil 
society in Africa, a pessimistic view is put forward by the Western exceptionalism 
approach, while an optimistic view is associated with the approach identified by 
Lewis (2002) as ‘adaptive prescription’ (p. 578). The pessimistic approach is 
adopted, for example, by Chabal and Daloz (1999) who regard African societies as 
inherently too deeply divided to develop civil societies. These authors assert that 
there is a distinct lack of horizontal solidarity in African societies, which are 
‘essentially plural, fragmented and, above all, organized along vertical lines’ notably 
those of patron–client networks (1999, p. 20). However, Peter Gibbon (2001, p. 838) 
identifies age-sets, a clear example of horizontally-organised association, as one of 
the ‘remarkably resilient historical phenomena’ that comprise the core of Tanzanian 
civil society. The ‘adaptive prescription’ approach suggests that there are indigenous 
forms of civil society in Africa that tend to be ignored by authors sticking too rigidly 
to Western notions of civil society. Comaroff and Comaroff (1999) point to 
‘“uncool” forms of African association’: kin-based, ethnic or religious groups, 
‘tradition’, and ‘customary’ styles of popular critique (p. 22). Similarly, in his quest 
to identify African civil society, Stephen Orvis (2001) points to liberal democratic 
values but also to ‘moral ethnicity’, patron–client networks, self-help and ethnic 
associations, and traditional authorities. So, whereas Chabal and Daloz (1999) view 
patron–client networks as antithetical to civil society, Orvis (2001, p. 27) considers 
their potential as an indigenous civil society institution: ‘Strong but imprecise norms 
demand that patrons provide essential resources to clients when needed, while clients 
provide loyalty and support to patrons as asked.’ Linking people from different strata 
of society in webs of (albeit unequal) reciprocity, patron–client relationships may be 
both hierarchical and levelling. 
A potential pitfall of the ‘adaptive prescription’ approach is cultural 
relativism (Lewis 2002, p. 580). If the term ‘civil society’ is not to be rendered 
meaningless, it will be important to critically examine Western concepts of civil 
society together with non-Western forms and norms in their proper contexts. This 




Transnational civil society and African contexts: theoretical challenges 
30 
means posing the sort of question posed by J.-F. Bayart (1986), who asks with 
reference to West African traditions of griotism, ‘What does freedom of speech 
imply where political expression was previously entrusted to designated orators who 
could control such a cosmic, dangerous power?’ (p. 123). Western Enlightenment 
concepts of civil society are predicated on the notion of individual liberty as a 
prerequisite for voluntary association. In Africa, society is anything but a ‘society of 
strangers’, the prospect of which prompted Adam Smith and his contemporaries to 
re-imagine civil society for the age of industrial capitalism in Europe (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1999, p. 11). It is far from clear that Western societies have ever reached 
this feared extreme of individualism, but it is easy to see why the prevalence of 
lineage groups and social networks in Africa is viewed either an alternative form of 
civil society or as making Western-style civil society superfluous.  
The principle of liberty may have even weaker roots in African cultures than 
does individualism. Political opposition has been widely regarded as divisive and un-
African in character, but this view that has been tainted by experience of single party 
regimes in Africa (Olukoshi 1998, p. 19). The notion of governance by consensus, if 
it is achieved through dialogue, is akin to classical notions of civil society. 
Contemporary Western conceptualisations of civil society, however, highlight the 
need for an independent watchdog to ensure that norms of good governance are 
adhered to. Thus, while the associative function of civil society may be well catered 
for in African society, it is the function of independent critique of government that is 
lacking in Africa. 
Although association in Africa takes both vertical and horizontal forms, the 
combination of strong association and weak independence nonetheless casts doubt on 
the neo-Tocquevillian view of civil society (for example, Putnam 1993; 1995) which 
assumes a causal link between horizontal association and democratic governance. 
Chabal and Daloz (1999) go so far as to argue that due to the strength of societal ties, 
it is the state which lacks independence from society in Africa, rather than the 
reverse. 
 
However arbitrary, violent or even criminal, state coercion on the 
continent has rarely been such as to make totalitarianism a realistic 
option. We would argue that, if anything, the very reverse has occurred: 
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it is the state which has been ‘captured’ by society. […] what needs to be 
stressed are the linkages between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics, between the 
political elites and their clientalistic networks throughout society. 
(Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 26) 
 
The question that then arises is whether the lack of independence is an 
inherent feature of African society and politics. The Western exceptionalism 
approach would concur that it is. Although it points to some important considerations 
for empirical study of civil society in African contexts, this approach is overly 
deterministic.  
In his critique of Robert Putnam’s (1993) study of civil society and 
democracy in Italy, Tarrow (1996) argues that in viewing weak civil society as a 
feature of political culture and a cause of low civic capacity in southern Italy, 
Putnam overlooks the role of state agency in the formation and erosion of social 
capital. Applying this insight to Africa draws attention to the agency of political 
actors in mobilising cultural norms around ‘consensus’ and ‘unity’ to legitimise the 
dominance of single parties and the suppression of pluralist forms of democracy. The 
focus on state agency would seem to be in tension, however, with the rejection, 
prevalent in the literature, of a clear state/society dichotomy in Africa. In his study of 
civil society in Mexico, Fox (1996) widens Tarrow’s analysis to take account of 
interactive ‘processes of mutual influence between state and society’ (Fox 1996, p. 
1090). Thus, civil society is viewed as a product of dynamic interaction between 
state, society – and, it might be added, market – actors in the context of structural 
forces: ‘in contrast to the predetermination inherent in Putnam’s explanation of 
social capital accumulation[,] historical legacies are woven deeply into social fabrics, 
but those imprints are not necessarily fixed by history’ (Fox 1996, p. 1098). 
Literature on peasant resistance and participatory development is particularly 
useful for understanding interactions between actors in the state and in society in 
authoritarian and repressive contexts. Drawing on the work of Freire (1970) and 
Scott (1986; 1990), Gaventa and Cornwall (2001) note that ‘relatively powerless 
groups may simply speak in a way that “echoes” the voices of the powerful, either as 
a conscious way of appearing to comply or as a result of the internalization of 
dominant views and values’ (p. 75). Building on these insights, Allen Isaacman 
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(1993, p. 208) suggests that the tendency for peasants to engage in hidden or 
localized rather than open and collective forms of resistance is explained by their 
partial autonomy, in the sense of their access to the means of production and of 
subsistence, but also by their limited power. Chin and Mittelman (1997) build on 
Scott’s (1990) analysis in order to better understand actors’ differing responses to 
apparently similar situations in the context of resistance to globalisation. Whereas 
Scott focused on class structures, Chin and Mittelman seek to take full, 
contextualised account of the culturally-embedded nature of resistance. 
 
Gramsci reminded us that subaltern identities are embedded in complex 
overlapping social networks in which individuals simultaneously assume 
positions of domination and subordination (perhaps as a husband or wife, 
an elder or junior, a manager or office clerk, and a donor or recipient of 
aid). Analysis of the manner in which particular combinations of identity 
are expressed in the context of structural constraints can help explain 
why, given systems of surveillance (in which rewards and punishments 
inhere), some conform while others engage in infrapolitical activities of 
different types. (Chin and Mittelman 1997, pp. 32–33) 
 
While the emphasis in most of the literature has been on identifying and 
explaining either compliance or passive forms of resistance, less attention has been 
paid to the conditions under which rural populations have participated openly in 
contentious political action. Fox (1996, p. 1091) argues that alongside passive 
resistance and compliance, authoritarian contexts can also provoke the intensification 
of assertive resistance: ‘repression cuts both ways, simultaneously facilitating 
collective action by sharpening the “us” vs. “them” distinction, while increasing the 
price to be paid for it.’ This would seem particularly likely where ‘exit’ strategies 
(Hirschman 1970) are not readily open to the actors concerned. Thus, in varying 
ways, actors’ multiple subjectivities combined with structural power relations affect 
the choices they make over whether and how to engage politically, and, in turn, 
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Civil society in Mali 
Mali was one of the thirteen African countries that made the transition to 
democracy during the early 1990s. Popular revolt began in 1990, led by civil society 
groups (including the Association of Students and Pupils of Mali, the Mali Bar 
Association of lawyers, and the single national trade union) (Nzouankeu 1993). 
Internal strife deepened until March 1991, when army colonel, Amadou Toumani 
Touré, overthrew the incumbent president, Moussa Traoré, in a coup d’état. Touré 
handed over power to a mixed military and civilian committee to oversee the 
transition to democracy; for this, he was lauded internationally as a ‘soldier of 
democracy’. In 1992, Alpha Oumar Konaré, an academic and promoter of free 
media, arts and culture,20 was elected president. During his two terms in office, 
President Konaré sought to develop deliberative democracy21 in Mali, based on 
promotion of dialogue and freedom of speech (Wing 2008).22 His attempts were 
plagued, however, by the effects of economic crisis, structural adjustment and 
internal corruption. Amadou Toumani Touré returned to power as a civilian in 
democratic elections in 2002. His regime, driven by ‘consensus politics’, was ended 
abruptly – just weeks before elections at which he was due to step down – by the 
military coup d’état of March 2012. President Touré’s version of consensus-making 
overlooked the significance of the means through which consensus is achieved and 
legitimated, and it extended to his management of civil society: ‘Independent of 
political affiliation, ATT [President Touré] successfully silenced civil society with 
the merest hint of the prospect of a lucrative government post’ (Wing 2008, p. 103). 
Fieldwork research for this thesis was conducted in Mali under Touré’s presidency, 
when the slow rot of Mali’s civil society was underway. 
Whether through clientalism or liberal-democratic methods, Malian civil 
society is very effective at collaborating in governance and, to a lesser extent, at 
                                                        
20 Konaré had briefly occupied a government post under Moussa Traoré, as Minister of Youth, Sports, 
Arts and Culture from which he resigned in 1980. In 1983 he founded a culture and media 
cooperative, Jamana. Its quarterly cultural review was Mali’s first independent journal of the post-
colonial era. The co-operative began publishing an independent newspaper, Les Echos, in 1989. See 
www.jamana.org. 
21 For more on the concept of deliberative democracy, see Cohen (1989). 
22 Examples include the Éspace d’Interpellation Democratique (EID), created in 1994 as an annual 
event for citizens to publicly question their government representatives with the oversight of a jury 
(Wing 2008, pp. 125–126). 
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advocacy (Togola and Gerber 2007).23 In their evaluation of Malian civil society’s 
role in governance, however, Togola and Gerber (2007) argue that ‘The weakest area 
for civil society has been in the role of a watchdog over government’ (p. 9, original 
emphasis). In Mali, the lack of independence of civil society can be accounted for by 
a combination of factors, including both cultural norms, such as the role of religion 
in society, and the agency of state actors who have mobilised cultural ideas and 
symbols, such as ‘consensus’, for political gain.  
In Mali, the principles of collectivism and paternalism – on which kin 
relations are based – inspire horizontal and vertical forms of solidarity in social and 
political life. The population of Mali’s cotton zone belong mostly to the Mandé 
group of ethnically and linguistically linked peoples, which stretches across West 
Africa. Around Sikasso and Koutiala, there are large Minyanka populations: a 
northern-Senufo language family, which has relatives in northern Côte d’Ivoire, and 
there are also Fula minorities throughout the cotton zone. Individualist tensions 
within the patriarchal gerontocratic (fasiya) kin system would seem to be represented 
in the Mandé culture hero – an ambitious person who rises to power outside of the 
fasiya-based authority structure by garnering popular support through patron–client 
relations (Johnson 1999, p. 17) – and are supposedly diffused through the horizontal 
associations of age-sets, which unite to form a village-wide tòn, and, in particular, of 
hunter-gatherer societies (donso-tòn), which are based internally on the principle of 
equality. In contrast to other African contexts, where they are conceived as intra-
ethnic,24 patron–client relations in Mali often bridge ethnic divides.25 Thus, they do 
not necessarily lead to ‘political tribalism’ (contra. Lonsdale 1994). They do, 
nonetheless, blur the boundaries between state and society, and seriously undermine 
the independence of civil society. Historical attempts to scale up horizontal 
                                                        
23 Mali has a large number of non-governmental organisations of local, national and international 
varieties. The Conseil de Concertation et d’Appui (CCA-ONG) co-ordinates national and international 
NGOs since the droughts of 1983–1984. The CCA-ONG comes together with the national collective 
of women’s groups and with several regional coordinating committees of local NGOs under the more 
recently established Fédération des Collectifs d’ONG (FECONG). 
24 Note, for example, Orvis’ assertion that ‘clientalist ties across ethnic boundaries are rare’ (2001, p. 
28). 
25 Egalitarian Bamana ideology discourages the development of patron–client relationships (including 
wage employment) among freeborn Bamana, whereas such relationships are regarded as appropriate 
between Bamana and their pastoralist FulBe neighbours (Toulmin 1992, Appendix, pp. 282–283).  
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solidarity, on the other hand, have been accompanied by authoritarianism and 
tyranny.26 
It is only since the spread of capitalism, beginning in the late colonial era, 
that individualism has begun to pose a serious challenge to the principle of the 
supremacy of the corporate group. Capitalism’s uneven penetration of the Malian 
economy leaves in its wake a mixture of social logics, creating tensions based on 
incompatible forms of social capital. The introduction of village associations 
(chapter three) and producer co-operatives (chapter seven) are prime examples of 
this phenomenon. Whereas these and other Western forms of civil society are 
theoretically based on the principle of individual liberty, in Mali they, and the state–
society relations through which they have been introduced, are infused with patron–
client relations. Alexis Roy (2010a) underlines the prevalence clientalism in his 
analysis of farmer representation in Mali. 
 
Clientelism and corruption, which more often than not characterise the 
exercise of power in Africa, are modes of political regulation that 
transcend the categories and lead to the conclusion that whoever is 
holding the reins of power – the state via its officials, peasants via their 
representatives, or even traders and the market – uses pretty much the 
same mechanisms. (Roy 2010a, pp. 311–312) 
 
Roy’s analysis is characteristic of the ‘Western exceptionalism’ approach 
(Lewis 2002) to civil society in Africa. It highlights a significant empirical 
phenomenon in contemporary civil society in Mali, but it misses less obvious 
phenomena and it obscures more subtle analysis that might explain how and why 
clientalism has become so pervasive. 
Prospects for democratic governance in Mali have suffered from selective 
interpretations of the principle of government by consensus. According to social 
norms in Mali, open conflict is deplored, but that does not mean that debate is 
closed; rather, peaceful negotiation and conflict resolution are prized. Processes of 
                                                        
26 For example, a veritable revolution occurred c.1712 when the tòn in Segu rebelled against the 
elders. It stopped providing agricultural labour and extracted a surplus from the population by force, 
leading to the rise of the Bamana Fanga (empire) of Segu (Djata 1997; Roberts 1987). Two centuries 
later, the postcolonial socialist regime of Modibo Keita (1960–1968) attempted to base its rural 
development policy on the same egalitarian institution of the tòn. Young men were encouraged to 
liberate themselves from the authority of the elders through the ‘Mali tòn’ (Jonckers 1994, p. 124), as 
the grassroots base of the single party state. 
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negotiation between equals and unanimous acceptance of executive decisions are all 
facilitated by appeal to the Mandé virtue of sabali (moderation), which encourages a 
person to give up his position for the sake of accommodation (Traoré 2004, p. 102). 
The chief’s word is final, however, not because his individual opinion carries more 
weight but because it is his responsibility to take account of all the opinions that are 
expressed and he is trusted to represent as best he can the overall interests of the 
corporate group. 
In the Mandé belief system, independent oversight over government is 
provided by the spiritual realm. Not only has Mali adopted the French republican 
tradition of laïcité, but pre-Islamic Mandé religion is traditionally separated from 
political affairs (Dieterlen et al. 1992, pp. 67–70).27 The separation of powers is 
currently being challenged by Islamist movements,28 but the notion that the 
primordial spirit world is an important source of legitimacy for political authority has 
deep roots in Malian society.29 Connections between the two realms are facilitated by 
nyamakalaw, notably the jeliw (griots, bards), who are entrusted with the duty to 
speak truth to power, and by donsow (hunter-gatherers), whose responsibilities 
include inter-village diplomacy (Jansen 2008). Because the former groups depend for 
their livelihoods on cliental relationships to their patrons, donsoya is the more 
influential institution for political legitimacy or sanction.30 Despite a cursory attempt 
by President Konaré to bring it into the national political domain in Mali (Traoré 
2004), Mandé religion has been discredited as backward and un-Islamic, while it has 
not been effectively replaced in its function of independent oversight over 
governance. 
                                                        
27 In present day Mandé villages, the chiefly function of ritual ‘earth-master’ (dugu-kolo-tigi) is 
distinct from that of village political chief (dugu-tigi) (Johnson 1999, p. 12; Tag 1994, p. 77). The 
separation of powers rests on a distinction between nature (the realm of untamed spirits) and culture 
(the domain of order and authority) (Jansen 2008).  
28 Not only by jihadist groups in the North of Mali, but also by some Muslim groups in Bamako, as 
became evident during the 2009 controversy over the family law code 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8223966.stm; www.wluml.org/node/7103; 
www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=85676 consulted on 15/08/11). 
29 See Johnson (1999) for more on the Mandé belief system. 
30 Note, for example, the use of donso symbolism by the leader of the 2012 coup d’état 
(http://bamakobruce.wordpress.com/2012/03/24/amadou-sanogo-power-is-his-middle-name/ 
consulted on 24/03/12). Furthermore, a contemporary genre of Mandé music, called Wassoulou, uses 
the instruments and styles of the donso priest-bard. Wassoulou performers, calling themselves konow 
(birds), claim ‘a “bird’s eye” view of society, allowing them to comment on social issues in “freer” 
musical and textual ways than those of the jeliw’ (Dúran 1995, p. 105). 









This chapter has shown that transnational civil society action must be 
considered in relation to the multi-level contexts through which it flows, and, in 
particular, in relation to the local arenas through which it claims to derive much of its 
legitimacy. Actors in transnational networks are not rootless global citizens, but have 
multiple subjectivities shaped by the political, economic, social, cultural and 
historical contexts in which they are embedded. This is not to suggest that actors are 
not in some ways transformed through their cross-border interactions, as Keck and 
Sikkink (1998) suggest they are, but that they come to these interactions with a 
certain level of ‘baggage’, and that overt or covert forms of contestation between 
actors often ensue, and sometimes they simply talk at cross-purposes. 
Henry, Mohan and Yanacopulos (2004) argue that there has been insufficient 
attention paid in the literature to how power operates and how values are negotiated 
and contested within transnational development networks – a gap that this thesis 
helps to fill – but the ‘instrument effects’ of transnational campaigns and advocacy 
networks have received even less attention. Non-normative approaches to analysing 
transnational interventions are useful for explaining how these processes take place 
in practice, but they underestimate the significance of overall patterns of unequal 
power. These power inequalities are particularly relevant to issues of legitimacy, 
conceived as a social construct (Lister 2003), and of accountability, conceived as 
political responsibility to the most vulnerable stakeholders in the campaign or 
intervention (Jordan and van Tuijl 2000).  
The ways in which actors and beneficiaries participate or do not participate in 
transnational civil society action are conditioned by their multiple subjectivities, 
which are in turn connected to the particular civil society traditions with which they 
are linked. Civil society in Africa has developed – and been undermined – through 
the dynamic interaction of state, society and market forces, both endogenous and 
exogenous. In contemporary Mali, this interaction has produced a civil society that 
tends towards collaboration in governance and is weakest in its role as an 
independent watchdog over the state and capital (Togola and Gerber 2007). This 
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model is not uniform, however; Fox (1996) reminds us that repression provokes 
militantism among some actors, while hidden forms of resistance should not be 
mistaken for acquiescence (Scott 1990) – nor is it predetermined: genuine consensus 
based on dialogue remains a cultural norm. The challenge mounted in this thesis is to 
identify and analyse the dynamic interaction between actors in Mali and in 
transnational civil society.
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Chapter three 
Malian farmers and cotton in the world 





Cotton, perhaps more than any other commodity, shows up the imbalances of 
global economics and politics: rich countries press for liberalisation of African 
cotton sectors while practising protectionism with regards to their own. 
Liberalisation and privatisation of African cotton sectors have been pushed by the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund through structural adjustment 
policies and through the initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC); an 
initiative that was, ironically, the response of these institutions to the transnational 
anti-debt campaign. Joseph E. Stiglitz (2008) blames the biases of the international 
financial institutions on a lack of democracy in global governance. Public opposition 
to liberal reform of Mali’s cotton sector is the subject of chapter five; while US and 
EU cotton subsidies became the target of a transnational campaign, which is 
examined in chapter six. This chapter sketches the national and international 
economic, political and historical contexts in which these civil society responses are 
situated. In so doing, this chapter outlines the structure of the global cotton value 
chain in which Malian producers participate, and which is the setting for the 
international NGO advocacy and ‘capacity building’ interventions examined in 
chapter seven. As argued in chapter two, understanding these contexts is essential to 
understanding the perspectives of actors and stakeholders in the transnational civil 
society networks examined in this thesis. 
Raymond C. Miller (2008) cites the US cotton subsidy regime as a prime 
example of contemporary neo-mercantilism, demonstrating that the global market is 
not a free market. Questions that arise in the literature in connection to this issue 
include whether the elimination of subsidies would really increase the revenues of 
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cotton-producing African countries, given that there are other factors affecting the 
world cotton market, and whether any revenue increases would trickle down to the 
producers themselves. Koray Caliskan’s (2010) multi-sited ethnography of the global 
cotton trade demonstrates how actual cotton prices are realised through unequal 
power relations between market actors, and how farmers in Turkey and Egypt are 
excluded from this process. Another important question is whether the issue of 
cotton subsidies can be dealt with effectively through the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) process. Pascal Lamy, speaking in his capacity as Director-General of the 
WTO in 2008, commented that ‘cotton has become a litmus test of the commitment 
to make the WTO Doha Round of global trade negotiations a truly development 
round’.31  
The absence of a ‘level playing field’ is one reason to question the wisdom of 
the policy of liberalising and privatising African cotton sectors, but it is not the only 
reason. Some of the challenges to successful implementation of liberal reform appear 
to be integral to the nature of cotton as a commodity, especially in the context of 
resource-poor farmers. In his study of the impacts of privatisation on cotton sectors 
in sub-Saharan Africa, Michel Fok (2001) argues that we should take a look back at 
the history of cotton in Africa to see why the free market does not seem to work well 
in the case of African cotton sectors. He asserts that government regulation arose as a 
response to the failure of free trade (Fok 2001, p. 21). 
In fact, in the territory that is now Mali, a free market in cotton did function 
very successfully prior to government regulation. But it was not oriented towards the 
export of raw cotton; rather, it consisted in local and regional trade of surplus hand-
ginned and hand-spun cotton, which fed a vibrant handicraft textile industry (Roberts 
1996; Bassett 2001). For much of the colonial era, Malian peasants resisted pressure 
to expand cotton production, seeming to realise, as did Allen Isaacman et al.’s (1980) 
informants in Mozambique, that ‘cotton is the mother of poverty’, because it earned 
little while holding back production of food crops (Isaacman et al. 1980, p. 594). 
Colonial government involvement in the West African cotton trade aimed at 
increasing the volume of cotton produced, but also at re-orienting cotton production 
                                                        
31 Speech at the UNCTAD High Level Multi Stakeholder Meeting on Cotton in Geneva on 2 
December 2008. www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl110_e.htm consulted on 11/05/11. 
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and trade towards the export market. Acknowledging the legacy of the historic shift 
in the structure of long-distance trade from overland to sea routes, especially for 
land-locked African countries like Mali, Thomas Lines (2008) advocates an end to 
the policy of export orientation for the world’s least developed countries, together 
with a re-orientation towards domestic and regional markets and support for 
domestic food production.32 
R. James Bingen (1998, p. 275) argues that given the intensity of intervention 
and strict discipline needed to produce it on industrial levels in West Africa, cotton 
‘fosters the development of a consciousness among peasants roughly comparable to 
that more commonly found among factory workers’. However, the integration of the 
peasantry in the cotton economy has not been uniform. In cultivating ‘loyalty’ 
strategies among producers (cf. Hirschman 1970), the State and the cotton company 
have carried over a colonial attitude of paternalism towards farmers, which has 
evolved into patron–client relations in the case of producers who have challenged the 
authorities – or repression in the case of the few who have refused to be co-opted. A 
cotton-farming elite has emerged, which identifies more closely with the interests of 
the cotton company than with the majority of smallholders, and which has mirrored 
the corrupt practices of the company (Roy 2010a). 
The main argument of this chapter is that the crux of the problem for African 
cotton in the world economy lies in the export orientation of agricultural production 
and in the power-based nature of the world trade system. Malian farmers have 
become entrenched as producers at the bottom of the global cotton value chain 
through a combination of colonial and post-colonial government intervention, 
tensions within the lineage-based system of subsistence farming, and the tying of 
state-led rural development, including support for subsistence crops, to the cotton 
system. The socio-economic and political differentiation of the peasantry that has 
accompanied this process are elements of the explanation for the heterogeneity of 
farmers’ perspectives on, and participation in, contentious political action around 
liberal reform of the Malian cotton sector and rich country cotton subsidies. 
                                                        
32 Similarly, Toulmin and Guèye (2003, p. 59) question export orientation, and recommend adding 
value through processing and re-orienting trade towards regional markets. 
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The first section of this chapter details the development of cotton commodity 
production in Mali. The second section traces the recent history of cotton in Mali, 
from agronomic success to the emergence of a peasant movement and the decline of 
the cotton parastatal. The third section outlines the background to liberal reform of 
cotton sectors in African countries, including Mali, and highlights the main 
challenges that have emerged since. The final section looks at the controversy over 
cotton subsidies that became a major focus of the Doha Round of World Trade 
Organization (WTO) negotiations. 
 
 
The development of export-oriented cotton production in Mali 
The global cotton value chain developed in tandem with European 
colonisation, which to some extent is reflected in the structure of trade today. The 
world market in cotton lint33 expanded rapidly in the late eighteenth century, 
following the mechanisation of textile production in Europe (Roberts 1996, pp. 45–
51). The vast majority of cotton supplies to Britain in the first half of the nineteenth 
century came from the southern states of America, where it was grown on slave 
plantations. In 1860, America accounted for ninety-three percent of France’s cotton 
supply. The American Civil War, from 1861 to 1865, cut off supplies of raw cotton 
to Europe, where the impact began to be felt in 1862. Cotton imports from America 
gradually resumed after the War,34 but the experience of disrupted supplies led to the 
development of a futures market in cotton, and to the establishment of cotton 
                                                        
33 Cotton is a plant of the Gossipium genus. When it reaches maturity, it produces capsules of seeds 
surrounded by fibres. The capsule is called a ‘boll’. G. hirsutum, commonly called Upland cotton, is 
by far the most widely cultivated variety of cotton in the world today. The most highly valued cottons, 
including Egyptian, Sea Island and Pima cottons, are of the G. barbadense variety, which grows well 
only in optimal climatic conditions. When raw cotton is picked, it contains seeds and bits of debris 
(dry leaves, etc). It is called, ‘seed cotton’. The cotton is then ginned, a process that removes the seeds 
and debris from the cotton fibre, called lint. The seeds that are removed may be used to sow another 
crop, to conduct research and development of cotton varieties, to produce fodder for livestock, or to 
make cottonseed oil for use in the manufacture of various products including vegetable oil, soap and 
photographic film (source: www.cotton.org/pubs/cottoncounts/fieldtofabric/cottonseed.cfm consulted 
on 09/03/11). Cotton lint is spun into yarn, which is then woven to make textiles. It also has medical 
and cosmetic uses in the form of ‘cotton wool’. Only ginned cotton lint, not seed cotton, is traded on 
world markets; this gives ginning a pivotal role in the cotton commodity chain (Larsen 2002, p. 191). 
34 Slavery was abolished and small farms largely replaced plantations. 
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exchanges in Liverpool and New York (May and Lege 1999, p. 91).35 It also 
prompted European powers to seek to develop their colonies as alternative sources of 
raw cotton. 
On seeing cotton grown throughout the Savannah region, the colonial rulers 
of French West Africa initially thought that it would be relatively simple to supply 
the metropolitan textile industry with cotton from these territories (Roberts 1996). In 
the nineteenth century, the French first elaborated and attempted to implement their 
cotton development policy (la politique cotonnière) in Senegal, without success. The 
policy was revived in 1897 with the new colony of French Soudan36 (Mali) as its 
focus, but based on the same (misguided) assumptions that peasants would readily 
expand production and that the export trade would offer an attractive market for 
West African cotton. 
Historically, cotton was grown in West Africa mainly by peasants as part of 
subsistence farming, in which lineage was a significant factor in structuring the 
organisation of labour, control over the means of production, and the distribution of 
produce.37 Before the development of peasant cash crop agriculture, households 
produced cotton primarily to make their own clothing and blankets through the 
reciprocal labour of men and women. Cotton was grown interspersed with food 
crops.38 Women did the laborious tasks of ginning and spinning cotton by hand, then 
men wove it into long, narrow bands of cloth that they sewed into a pagne (wrap 
skirt), boubou (robe) or blanket (Roberts 1996, pp. 55–56). Hand-woven cotton was 
                                                        
35 Centres of cotton trade grew up in Liverpool, Le Havre, Bremen and Winterthur; locations which 
are among the hubs of global cotton trade today (Ruh 2005). 
36 The territory of contemporary Mali was part of the following French colonial administrative units: 
French Soudan territory 1890–1902; Senegambia and Niger 1902–1904; Upper Senegal and Niger 
1904–1920; French Soudan 1920–1958. Borders varied but not so as to affect the argument presented 
here. For simplicity, the term, French Soudan, is used to refer to the territory during the entire period 
of French colonisation. 
37 One might be tempted to refer here to the Structural Marxist notion of a lineage mode of 
production, but that would risk adding greater confusion than clarity, given the fierce debate over the 
interpretation of the concept (see Resch 1992 for a review of the works of E. Terray, P. Rey and C. 
Meillassoux on the topic) and its applicability to specific historical contexts (Geschiere 1985), as well 
as putting undue emphasis on structure over agency (Clarence-Smith 1985). On the other hand, 
Chaveau and Richards (2008) have incorporated apparently competing models of the lineage mode of 
production into their analysis of conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. Their work suggests 
possible avenues for future research on cotton farming in Mali, which would require a level of 
ethnographic depth that is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
38 Millet and sorghum in French Soudan (Mali) (Roberts 1996, p. 55); yams in northern Côte d’Ivoire 
(Bassett 2001, p. 58).  
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important in wedding and funeral rites.39 Domestic textile production did not incur 
much of an opportunity cost as it was a dry season activity, when very little 
agricultural work was possible (ibid., pp. 197–198). Roberts (1996, p. 197) 
hypothesises that peasants sold ‘normal surpluses’ of cotton but did not deliberately 
grow more than they needed to meet their domestic requirements. The sale of small 
quantities of surplus cotton was one way in which peasants participated in local and 
regional circuits of trade.40 
Commercial production and processing of cotton operated within West Africa 
alongside this subsistence-oriented system. Cotton cloth was exported from the 
Empire of Wagadu41 to Christendom as early as the twelfth century (Kea 2004, pp. 
768–769). In the nineteenth century, the Maraka in the Middle Niger Valley and the 
Jula in northern Côte d’Ivoire expanded regional trade in hand-woven cotton textiles 
through the use of slaves and plantation systems (Roberts 1996, pp. 57–58; Bassett 
2001, pp. 30–31). They used slaves to grow cotton; they allocated entire fields to 
cotton alone; they bought some cotton from peasants; they used slaves to spin, weave 
and dye cotton; and they sold textiles throughout the region.  
Slave plantations were limited to the Maraka and Jula, who specialised in 
trade, but slavery was widespread in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and 
operated alongside the family-based system of farming. Customarily, slaves were 
entitled to some free time and to small plots of land (jòn-forow; slave-field), which 
they could use to supplement their subsistence or to accumulate their own wealth.42 
                                                        
39 Bassett (2001, pp. 57–58) notes that in northern Côte d’Ivoire in the early colonial period, only 
handcrafted cloth was used for burial shrouds and other ritual purposes. According to Toulmin (1992, 
p. 238), in the village of Kala, north of Segu, in the contemporary era, wedding costs included kòòri-
songo, literally, ‘the price of cotton’, to the value of one or two sacks of raw cotton, which is paid by 
the fiancé’s family to the fiancée’s family. The cotton is spun by the women of the fiancée’s family, 
then woven by the men of the fiancé’s family into blankets and pagnes for the bride. In contemporary 
Mali, pagnes are given as gifts to the bride at her wedding: most consist of manufactured cloth, much 
of which is imported, but they traditionally include at least one article of hand-woven cotton offered 
by the fiancé’s family (fieldnotes, Bamako, February 2008). 
40 For example, in northern Côte d’Ivoire in the mid nineteenth century, Senufo farmers exchanged 
their surplus cotton with Jula traders for salt and kola nuts (Bassett 2001, p. 29). 
41 Also known as the Empire of Ghana, covering much of western, central and north-western present-
day Mali. 
42 According to Diarra (2010, p. 22), the Kurukan Fuga asserted that one is master of the slave but not 
of the slave’s property. Slaves had the right to work their own fields on two days out of seven 
(Roberts 1987, p. 187). Domestic slaves in northern Côte d’Ivoire were given food, housing, clothing, 
and spouses by their masters (Bassett 2001, pp. 96–97). They were entitled to cultivate individual 
fields and to engage in trade, but had to give up to one-fifth of their income to their masters. Slaves in 
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At the beginning of the twentieth century, plantation slaves complained that their 
masters were failing to guarantee their customary rights. In 1905, slaves of the 
Maraka plantations of Banamba ‘started a massive and spontaneous exodus of slaves 
that spread throughout the Western Sudan in ever-widening circles over the next ten 
years.’ (Roberts 1987, p. 184).43 Bassett (2001, pp. 96–97) notes, however, that 
domestic slaves were not liberated at this time. 
The expansion of the institution of slavery and the slave exodus ushered in a 
number of social and economic changes. There was an erosion of the gendered 
division of labour. On plantations, slave women were put to work on fields alongside 
men, sparking intense protest in 1895.44 Yet, when slaves left their masters en masse 
a decade later, men and women worked side-by-side in their own fields to ensure 
their survival (Roberts 1987, p. 198). A small free-labour market developed. Many of 
those who had worked as spinners and weavers for their masters used their skills to 
earn an independent income (Roberts 1987; 1996). Agricultural wage labour 
emerged as some former plantation owners hired peasant work parties to cultivate 
their land (Roberts 1987, p. 203). The organisation of production was further altered 
through the allocation of plots of land to individuals and sub-groups within the 
household. In many areas, these plots are called jònforo (slave field) or jònkani 
(slave’s share), indicating that the practice emerged out of slavery.45 This was a 
gradual change, however; both domestic slavery and lineage-based subsistence 
farming persisted for most of the colonial period. 
From 1897, French colonial authorities and the Association Cotonnière 
Coloniale (ACC), representing French textile industrialists, intervened in the French 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Maraka plantation system were fed by their masters on days when they worked for them, but on 
other days they had to fend for themselves. They cultivated their own plots to meet their additional 
subsistence needs, but they were also allowed to accumulate their own wealth from them (Roberts 
1987, pp. 123–125). 
43 French colonists initially resisted the application of the French law of 1848 on the abolition of 
slavery, fearing it would cripple the regional economy, but a 1903 reorganisation of the judiciary in 
French West Africa effectively abolished the legal underpinnings of slavery (Roberts 1987, pp. 174–
207).  
44 In Banamba in 1895, a group of slaves armed with hoes threatened their master in protest at his 
attempts to force a woman to work in the fields (Roberts 1987, p. 189). 
45 In the Bamana village of Soro, south-east of Bamako, fields cultivated by individuals or sub-groups 
within the household are called, jònforo, (Becker 1990, p. 317). Among Bamana-Minyanka (northern 
Senufo) communities in the Koutiala area, plots allocated to the dependants, juniors and women, are 
called jonkani “the slave’s share (Jonckers 1994, p. 123). In northern Côte d’Ivoire, the terms, 
jònforo, jònkani and jòngarri designate a private or individual field (Bassett 2001, p. xviii). 
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Soudan to develop cotton production to a level and a standard that would meet the 
demands of the textile industry and arouse the interests of French commerce.46 The 
fibres of indigenous varieties of cotton were too short for machines calibrated to the 
medium staple American strains that constituted the mainstay of the industry’s 
supply; while those New World varieties produced low yields in the Soudanese 
climate and were attacked by pests. Low prices offered in Le Havre for Soudanese 
cotton were compounded by the high costs of transporting the bulky commodity 
from the West African interior. Administrators and the ACC distributed imported 
seeds, built ginneries, and set up agronomic experimentation stations and farm 
schools to develop hybrid cotton varieties and to promote intensive farming methods. 
They also established cotton fairs to tighten control over quality by grading and 
weighing cotton.  
Under pressure from French commercial houses, the colonial authorities 
largely adhered to free market policies (Roberts 1996). Briefly in the 1920s, officials 
set minimum buying prices for seed cotton,47 but this intervention continued only in 
the case of the specially-developed Allen variety of cotton, which they sought to 
promote. By 1928, cotton sales outside of official markets were prohibited, but 
peasants continued to sell their surpluses to local traders that supplied the domestic 
handicraft textile industry. 
For peasants, the local market consistently offered higher prices than the 
export market and allowed them to add value by hand ginning, spinning and even 
weaving some of their cotton before selling it, while itinerant traders saved peasants 
the time and energy of carrying their harvests to central markets (Roberts 1996). The 
local market, which expanded further after ex-slaves set up as independent spinners 
and weavers, was far from saturated. Meanwhile, peasants remained unmotivated to 
increase their production of cotton: peasant households were generally self-
sufficient, social norms prioritised collective subsistence over individual 
accumulation, and resources were controlled by household heads, so imported 
manufactured goods, which were expensive, did little to motivate peasants to 
increase their disposable income (ibid.). Furthermore, processing cotton by hand 
                                                        
46 This section draws on Roberts (1996). 
47 ‘Seed cotton’ is the name given to cotton when it is picked, before it is ginned to remove the seeds. 
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added value to harvests during the under-productive dry season, but production of 
cotton competed with that of subsistence food crops for scarce labour during the 
short rainy season (June, July and August) (Roberts 1996, pp. 208–210).  
In 1924, the new governor of the Soudan, Jules Carde, introduced 
compulsory collective cotton fields that became known as the champ du 
commandant (the commander’s field) (Roberts 1996, pp. 172–177).48 He employed a 
discourse of paternalism to justify forcing peasants to expand cotton production,49 
and envisaged that each village would have a cotton field which would model 
‘scientific’ farming techniques, and on which all villagers would be required to work, 
with the profits shared equally among them. However, abuses were rife. French-
appointed canton chiefs who were involved in organising collective fields were 
accused of pocketing all of the proceeds (ibid.). The policy of collective fields met 
with strong resistance in Bamana communities, where it was antithetical to the 
principle of the autonomy of household heads.50 It was soon replaced, first by 
compulsory household cotton fields, and later by a system in which each household 
grew cotton on a contiguous plot on a large field area, to facilitate the work of a 
master-plougher.51 
Alongside rain-fed peasant production, French Soudan witnessed experiments 
with irrigated cotton during the colonial era. In the 1920s, two European 
concessionary companies operated irrigated cotton plantations, one in Segu district, 
the other near Timbuktu, in the North (Roberts 1996; van Beusekom 2002). As the 
free labour market was small, the companies relied on the administration to conscript 
labourers for them. This fell as a heavy burden on rural households, especially during 
the rainy season, and workers were poorly treated. In the 1930s, amid the Great 
Depression, one of the companies collapsed financially and an alternative method of 
labour recruitment – ‘indigenous colonisation’ – was developed. This approach was 
                                                        
48 In the Middle Niger Valley, this collective field was called faama foro, a reference to the fields of 
the rulers of the Bamana Empire of Segu, which were worked by their slaves.  
49 Carde was averse to brutal methods of forced labour prevalent in Côte d’Ivoire and Upper Volta 
(Roberts 1996, p. 148). Large scale out-migrations affected those colonies (Asiwaju 1976, p. 590).  
50 Collective cotton fields were more readily imposed on the Senufo of northern Côte d’Ivoire, among 
whom agricultural production was organised at the level of village residential quarters, inhabited by 
members of the same lineage (Bassett 2001, pp. 82, 98). 
51 This new form of compulsory cotton production nonetheless motivated out-migrations from the 
districts of Bamako and Bougouni in 1937 (Roberts 1996, p. 260).  
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used for a large scale irrigation project, the Office du Niger, which opened in central 
Soudan in 1932 (Roberts 1996; van Beusekom 2002).  
The Office du Niger was designed to yield cotton for export and rice for 
consumption in French West Africa (van Beusekom 2002). Yet, even Soudanese 
peasants who suffered disastrous harvests and increased taxes in the 1930s resisted 
resettlement on the irrigated lands, preferring to sell their assets and, as a last resort, 
migrate for seasonal work on plantations in neighbouring colonies.52 Many Office du 
Niger settlers were forcibly recruited and, once there, they were subjected to strict 
rules and close supervision, and were obliged to pay fees for the irrigation service. In 
1944, one thousand settlers in the Niono area threatened to leave the project en 
masse and return to their villages of origin (van Beusekom 2002, p. 159). In the same 
year, there was a shift in policy away from cotton and towards rice production at the 
Office, coinciding with farmers’ preferences.  
A major shift occurred at the end of World War II when, indebted to Africans 
who had fought with them, the Free French abolished forced labour (Roberts 1996; 
van Beusekom 2002). In the context of improvements in working conditions and 
deeper integration into the colonial economy, Soudanese peasants finally became 
interested in wage labour and commodity production. In 1947, discontented farmers 
at Nienebale did not threaten to leave, but instead exerted collective pressure on the 
Office du Niger to change policies and practices (van Beusekom 2002, pp. 160–161). 
These settlers cited the new social reforms in protest at the obligation to sell their 
produce to the Office, usually for less than the local market price. Meanwhile, 
increasing numbers of young men and descendants of domestic slaves migrated for 
employment on coffee and cocoa plantations (Bassett 2001, pp. 97–98). Young men 
left secretly without permission from elders, but were not reprimanded when they 
returned after six months or a year, having earned enough to buy a bicycle. Some 
colonial administrators sought to direct this capitalist spirit towards peasant cash 
crop production.  
From 1944, cotton policy was oriented towards rain-fed peasant production in 
Southern Mali (Roberts 1996; van Beusekom 2002). The Compagnie Française pour 
                                                        
52 For example, Toulmin (1992, pp. 25–26) recounts that villagers in Kala, not far from the Office 
lands, in the 1930s sold their livestock and gold, and as a last resort men undertook a month-long walk 
to the groundnut areas of Senegal to earn cash to pay taxes. 
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le Développement des Fibres Textiles (CFDT), a joint venture between the French 
State and private textile interests, began intervening in West Africa in 1952.53 Post-
war structural funding for colonial development was used to accelerate cotton 
research and development, and led to the creation of the CFDT system (Bassett 2001, 
pp. 90–91; Roberts 1996, p. 280). The CFDT system is a ‘vertically integrated 
system’, involving all stages from research through production and processing to 
marketing of cotton lint. In the 1950s, the CFDT penetrated peasant agriculture more 
deeply than ever before through African extension agents and propaganda-style 
promotion of ‘scientific’ agricultural techniques, including the use of pesticides, a 
development which encouraged mono-cropping (Bassett 2001, pp. 92–94).  
After Independence in 1960, Mali’s first president, Modibo Keita, injected 
renewed vigour into the policy of export-oriented cotton production, as part of a 
socialist model of economic development. Rather than risk losing the CFDT’s 
investment capital and its technical expertise, independent West African 
governments granted the CFDT a monopsony on buying peasant cotton, ‘Under the 
paternalistic guise of protecting the cotton growers from the unscrupulous Jula 
[traders] and at the same time preserving seed quality in the name of “development”’ 
(Bassett 2001, p. 176, referring to Côte d’Ivoire). Thus, the circle was closed: 
farmers who grew cotton were locked into the CFDT system, which provided seeds, 
fertiliser and other inputs, then bought the harvested seed cotton and ginned it, 
thereby controlling the circulation of new seed. 
CFDT extension agents in the 1960s persuaded West African peasants to 
grow cotton using methods similar to those employed by colonial administrators, in 
particular, targeting young men whom they recruited to plant cotton in individual 
demonstration plots, paying them directly for their harvests with a wad of cash 
(Bassett 2001, pp. 108–111). The proliferation of fields controlled by individuals or 
sub-groups within the household is associated with cash cropping and, as mentioned 
above, the precedent for this was set during the era of domestic slavery.54 Some 
                                                        
53 The company was established in 1949 under the name, CTUF, la Compagnie des Textiles de 
l’Union Française, changing its name to CFDT in 1950.  
54 In Jonckers’ (1994) study of peasant communities near Koutiala, jònkani plots were cultivated on 
two days per week and were devoted to cash crops; their use for the growing of subsistence cereals 
was not permitted. Simialrly, Toulmin (1992, p. 32) notes, ‘During the groundnut boom of the 1950s 
and 1960s, these subgroups of men [brothers of the same mother in a polygynous marriage] also 
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peasants started to grow cotton voluntarily when the price rose compared to that of 
other crops. The CFDT system transformed peasant farming in Southern Mali, 
through intensive intervention. One elderly interviewee, Bah Kissiman Traoré, 
recalled his personal experience of this process in a positive light. 
 
I was one of the first to cultivate cotton. … That was at the time of the 
CFDT. … Trainers came to train us, to teach us how to grow this crop. 
At that time, there were no associations. So it was the Europeans 
themselves who came to the place where we sold the cotton. … Our 
grandparents grew cotton but not in the same way. It was not the same 
cotton that we have today. There was a difference between the qualities. 
They made that [pointing to an article of thick, hand-woven cotton cloth 
that he is wearing]. … In the past, we didn’t sow cotton, we threw the 
seeds on the ground and that was all. … They taught us how to transplant 
seedlings… Now we have good yields. … At that time, when you did 
work according to the instructions of the trainers sent by the CFDT, they 
appreciated it. … I have received medals. Because I am a big producer. 
The Government often gives me a prize. I am a pilot farmer. Each year, I 
produce ten tonnes. There were years when I produced thirty tonnes; 
frequently twenty-five tonnes.55 
 
 
Malian cotton: from agrarian revolution to peasant revolt56 
Bassett (2001) classifies the period from 1965 to 1984 in West Africa as a 
‘peasant cotton revolution’. World cotton prices were generally high and yields 
increased through intensification. The Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement 
des Textiles (CMDT) was created in 1974, with the Government owning sixty 
                                                                                                                                                             
became involved in farming separate fields of their own with this crop, investing the profits in cattle.’ 
Wider rural development policy under Modibo Keita encouraged young men to liberate themselves 
from the authority of the elders through the ‘Mali ton’ (Jonckers 1994, p. 124).  
55 Interview with B K Traoré, cotton farmer, Wolodo, near Fana, 18/02/08. Original (interpreter): Moi, 
j’étais un des premiers qui fait la culture du coton. … C’était la CFDT à l’époque. … Les formateurs 
venaient nous former, nous faire comprendre comment se faire cette culture. En ce moment-là, il n’y 
avait pas d’association. Donc c’est les européens mêmes qui venaient au lieu où on vend le coton. 
…Nos grands-parents cultivaient le coton, mais ce n’était pas la même façon. Ce n’est pas le même 
coton que nous on a aujourd’hui. Il y avait une différence entre les qualités. Donc on faisait ça. 
[pointing to an article of thick, hand-woven cotton cloth that he is wearing]. … Autrefois, au moment 
des nos grands-parents, … on ne semait pas, … on jetait des graines sur le sol … à l’époque quand les 
élèves venaient quand tu faisais un travail convenable à ce que la CFDT envoie les gens comme 
formateurs, depuis à l’époque quand tu travailles très bien, eux ils apprécient. … J’ai eu des médailles. 
Parce que je suis gros producteur. Le gouvernement a l’habitude de me donner un prix. Je suis paysan 
pilote. Chaque année, je fais dix tonnes. Il y avait des années j’ai fait trente tonnes, souvent vingt cinq 
tonnes. 
56 An early version of the analysis presented in this section was presented as part of a conference 
paper at the 3rd European Conference on African Studies, Leipzig, 4–7 June 2009. 
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percent, and the CFDT, forty percent of the capital. R. James Bingen (1998, p. 269) 
argues, ‘Rather than an expression of radical nationalism, this joint Malian–CFDT 
decision represented a mutually beneficial move.’ It allowed President Moussa 
Traoré, who replaced Modibo Keita in the coup d’état of 1968, to attract foreign 
public investment in rural development. In the 1970s and 1980s, the CFDT/CMDT 
promoted mechanisation of farming. It facilitated credit arrangements with the 
National Agricultural Development Bank (BNDA) to enable farmers to buy oxen and 
ploughs. The CMDT also created a department for motorised agriculture to help the 
largest farmers57 to acquire tractors on credit (Girard et al. 2008, p. 3). 
Peasants themselves did not see a great deal of the profits from the 
‘agronomic miracle’ of West African cotton (Bassett 2001). In addition to the 
creation of the CMDT, the year 1974 also witnessed a protest, organised by a group 
of villagers aided by a CMDT extension agent, against corrupt practices on the part 
of CMDT staff in the grading and weighing of cotton (Bingen 1994). In response, the 
CMDT’s Area Manager for Fana, Michel Daou, proposed that producers be trained 
to undertake these tasks and sell their cotton to the CMDT themselves. This was the 
beginning of the system of associations villageoises (AV), whereby producers 
organised into local groups to perform a range of operational and accounting duties, 
and to liaise with the CMDT. The CMDT eventually provided functional literacy, 
numeracy and management training in the Bamanan language, widely spoken in the 
CMDT areas.  
In an interview, Michel Daou recalled that his novel idea was derided by 
colleagues who felt it threatened their positions in the hierarchy.58 Technical Director 
of the CMDT, French ex-patriot Jacques Moineau, backed his proposal, however, 
and ordered a pilot project then expansion of the scheme. The first villagers Daou 
attempted to recruit for the pilot project refused to participate for fear of reprisals, 
since to suggest that farmers might be able to do the work of the supervisory 
framework would be to turn the hierarchy upside-down.59 Far from provoking an 
immediate revolution, the AV system may be viewed as a successful co-optation of 
                                                        
57 Those growing more than twenty hectares of cotton. 
58 Interview with Michel Daou, Fana, 18/02/08. 
59 Interview with Michel Daou, Fana, 18/02/08. Original: C’est comme un chef- tu reprends sa place 
donc vous voyez comment ça va se passer; ça fait un bouleversement à peu près. Mais, bon, ils n’ont 
pas voulu. 
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the farmer uprising since it kept potentially dissident cotton farmers loyal to, and 
under the control of, the CMDT, while off-loading work previously undertaken at the 
expense of the CMDT onto unpaid villagers.60 Nonetheless, producers benefitted 
from a guaranteed minimum price for their cotton and, through the AV, they 
received a collective bonus if a profit was made, increasing village-directed 
investment in local infrastructure, education and healthcare.  
The AV system represented a new, contractual form of organisation, and 
hence a departure from the lineage-based system of farming. Whereas the tòn system 
redistributes labour between households at the production stage, the AV operates 
according to the principle of collective liability for net losses incurred by the group 
once the costs of input credit are deducted from the sale of cotton harvested. This is 
viewed as engendering ignoble debtor-creditor relations between theoretically equal 
and autonomous households within the group. Established modes of social relation 
have nonetheless remained influential in AV structures (Bingen 1998, p. 281), 
although in somewhat distorted form. In some cases, the village chief assumed the 
role of president of the AV, helped himself to the association’s funds, and 
monopolised the services of the village tòn for his own cotton field (Jonckers 1994, 
pp. 128–129). 
Bingen (1998, pp. 281–282) argues that the AV system has both ‘eroded the 
peasant political ecology of interdependence’ and fostered a sense of solidarity 
among some entrepreneurial cotton producers. From the mid 1970s, there emerged a 
cadre of literate young men – secretaries and treasurers of their AVs – whose 
elevated social positions depended on their professional relationships with the 
CMDT: ‘the AVs have been Mali’s hothouse for a new generation of rural leaders’ 
(Bingen 1996, p. 25). Thus, the introduction of AVs has contributed to profound and 
complex changes in rural Malian communities, as Danielle Jonckers (1994) argues. 
 
The logic of the AVs is paradoxical: The development agents work 
essentially with so-called pilot farmers, who act according to a market 
logic. They ask them, at the same time, to develop a sense of solidarity at 
the heart of the AV, despite the fact that these farmers are in a rupture of 
                                                        
60 For similar analyses, see Roy (2010a, pp. 301–302) and Bingen (1994). 
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solidarity with their own kin community. (Jonckers 1994, p. 129, my 
translation)61 
 
Selected by the CMDT for pilot projects and brought together for training, 
members of the AV elite developed both a sense of camaraderie among themselves 
and a sense of partnership with the CMDT (Bingen 2000, p. 357).62 The transfer of 
responsibilities from the CMDT to the AVs was frequently accompanied, however, 
by a ‘transfer of abuses’: AV officials engaged in corrupt practices in grading, 
weighing and financial management, which sparked protests by farmers in the early 
1980s (Roy 2010a, p. 302). 
More broadly, cotton cash cropping and the CMDT system have increased 
socio-economic differentiation among farmers in Southern Mali, which, Moseley 
(2005, p. 49) argues, has been accelerated the CMDT facilitating access to 
machinery on concessionary terms for entrepreneurial pilot farmers. Poorer farmers 
pay their richer neighbours for the services of a plough team, often by exchanging 
their own labour (Bassett 2001, p. 140). Poorer households whose fields are 
ploughed last, suffer lower yields (Toulmin and Guèye 2003, p. 42). Mechanisation 
has enabled richer farmers to expand the area of land under cultivation. Moseley 
(2005) found that in Siwaa, Sikasso, where land is limited, rich farmers used 
customary usufruct principles of land tenure to persuade their poorer neighbours to 
let them use their fallow fields when cotton prices rose, thus exacerbating soil 
degradation. The increase in cultivated area increases the labour needed at weeding 
and harvesting (Bassett 2001, p. 140). Jonckers (1994, p. 128) observes that the tòn 
has become a paid workforce that hires out its services to rich producers. 
Cotton cash cropping has developed hand-in-hand with the proliferation of 
‘individual’ fields, as noted above. To some extent, this has contributed to increased 
socio-economic differentiation, but choices of household set-up and their outcomes 
vary. Brothers of the same mother (in a polygynous marriage) often unite to form a 
sub-group within the household and cultivate a plot together. Growing cash crops on 
                                                        
61 Original: La logique des AV est paradoxale: les promoteurs de développement travaillent 
essentiellement avec les paysans dits pilotes, qui agissent selon une logique de marché. Ils leurs 
demandent, en même temps, de développer des sentiments de solidarité au sein de l’AV, alors que ces 
cultivateurs sont en rupture de solidarité avec leur propre communauté familiale. 
62 This point was echoed by Michel Daou (interview, Fana, 18/02/08). 
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this plot gives them a degree of economic independence. In some cases, the 
individual fields of these sub-units have been the basis of household fission, while in 
others they have helped to diffuse tensions between elders and cadets, thus 
maintaining the corporate household.63 While large households may carry a 
significant number of dependents, they are often less vulnerable to risk and can 
benefit from economies of scale (Toulmin and Guèye 2003, p. 20), whereas small 
households tend to struggle if they lack equipment and labour.64 A further trend in 
intra-household relations has been an increase in work done by women and children 
in fields controlled by men. The CFDT/CMDT system has targeted men,65 yet relies 
on unpaid family labour, particularly in ploughing, weeding and harvesting. 
Despite these deep-rooted difficulties, the CMDT system has nevertheless 
been associated with rural development and improved in food security in Southern 
Mali. In the first half of the 1980s, the CMDT ran a Maize Intensification Project, 
which substantially increased yields through subsidised fertiliser for maize (in 
addition to cotton), improved varieties, promotion of intensive agricultural 
techniques such as mono-cropping, and guaranteed prices from the state marketing 
board (Fok et al. 2000). The impacts of cotton farming on soil fertility in West Africa 
are debated, but overall it seems that where they have been applied adequately, 
synthetic fertilisers have off-set depletion of nutrients, though soil organic matter has 
not been adequately replaced through organic manure.66 
Both maize and cotton cultivation were adversely affected by economic 
constraints from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, when farmers decreased their use 
of synthetic fertilisers and extensified production (Fok et al. 2000; Bassett 2001, p. 
153). State support for maize decreased far more than for cotton, so farmers diverted 
                                                        
63 Becker (1990) identifies several forms of household organisation in a village in Southern Mali in 
the late 1980s: extended families in which the household field takes priority over individual fields; 
federal-style structures in which sub-groups are largely independent but come together to work a 
small household field; fraternal households or nuclear families in which the distinction between 
household and individual fields is less clear. 
64 See chapter six.  
65 The AV system has tended to exclude women because social norms dictate that men and women 
associate separately (Jonckers 1994, p. 130). At particular times and places, women have tapped 
informal markets in agricultural inputs, equipment and labour in order to grow cotton in their gardens 
or personal fields (see, for example, Bassett 2001, pp. 154–155). 
66 Compare, for example, Benjaminsen, Aune and Sidibé (2010) with Kidron, Karnieli and Benenson 
(2010). 
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some of their cotton fertilisers to their maize crops,67 decreasing cotton yields yet 
further. As repayment for inputs was collected through cotton sales, AVs were left 
indebted, leading to conflicts within communities. 
Like many poor countries faced with spiralling interest rates and plummeting 
world commodity prices in the 1980s, the Malian Government was unable to repay 
its external debts, and signed its first World Bank structural adjustment programme 
(SAP) in 1982. While implementation of austerity measures was under way, the 
country was hit by drought in 1984. In 1986, the CMDT agreed a ten-year contrat-
plan with the Government, fixing the price at which the CMDT would buy cotton 
from Malian farmers at 93 CFA/kg. This ‘producer price’ represented little over a 
quarter of the world market price of cotton that year (365 CFA/kg) (Docking 2005). 
The government abandoned its first SAP by 1987, only to agree another in 1988, 
which led to a dramatic rise in the costs of imported goods, including agricultural 
inputs, and in the interest rates on the loans farmers had with Mali’s National 
Agricultural Development Bank (BNDA). By late 1989, cotton farmers were making 
a loss: ‘With their fixed price at 93 CFA francs per kilogram, while their costs 
averaged 95 CFA francs per kilogram, producers wanted to know why they couldn’t 
demand a price increase.’ (Bingen 1994, p. 61). 
In the democratic opening of 1989–1991, cotton farmers, forming a 
committee of AVs and tòns in the Koutiala area, called a strike. In the negotiations 
that followed, the CMDT attempted to persuade the strike leaders to adopt the form 
of a professional association that would be incorporated into the vertically-organised 
industry and would ‘adjust their demands to the “big picture” of the international 
cotton market.’ (Bingen 1998, p. 277). Instead, the producer leaders created a union 
of cotton and food crop producers, Syndicat des Cotonniers et Vivriers (SYCOV), in 
1992. Yet, from the start, SYCOV gave itself a dual mandate: to represent producers 
and to work in a professional partnership with the CMDT (Bingen 1998, p. 272). The 
union became signatory, on behalf of producers, to the contrat-plan between the 
CMDT and the State. 
                                                        
67 A survey in Benin in 1998 found that almost thirty percent of fertiliser bought on credit from the 
cotton parastatal through AVs was diverted to other crops, mainly maize (Minot et al. 2000, pp. 16–
17). Some farmers also sold cotton fertiliser on the black market (Bassett 2001, p. 152). 
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SYCOV was formed with help from the Chamber of Agriculture and from 
foreign development agencies, both governmental and non-governmental (Bingen 
1994; 1996). The union relied on the CMDT for its telecommunications and 
transport (Docking 2005, p. 210). It was given office space for its national 
headquarters at the Assemblée Permanente des Chambres d’Agriculture du Mali 
(APCAM). Meanwhile, in the Kita area of western Mali, a request from cotton 
producers to establish a union was feared both for revealing ‘the corporatist nature of 
the Chamber’ and for the farmers’ assumed political sympathies (Bingen (2000, p. 
355).68 Mali’s system of Chambers of Agriculture was founded in the 1980s by a 
group of highly capitalised farmers, and its close relationship with the State is 
infused with neo-patrimonial control (Bingen 2004, p. 30). Bonnaisseux (2003, p. 
52) argues that the Malian union ‘has never received the financial and technical 
support that could have reinforced its autonomy’, noting that it was installed within 
APCAM, whereas the Burkinabè cotton union, Union Nationale des Producteurs de 
Coton du Burkina Faso (UNPCB), received funding from the European Union to 
establish and equip its headquarters at Bobo-Dioulasso. The UNPCB was itself 
promoted by the Government of Burkina Faso and the CFDT at the expense of the 
more militant Fédération Nationale des Organisations Paysannes (FENOP) 
(Kaminski, Headey and Bernard 2009, p. 6).69 
The first contrat-plan that SYCOV leaders signed with the CMDT and the 
State in 1994 represented a poor deal for producers. It fixed the basic producer price 
for cotton for four years at a particularly low 125 F/kg  (Berthomé 2002, p. 169). 
This price remained unchanged even though world prices soared in the mid-1990s, 
due in part to the after-effects of a fifty percent devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 
and in part to a rise in the world market price for cotton lint (Bourdet 2002, p. 51). At 
the same time, the effects of the devaluation raised the cost of imported inputs on 
which producers were reliant. A mid-term review of the contrat-plan was due in 
                                                        
68 They had refused to affiliate to the single national trade union, UNTM, in the 1960s but reluctantly 
accepted in the 1990s, forming the Syndicat des Paysans du Cercle de Kita (SPCK) as a section of 
SYNAPRO (Syndicat National de la Production). 
69 Producers created FENOP after a riot in Dédougou, in 1991 (Kaminski et al. 2009, p. 5). 
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1996, but this was not done: producers from across the cotton zone took part in a 
peaceful protest march in Koutiala (SYCOV 2002, p. 7).70 
In the 1997/98 cotton campaign, Mali achieved a record harvest of 520,000 
tonnes, making it the largest producer in Africa that year. In April 1998, the CMDT 
celebrated its profits by throwing a party for farmers. But producers in Koutiala, who 
saw yields diminish in their area, boycotted the festivities. (SYCOV 2002, p. 7).71 In 
the same month, SYCOV held its second congress. The CMDT succeeded in 
orchestrating the election of sympathetic candidates to the leadership at national 
level and in every regional branch except Koutiala (Berthomé 2002, p. 173; Docking 
2005, pp. 216–217). 
When it was time to renegotiate the contrat-plan, in September 1998, the 
CMDT delayed then pushed for the same price as the previous year (125 F/kg plus 
45 F/kg bonus). The price had still not been agreed when producers were asked in 
December 1998 to deliver their harvests to the CMDT. SYCOV’s regional office in 
Koutiala called a strike, unsanctioned by its headquarters. The army was called in 
and the producers’ attempts to withhold their produce were violently suppressed 
(SYCOV 2002, p.20).72 
One of the founding members of SYCOV, who since became disillusioned 
with the union, described his personal experience of the CMDT’s methods of 
persuasion. 
 
During that strike – ’98–’99 – the CMDT promised me a motorbike. 
… When we raised that strike, the Regional Director sent three agents 
all the way to my village to see me. … In the night, eh. … They had a 
key to a motorbike so that I might take it, along with a few million [F 
CFA] and talk the farmers round. … They had talked round the 
president of SYCOV here at the regional level.73 
                                                        
70 The protesters also call for changes with regards to the provision of inputs and input credit. 
71 They were angry with the CMDT for having ignored their grievances over the poor quality of 
insecticides and the company’s failure to supply the agreed quota of cottonseed meal to feed their 
livestock, needed to plough their fields. 
72 One 65-year-old man, Lassine Dembélé died of his injuries. Violence between peasants and soldiers 
was also described by cotton farmer, Bourama Goita in a fieldwork interview (Koutiala, 21/02/08). 
73 Interview with Bourama Goita, cotton farmer, Koutiala, 21/02/08. Original: Pendant cette grève-là – 
98-99 – la CMDT m’avait promis une moto. …Au moment où on a soulevé cette grève-là, le DR 
[Directeur Regional] m’avait envoyé trois agents jusqu’à dans mon village même pour me voir. … 
Dans la nuit, eh. … Ils avaient une clé de moto pour que moi je puisse prendre ça avec les quelques 
millions et sensibiliser les paysans. Ils avaient sensibilisé le président du SYCOV ici au niveau 
régionale. 
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The strike was finally called off on 23 December 1998, after visits from two 
delegations, one from the National Assembly and one from the Chamber of 
Agriculture (APCAM). According to SYCOV’s account of the episode, the delegates 
went to several villages and ‘posed questions to know if the movement had not been 
guided by the leaders for political rather than unionist motives’ (SYCOV 2002, p. 
21).74 In the end, the CMDT paid farmers 185 F/kg (140 F/kg plus 45 F/kg bonus). 
Producers had at last secured a fairer share of the price of their cotton, but their 
expectations increased just as world prices began to plummet and the extent of 
CMDT mismanagement was uncovered. 
A technical audit of the CMDT, demanded by the World Bank, was belatedly 
completed in December 1998. Despite the profits of the boom years, the audit 
revealed a deficit in the CMDT’s finances estimated at tens of billions of francs 
CFA.  
 
In the four years following the devaluation, the CMDT was so profitable 
that it became a prime target for rent seekers and costs became heavily 
padded. When world prices started falling in 1998/99, the CMDT became 
virtually bankrupt. (Goreux 2003, pp. 9–10) 
 
The information revealed by the audit was not shared with SYCOV and a 
new union, SYPAMO,75 until union leaders were summoned to a meeting with the 
CMDT and the State on 8 September 1999 (Berthomé 2002, pp. 175–176). The 
agricultural year was well under way by this time. Producers had sown their crops 
assuming that the previous year’s price of 185 F/kg would be repeated. In the 
negotiations that ensued, producers were asked to accept a price of 150 F/kg, with no 
prospect of a bonus since the company would not be able to make a profit given its 
deficit. Worse still, producers learned that their 18 billion F CFA support fund, 
designed to protect their incomes in the event of such a price drop, had been entirely 
swallowed up in the company’s financial black hole. With the agreement of a 
majority of its regional branches, SYCOV signed agreement to this price as part of a 
                                                        
74 Original: posent des questions pour savoir si le mouvement n’a pas été guidé par des responsables 
pour des motifs politiques et non syndicaux. 
75 SYPAMO represents producers in the recently established cotton zone in South West Mali. 
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nine-month interim plan due for renegotiation by the start of the next sowing season, 
in June 2000 (ibid.). 
Producers’ precarious livelihoods bore the brunt of the losses made in the 
1999/00 agricultural year. Between December 1999 and June 2000, many producers 
had to sell equipment and livestock to repay the debts that they had accrued (Roy 
2010a). There was widespread anger and talk of strike. But, by May/June 2000, the 
SYCOV leadership moderated its position and encouraged producers not to strike. 
Producers from the usually more moderate areas of Bougouni and Sikasso formed a 
crisis committee and, without any legal right to do so, called on farmers to strike by 
refusing to sow cotton. A majority of producers joined the boycott. 
At the end of June, President Konaré met with the crisis committee and 
acceded to most of its demands. But the damage had already been done. It was too 
late to sow the rain-fed crop successfully. An independent audit by Ernst and Young, 
published on 15 July 2000, exposed mismanagement and a 57 billion F CFA deficit 
in the CMDT’s finances.76 Harvest time revealed the extent of the losses from the 
boycott. The nation’s cotton production for 2000/01 was halved compared with that 
of the previous year. The political impact of the farmers’ direct action was 
considerable. The government had been shocked into learning not to under-estimate 
the power of the producers acting together. But the strike split the union movement, 
with the crisis committee splintering away from SYCOV to form a rival union, 
SYVAC (Syndicat pour la Valorisation des Cultures Cotonnières et Vivrières). What 
is more, the crisis of 2000/01 propelled the question of the privatisation of the 
CMDT to the fore of the political agenda. 
 
 
Cotton sector reform in sub-Saharan Africa 
Cotton-producing countries throughout sub-Saharan Africa have 
implemented liberal reform of their cotton sectors to varying degrees since the 
1980s. These reforms have been part of wider structural adjustment programmes, 
made a condition for assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank since that time. Long-term deterioration in the terms of trade for 
                                                        
76 Source: ‘Mali: Playing the offside rule’, Africa Confidential 41:18, 15 September 2000. 
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primary commodity producers, the oil shocks of the 1970s, and recession in 
developed countries all contributed to the severe economic crisis that faced most 
African countries by the early 1980s (Parfitt and Riley 1989; Zack-Williams 2000).  
Unsuccessful government policies and corruption in African countries 
exacerbated their balance of payments deficits and public debt. Despite 
implementing austerity measures and other conditions attached to structural 
adjustment credits, many African countries fell deeper into debt as interest rates rose 
and terms of trade continued to decline. Following a transnational civil society 
campaign for debt cancellation, the IMF and the World Bank’s International 
Development Association (IDA) launched the initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) in 1996, with the aim of reducing the external debt burden of the 
world’s poorest countries to a level deemed sustainable by the major creditor 
institutions.77 In order to qualify for this assistance, eligible country governments had 
to agree and implement fiscal and structural policy reforms that followed the same 
liberal economic logic promoted by the World Bank and IMF since the 1980s.78 
Liberal reform of Mali’s cotton sector was made a condition for assistance 
through the HIPC initiative. Having agreed to Structural Adjustment Programmes in 
1982 and in 1988, Mali was already in the process of moving from a state-led 
economy to a market-led economy before HIPC took effect (Bourdet 2002, p. 27). 
The country entered the HIPC initiative with a ‘track record of satisfactory and 
largely uninterrupted adjustment over a nine-year period beginning in 1988’ (IMF 
and IDA 1998, p. 6). In the agricultural sector, the Office du Niger’s marketing 
monopoly on rice was abolished by 1995, and the cereals market was liberalised by 
1997 (Bourdet 2002, p. 29, table 1). Most of Mali’s state-owned enterprises were 
privatised in the early 1990s (Bourdet 2002, p. 34). Remaining ones in 
telecommunications, banking, power and water sectors were timetabled for 
privatisation according to the 1998 final decision point document on HIPC (IMF and 
IDA 1998, Table 5, p. 23).  
                                                        
77 Following a review in 1999 debt relief was extended under the Enhanced HIPC initiative, and 
assistance was made conditional on the writing and implementation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper. HIPC’s successor, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative was launched in 2005. 
78 Many other creditors including members of the ‘Paris Club’ have applied the same system to 
bilateral debt owed to them by HIPC-eligible countries.  
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Privatisation of the national cotton company, CMDT, was clearly on the 
agenda, but the HIPC document indicates that the modalities of reform of this 
sensitive sector were negotiable at this stage. 
 
The overall objective of the government is to open the cotton sector to 
increased private sector participation, according to modalities that will be 
discussed with the World Bank and IMF. A technical audit of the cotton 
industry will be completed by September 1998 that will help the 
government define its position on private sector participation in the 
industry.” (IMF and IDA 1998, pp. 9–10). 
 
The Executive Directors of the IMF and IDA ‘stressed the need to deepen 
structural reform, particularly in the area of restructuring and privatizing public 
enterprises, including the cotton industry’, yet the question of the privatisation of the 
cotton company was not entirely foreclosed (IMF and IDA 1998, p. 9). 
It is hardly surprising that the Malian Government was slow to liberalise its 
cotton sector compared with other sectors. Cotton is vital to the Malian economy, 
both in terms of the large section of the population that is involved in the sector – 
over 3 million people out of a population of 13 million, and in terms of the country’s 
dependence on the crop for export earnings – cotton accounted for fifty-five percent 
of Mali’s exports per year on average between 1995 and 1997.79 Moreover, the 
CMDT appeared to be a highly productive and profitable company at the time of 
writing of the HIPC decision point document. However, the circumstances of the 
parastatal’s decline ushered in the reform process at the turn of the millennium. 
Reform of Mali’s cotton sector began later than that of most other African countries. 
The experiences of other African countries in liberalising their cotton sectors, 
outlined below, gave grounds for a cautious approach to reform of the CFA zone’s 
most productive cotton sector. The trajectory of cotton sector reform in Mali is 
examined in chapter five, in relation to civil society opposition to it. 
Prior to the liberal reforms, most African countries had state marketing 
boards with monopsony purchasing rights on agricultural produce (Zack-Williams 
2000, p. 4). Cotton sectors were run by state companies, or by combinations of co-
operatives and state marketing boards. All sectoral activities were co-ordinated in a 
                                                        
79 Calculated from data in IMF and IDA (1998, Appendix, Table 10). 
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single system: supplying inputs and extension services, purchasing seed cotton, 
ginning, and marketing cotton lint (Larsen 2003, p. 16). Cotton was grown 
predominantly by smallholder farmers (Fok 2001, p. 4).80 In most sub-Saharan 
African countries, the vast majority of cotton lint was – and is – exported, making 
these sectors dependent on the world market (Fok 2001, p. 4).81  
In the African Franc Zone, state cotton monopolies were part-owned by the 
Compagnie Française pour le Développement des Fibres Textiles (CFDT), which 
promoted cotton production for export during the colonial era and was granted 
monopolies on the external marketing of lint through its subsidiary, the Compagnie 
Parisienne de Coton (COPACO) in the independence period (Bassett 2008, p. 49; 
Kaminski et al. 2009, p. 9).82 In the mid 1990s, the CFDT was majority-owned by 
the French state (sixty-four percent). It was considered for privatisation by decree in 
1996 under the Juppé government (Docking 2005, p. 214). The company was 
renamed DAGRIS in 2001 and eventually privatised in 2008, with the Geocoton 
group becoming the major shareholder. Now a private company, COPACO was 
among the fourteen largest cotton trading companies in the world in 2009 
(Guitchounts 2009, p. 11). 
Cotton sector reform began in anglophone African countries (and in 
lusophone Mozambique) in the mid 1980s, at a time when they were generally 
performing badly. Cotton sector reform in francophone African countries began in 
the mid 1990s, when production was increasing, provoking resistance to the reforms 
and accusations of dogmatic commitment to neo-liberal policies (Fok 2001, p. 6). 
Cotton sector reform has followed different paths in different countries and produced 
different outcomes. The challenges for liberalised cotton sectors in Africa principally 
revolve around input provision, farmer credit and cotton quality.83 
                                                        
80 Other models, however, included the Gezira state irrigation scheme in Sudan, large commercial 
farms in Zimbabwe and South Africa, and the concession system in Mozambique. 
81 Exceptions are Nigeria and South Africa, which do not produce enough cotton to satisfy their textile 
industries. Ninety-nine percent of Mali’s and Burkina Faso’s cotton is exported (Bassett 2008, p. 48). 
82 However, Benin is exceptional because an additional French company entered the sector after 
independence and both companies left the country during the 1970s (Gergely 2010, p. 2). 
83 In addition to the examples discussed here, Caliskan (2010, p. 157) finds that liberalisation of the 
cotton input market in Egypt has led to decreased use of fertilisers, the privatisation of credit has 
contributed to an increase in informal money lenders, and farmer incomes have decreased 
significantly. 




Malian farmers and cotton in the world economy: history and context 
63 
The quality and reputation of cotton lint, linked to its national origin, are key 
factors in determining prices and guaranteeing sales of the product. Quality is linked 
to the variety of cotton grown and to climatic factors, but also to crop management 
practices, which are affected by the provision of inputs and extension services, and to 
the facilities and practices involved in grading, transportation, storage and ginning. 
During periods of high competition following liberal reforms in Uganda, Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe and Zambia, when the numbers of companies operating in their cotton 
sectors increased, problems arose in maintaining the smooth running of these 
elements of the commodity chain, lowering the quality of cotton and the levels of 
production, and so damaging the countries’ reputations on the world market.84 One 
of the main problems that arose was the breakdown in relationships that linked the 
provision of inputs to farmers on credit to the sale of seed cotton to ginneries to the 
recovery of input credit, which would enable the provision of inputs on credit for the 
next season. Solutions to the crises provoked by liberalisation have included the re-
establishment of zonal monopsonies (in Uganda), increased sector-wide public-
private co-ordination (in Tanzania and Zimbabwe), and a government-initiated fund 
to support private companies to provide input credit services (in Zambia). 
Alongside Mali, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso are the largest cotton 
producers in the African Franc Zone. Of these, Benin was the first to reform its 
cotton sector, but privatisation proceeded gradually, accompanied by minimal 
liberalisation and considerable political interference (Gergely 2009). The parastatal, 
SONAPRA (Société Nationale pour la Promotion Agricole) continued to control 
activities across the whole sector85 until 2000, when management responsibilities 
passed to a public-private interprofessional body, the Association Interprofessionelle 
de Coton (AIC) and a clearing house, Centrale Sécurisation des Paiements et des 
Recouvrements (CSPR) designed to oversee all payments and credit recovery in the 
chain. The government continued to intervene intermittently in the sector, and 
SONAPRA continued to operate as a public ginning company until it was privatised 
in 2008. A crisis developed between 2002 and 2006, when input suppliers, ginners 
                                                        
84 For full analyses, see Gibbon (1999), Larsen (2003), Poulton et al. (2004), Tschirley et al. (2006), 
and Poulton and Hanyani-Mlambo (2008). 
85 Managing input procurement bids; setting sector-wide prices for inputs, seed cotton, cotton lint and 
cotton seeds; setting quotas for the quanity of seed cotton each company could buy; and ensuring that 
producers sold their harvests directly to ginneries. 
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and producers by-passed the CSPR, which, along with the AIC, had not been given 
the legal and regulatory powers to enforce the rules (Gergely 2009, pp. 22–23). 
Gergely (2009) suggests that the government allowed – and even encouraged – side-
selling, while Goreux (2003, p. 24) notes that ‘political pressures’ occasionally 
interrupted the smooth functioning of the CSPR. Producers bore the consequences of 
the crisis in the form of delayed payments. Production declined dramatically for a 
number of years. 
A combination of privatisation, deregulation and war resulted in chaos in 
Côte d’Ivoire. In 1998, the state cotton company, CIDT (Compagnie Ivoirienne pour 
le Développement des Textiles), was split into three companies, each with a regional 
monopoly (Goreux 2003, pp. 12–13). Results were mixed, with Ivoire Coton 
performing better – but LCCI (La Compagnie Cotonnière de la Côte d’Ivoire) 
performing much worse – than the state-owned enterprise, CIDT Nouvelle. From 
2000, companies could set their own prices above a pan-territorial minimum price set 
nationally, but they rarely did (Gergely 2010, p. 28). The reform period coincided 
with a period of intense political instability, when the reforms became heavily 
politicised.86 All aspects of the commodity chain were disrupted by a civil war from 
2002 to 2004,87 and national production fell (Gergely 2010, p. 45). The ambitious 
producers’ association, URECOS-CI (Union Régionale des Entreprises Coopératives 
de la zone des Savanes de Côte d'Ivoire) built its own ginnery in 2002, right next to 
an existing LCCI one,88 but it was partially destroyed in the war, and inputs that the 
union had imported were diverted to food crops or seized by militias. Between 2001 
and 2005, payments to farmers by most companies (except Ivoire Coton) were 
delayed by months and in some cases years. Desperate farmers sold their crops to 
                                                        
86 Following the 1999 coup d’état, the military government proposed to sell eighty percent of the 
shares in CIDT Nouvelle to producers’ associations for a symbolic franc (Goreux 2003, p. 13; 
Gergely 2010, p. 7). This sale was prevented by the civilian government elected in 2000, but the 
proposal inspired the producer group, URECOS-CI, to pursue its ambitions. 
87 For example, the national cotton research station and quality grading facility were destroyed. 
88 URECOS-CI, which claimed to represent eighty percent of producers, received support from the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation to set up a ginning company, SICOSA (Gergely 
2010, p. 7). It built its ginnery in Korhogo in 2002 with money from the producer price support fund 
that it managed and together with two international companies. It gained the liquidity to import inputs 
through a strategy of forward sales of lint (Goreux 2003, p.13).  
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companies outside of their zones or to itinerant traders.89 While socio-political unrest 
was a major factor in the poor performance of Côte d’Ivoire’s cotton sector after 
reform, Gergely (2010, pp. 45–46) also points to poor company management90 and a 
lack of institutional framework invested with regulatory powers. 
The reform process in Burkina Faso – which became the model for reforms in 
Mali – was very gradual, beginning with institution-building during the 1990s, and 
ultimately produced a relatively strong sector (Kaminski, Headey and Bernard 2009, 
pp. 5–8).91 Between 1996 and 1999, local level producer associations were 
reorganised from village groups into market-oriented cotton co-operatives. In turn, 
the new co-operatives were organised into a pyramid structure of unions, topped with 
a national union, UNPCB (Union nationale des producteurs de coton du Burkina).92 
The cotton company was partially privatised in 1999 by the entry of producers into 
its capital. UNPCB used the surplus accumulated in their producer price support 
fund, from when prices were high, to acquire thirty percent of the State’s shares in 
the Burkinabè cotton company, SOFITEX (Goreux 2003, p. 11). The producers’ 
union also gained majority control over the selection of input bids and two seats on 
the board of management, and responsibility for quality grading and financial 
management were gradually transferred to it (Kaminski, Headey and Bernard 2009). 
Private firms entered the sector between 2002 and 2006, and two new ginning 
companies were given regional monopsonies.93 The Association Interprofessionnelle 
du Coton (AIC) was established as a public-private regulatory body.  
Following the reforms in Burkina Faso, input credit repayment rates 
increased, but so did debts between members within cotton co-operatives. Despite 
the apparent success of the reforms, the Burkinabè cotton sector accumulated deficits 
when world cotton prices fell to very low levels between 2004 and 2006 (Kaminski, 
                                                        
89 Illicitly purchased seed cotton was smuggled into Mali and Burkina Faso, including an estimated 
70,000 tons in 2004 (Kaminski, Headey and Bernard 2009, p. 13). 
90 LCCI was declared bankrupt in 2007. By 2008, a number of new companies were operating and 
producer umbrella groups had fragmented (Gergely 2010, pp. 13–16). 
91 Cotton production tripled over the course of the reform period, making Burkina Faso the largest 
cotton producer in Africa. However, this increase in production was probably largely due to a 
government initiative to greatly expand the area under cotton. Many of the new cotton farmers were 
migrants returning from Côte d’Ivoire because of the conflict there (Kaminski et al. 2009, pp. 8–15). 
92 See chapter six for analysis of similar reforms in Mali in the 2000s. 
93 New entrants included input suppliers, transporters, and ginning and marketing companies. The 
companies given regional monopsonies were SOCOMA and FASOCOTON. 
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Headey and Bernard 2009, pp. 33–34). Producer prices remained high relative to 
world market prices, but these high levels were not sustained by the price support 
fund at that time. Accusations of corruption were made since it seemed that the 
support fund had not been adequately replenished during years of higher world 
prices. In 2006, the mechanism for setting seed cotton prices was revised to reflect 
world market prices more closely. By 2008, a smoothing fund was operational to 
balance out discrepancies between the price set before the harvest and the actual 
world market price at the time of sale. In contrast to similar funds in the past, the 
new Burkinabè fund is managed by an independent bank at the West African 
regional level.  
 
 
Controversy over cotton subsidies 
Government subsidisation of cotton production and exports has become a 
major issue in international trade negotiations since the beginning of the 2000s. 
Seven countries directly subsidised production of cotton in 1999/2000, with the 
largest subsidies provided in the United States, China and the European Union, 
respectively (Valderrama Becerra 2000). The United States and China also gave 
direct payments to support exports of cotton. Goreux (2004, p. 6) comments, ‘In 
2001/02, subsidies to cotton producers in the United States, China, Greece and Spain 
reached six billion dollars which was the value of cotton exports worldwide.’ At such 
high levels, subsidies depress world market prices. Production subsidies encourage 
farmers to grow more cotton than they otherwise would, thereby increasing the 
supply of cotton on the market. Export subsidies make up the difference between low 
world market prices and high producer prices, and so it continues to be profitable to 
export cotton that would not otherwise be able to compete on the world market. 
There has been a general downward trend in cotton prices (adjusted for 
inflation) from the 1950s to the late 2000s (ITC 2011, figure 1.26). Cotton prices 
have followed a similar pattern to prices for agricultural commodities in general.94 
However cotton prices have fluctuated more widely than general agricultural 
                                                        
94 This includes a period of exceptionally high prices in the 1970s linked to the oil shocks (Baffes 
2011). 
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commodity prices and, while the latter began to recover in the early to mid 2000s, 
the price of cotton remained very low until the end of the decade.95 In addition to 
subsidies, factors affecting cotton prices include fluctuations in demand for cotton 
relative to synthetics;96 the internal balance of supply and demand in countries that 
both produce cotton and manufacture textiles, most notably China;97 and 
technological and biotechnological98 developments in agriculture that have increased 
yields, lowered the costs of production and increased the area under cultivation. 
Actual prices for cotton from the African Franc Zone are also affected by the 
exchange rate between the US dollar and the Euro (Bassett 2008, p. 53).99 
One question that arises in the literature revolves around whether the 
elimination of US and EU cotton subsidies would make a real difference to cotton-
producing African countries, including Mali, and to cotton farmers themselves. 
Gillson et al. (2004) explain that the answer to this question is complicated by the 
fact that the world cotton market is not a unitary, integrated market but a partially 
fragmented one, in which there is less scope for the substitution of one type of cotton 
with another. The world cotton market operates mainly on the basis of contracts, 
relationships and reputations, since buyers find these systems the most reliable 
methods of guaranteeing quality, quantity and delivery times of cotton lint; factors 
that are considered at least as important as price. Nonetheless, Gillson et al. (2004) 
conclude that on whichever basis the impact is calculated, the removal of US and EU 
subsidies would make a substantial difference to the incomes of cotton-producing 
African countries. 
 
under all the assumptions in all the studies, subsidies by the US and the 
EU depress the world price of cotton and reduce the income of 
developing countries, particularly those Least Developed countries most 
dependent on cotton for their foreign exchange earnings. Reducing these 
                                                        
95 After nearly a decade of extremely low prices, and following harvest failures in some countries, 
cotton production decreased in 2008/09 and 2009/10 (Cotton Inc 2011).95 Cotton prices rose 
dramatically in 2010 and continued to surge in 2011 to levels last seen in 1981 (Meyer 2011). It is 
expected that farmers will now increase output in response to high prices, and it is not clear whether 
prices for cotton will remain high. 
96 See Gillson et al. (2004, p. 88). 
97 For more information, see ICAC (2002, p. 10) and Goreux (2004). 
98 The introduction of GM cotton seeds has contributed to increased yields since 1990. 
99 In international markets, cotton prices are quoted in US dollars, while the CFA franc is pegged to 
the Euro. Bassett (2010, p. 47) observes that ‘Between January 2002 and May 2007, the world price 
of cotton increased by 12% but due to exchange rates, the price in Fcfa declined by 21%’. 
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subsidies, whether through national action, trade negotiations, or dispute 
settlements, would increase the income of poor countries and poor people 
within them. (Gillson et al. 2004, p. 65) 
 
Well over half of total world cotton subsidies in 1999/2000 were accounted 
for by US production and export subsidies, supporting only around 25,000 US cotton 
farmers (Valderrama Becerra 2000). Gillson et al. (2004, pp. 34–36) further note that 
despite their relatively small total size, EU cotton subsidies have a disproportionately 
large impact on cotton producers in West and Central Africa because cotton from 
these countries competes in the same segment of the world market.  
Citing studies that indicate that if all cotton subsidies were eliminated, world 
prices would increase by eleven percent, Thomas J. Bassett (2008, p. 36) asks, 
‘Would it [the price increase] trickle down to African cotton growers or end up in the 
pockets of other actors in the cotton commodity chain?’ His answer is a guarded and 
qualified ‘yes’: producers would see at least some price increase, but a significant 
portion of profits would be siphoned off by ginning and trading companies along the 
way, and the price increase would be short term, since the gap in the market would 
be filled by cotton-exporting countries that have greater flexibility to respond to 
fluctuations in demand. Bassett (2008, p. 58) also notes that the costs of agricultural 
inputs required for growing cotton according to conventional methods are as 
significant to farmer incomes as the prices they receive for their harvests. 
The impact of cotton subsidies on the world market in the context of 
declining prices became the focus of attention in the early 2000s. The International 
Cotton Advisory Committee’s Head Economist, Carlos Valderrama Becerra, 
produced a model that indicated that if US subsidies alone were eliminated, the 
projected average world cotton price for 2000/01 would be six US cents per pound 
higher than otherwise expected (Valderrama Becerra 2000). A number of cotton-
exporting countries sought to mount international pressure against these subsidies. At 
the World Trade Organization (WTO),100 Brazil made a legal case against the United 
                                                        
100 In establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995, member countries, including the 
United States, signed up to the Agreement on Agriculture, in which they promised to reduce domestic 
support, import tariffs and export subsidies by various percentages over a number of years.100 A 
distinction was made between domestic support programmes that distort production and trade (‘the 
amber box’) and those that do not (‘the green box’). There is no limit on green box subsidies, but 
amber box subsidies must be reduced to an agreed limit (five percent of agricultural production for 
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States, and four African countries proposed an initiative for the elimination of cotton 
subsidies. These complaints against developed country subsidies were accompanied 
by strong support from civil society organisations and became the focus of an 
international campaign against ‘unfair’ US and EU subsidies.101 
In September 2002, Brazil made a complaint against the United States 
through the WTO’s dispute settlement body regarding US subsidies on Upland 
cotton.102 Brazil complained that US domestic support and export subsidies cause 
serious prejudice to Brazil’s interests in the form of price suppression. After a long 
investigation and an appeal by the United States against the first ruling, the WTO 
eventually adopted the findings of its Dispute Settlement Body in favour of Brazil on 
21 March 2005.103 The WTO ruling was far from the end of the matter, since the 
WTO has no powers to force the United States to comply. The US Food, 
Conservation and Energy Act 2008 effectively shifted some government support 
from cotton to biofuels, but this was not enough to settle the dispute. Brazil 
eventually threatened the United States with retaliation, recourse to which it was 
                                                                                                                                                             
developed countries; ten percent for developing countries). There is also a ‘blue box’ for subsidies 
that are designed to reduce distortion of trade and limit production. There is currently no limit on blue 
box subsidies. The Agriculture Agreement also contained a ‘peace clause’ so that countries could not 
challenge one another’s subsidies for a period of nine years (until 31 December 2003) while they were 
in the process of reducing them, unless the subsidies exceeded 1992 levels.  
101 The European Union is a net importer of cotton. Greece and Spain are the only EU countries that 
produce significant volumes of cotton. In 2001, they accounted for six percent of world exports of 
cotton but sixteen percent of world subsidies to cotton (Gillson et al. 2004, p. 17). These subsidies 
support a generous target price for cotton. The European Union has the world’s highest level of 
subsidies per kilogram of cotton produced (Gillson et al. 2004, p. 34). Assistance is guaranteed for a 
maximum quantity of cotton but penalties in the form of lower subsidies are imposed on excess cotton 
produced above this level. Since these penalties are designed to limit production, EU cotton subsidies 
are classified as blue box subsidies. However, penalties were not sufficient to discourage excess 
production in Greece in the early 2000s (Goreux 2004, p. 19). 
102 ‘Dispute DS267: United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton’. 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm 
103 The United States had argued that its subsidy regime was protected until 2003 by the peace clause, 
but the WTO dispute panel found that the peace clause did not apply to a number of US support 
measures because they exceeded 1992 levels and because the United States wrongly classified 
decoupled payments in the green box (Benicchio 2005). This raised the level of subsidy support in the 
amber box above permitted levels. The WTO also ruled that Step 2 payments and export credit 
guarantee programmes counted as export subsidies. The United States had not reserved the right to 
use export subsidies under the Agreement on Agriculture, so the WTO ruled that these should be 
eliminated immediately. The WTO ruled that counter-cyclical payments, marketing loan payments 
and Step 2 payments caused serious prejudice to Brazil and other cotton exporting countries by 
preventing a rise in prices (Benicchio 2005, p. 35). 
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entitled under WTO rules.104 Only when Brazil announced it would take measures 
such as increasing import duties on US products did the United States enter into 
serious negotiations with Brazil. Brazil and the United States reached a preliminary 
agreement in April 2010 after Brazil threatened, amongst other moves, ‘to stop 
charging its farmers technology fees for seeds developed by American biotechnology 
companies’ (Chan/New York Times 2010). In response, the United States agreed to 
modify its export credit guarantee programmes but, rather than end its domestic 
support subsidies, it set up a technical assistance fund for Brazilian cotton farmers to 
the value of US$147.5 million per year (the value of the retaliation authorized by the 
WTO) until the next farm bill is passed or a final solution to the dispute is agreed. In 
February 2011, the US Congress voted against an amendment that would have ended 
the payments to Brazil. 
The Brazil–United States cotton case demonstrates the legitimacy of the 
complaint against US cotton subsidies but it also shows that in practice the world 
trade system is still far from rules-based. Without the authority to enforce the rules, 
the WTO system rests ultimately on countries’ relative bargaining power. When 
countries are linked by relations of dependence there are also fears of reprisals 
outwith the rule-governed trade system in the form of the withdrawal of aid.105 Benin 
and Chad took part in the dispute as third parties. This meant that the effect of US 
subsidies on their sectors could be taken into account, but as third parties they were 
not entitled to any form of compensation or to retaliation against the United States.  
In challenging the cotton subsidies of developed countries, Benin and Chad 
joined Mali and Burkina Faso in pursuing a different strategy from that of Brazil. 
These four African countries submitted their proposal, Poverty Reduction – A 
Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton, to the WTO in May 2003. The ‘Cotton Four’ 
proposed that a mechanism be set up at the WTO Ministerial meeting in Cancùn in 
September 2003, ‘to progressively reduce support to cotton production and export, 
with a view to fully suppressing all cotton subsidies at a defined deadline.’ 
(Compaore 2003). They also called for compensation to be paid to farmers of West 
and Central Africa for the losses incurred from developed country cotton subsidies 
                                                        
104 On 19 November 2009 Brazil was authorized by the WTO to retaliate against US subsidies on 
upland cotton. See www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm 
105 See, for example, Jawara and Kwa (2004, p. xxxviii). 
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pending their removal. The Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton specifically did 
not request preferential treatment or additional aid, but requested that WTO members 
recognise the strategic importance of cotton for development and poverty reduction 
in many of the world’s least developed countries.  
The Sectoral Initiative was tabled as an agenda item at the WTO Ministerial 
meeting in Cancùn in September 2003. Initially, it appeared to garner a great deal of 
support from the conference, and it certainly had very vocal support from 
demonstrators outside the conference. The Cotton Four made an agreement on cotton 
their bottom line in the negotiations at Cancùn. Their determination contributed to 
the breakdown of the talks. The United States was determined not to back down on 
agriculture and the European Union pushed for the introduction of the ‘Singapore 
issues’106 into the negotiations. The original agreement was that the Singapore issues 
would begin to be negotiated after the 2003 Cancùn conference if there was explicit 
consensus to do so.107 Developing countries including China, Brazil and India 
formed the Group of Twenty-One and insisted that negotiations on agriculture be 
completed before the Singapore issues be introduced. As the talks became 
deadlocked, the United States and the European Union moved negotiations from the 
official conference sessions to closed meetings of selected countries. The conference 
was brought to an abrupt end on 14 September. The Kenyan delegate walked out of a 
closed meeting because EU negotiators insisted that any deal on agriculture be 
contingent on agreement to introduce the Singapore issues.108 At the last minute, the 
European Union offered to negotiate on only one of the four Singapore issues (trade 
facilitation). But after consulting with members of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group, Botswana delivered the group’s decision that they would not negotiate on any 
of the Singapore issues until there was a satisfactory offer on agriculture on the table 
(GAO 2004, p. 33). 
A draft ministerial declaration, referred to as the ‘Derbez text’, mentioned the 
Sectoral Initiative on Cotton (paragraph 27). But, far from calling for an end to 
subsidies, it called for change in the countries whose economies are heavily 
                                                        
106 Investment, competition, government procurement, and trade facilitation. 
107 www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey3_e.htm consulted on 28/04/11. 
108 www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/gov/kenyagov.html consulted on 28/04/11; Elliott et al. 2003. 
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dependent on cotton and for the involvement of the Bretton Woods institutions in the 
matter. 
 
The Director-General is instructed to consult with the relevant 
international institutions including the Bretton Woods Institutions, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Trade Center to 
effectively direct existing programmes and resources toward the 
diversification of the economies where cotton accounts for the major 
share of their GDP.109  
 
This section of the text, which was drawn up by the conference chair, Luis 
Ernesto Derbez, reflected the US position and it was rejected outright by the Cotton 
Four. Benin submitted a proposed revision to the text on 7 October 2003.110 
Negotiations continued to stall. On the matter of cotton there appeared to be a game 
ping pong being played between the United States and the European Union on whose 
cotton subsidies were worse.  
The WTO initiated the African Regional Workshop on Cotton, held at 
Cotonou, Benin, in March 2004. The workshop was attended by representatives of 
the Cotton Four, twenty-six other African countries, Canada, the European Union, 
Japan, the United States and China.111 At this workshop, a distinction was made 
between the development aspects and the trade aspects of the Sectoral Initiative on 
Cotton. The workshop dealt exclusively with the development aspects, while the 
trade aspects were set aside to be dealt with as part of the general negotiations on 
agriculture. However the WTO’s Summary Conclusions of the workshop note, ‘it 
was frequently underlined that the optimal and comprehensive response lay in 
coherence between trade and development policies.’112 This reflects a disagreement 
between WTO member countries that wanted cotton to be negotiated separately 
(including the Cotton Four) and those that wanted cotton to be reintegrated into the 
global framework of agriculture negotiations (Amehou 2005, p. 25).  
At the Cotonou workshop, the EU and US negotiators presented their 
proposed responses to the development aspects of the Cotton Initiative. The EU–
                                                        
109 www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/draft_decl_rev2_e.htm consulted on 28/04/11. 
110 WT/GC/W/516 
111 Summary conclusions from the Cotonou workshop: document WT/L/564 of 31 March 2004. 
112 Summary conclusions from the Cotonou workshop: document WT/L/564 of 31 March 2004. 
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Africa Partnership for Cotton Development includes technical support and financial 
assistance to a large number of African cotton sectors in the form of loans and 
subsidies, as well as discussion of the ‘trade dimension’ (EU–ACP c.2008). The 
United States presented its Millennium Challenge Account, and the Cotonou 
workshop was the genesis of the West Africa Cotton Improvement Program (USAID 
2006), which was launched in November 2005 ahead of the next WTO Ministerial, 
in Hong Kong. 
In order to get negotiations on the trade aspects of cotton back on track, 
several principles were agreed in Geneva as part of the July 2004 Framework 
Agreement. Cotton was placed firmly back into the Doha round but it was agreed 
that it would be addressed ‘ambitiously, expeditiously, and specifically, within the 
agriculture negotiations.’113 A sub-committee on cotton was set up, charged with 
overseeing progress on the cotton issue and coherence between the trade and 
development aspects of cotton. Part of paragraph 27 of the Derbez text, cited above, 
reappeared almost word for word in the text of the ‘July package’, demonstrating 
how much ground the Cotton Four had lost to the United States since Cancùn.114 
The December 2005 WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong saw limited progress on 
cotton. The United States agreed to eliminate all export subsidies by 2006, but these 
had already been ruled illegal by the WTO in the Brazil dispute and they represented 
only a small percentage of total support to cotton (Oxfam/Green 2005, p. 12). The 
Cotton Four were faced with the pitfalls – which they had hoped to avoid – of cotton 
being integrated in the general agriculture negotiations. 
 
In Hong Kong, US negotiators managed to turn a dispute settlement 
ruling against the USA into a bargaining chip for which developing 
country negotiators were expected to make concessions in other areas. 
(Oxfam/Green 2005, p. 12) 
 
The other offers made by the United States were far from what the Cotton 
Four were looking for. It proposed to allow tariff-free and quota-free access for 
African cotton to its cotton market, regardless of the fact that the United States is not 
a target market for West African cotton (Oxfam/Green 2005, p. 8). The United States 
                                                        
113 WT/L/579 Appendix A. 
114 WT/L/579, paragraph 1(b). 
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also threw into the negotiations its West Africa Cotton Improvement Program 
(WACIP), which offered a small sum115 as financial assistance to selected countries 
(the Cotton Four plus Senegal) (ibid., p. 12). The WACIP also promotes 
liberalisation and privatisation in African cotton sectors, and the introduction of 
genetically-modified (GM) cotton (USAID 2006).116 The United States succeeded in 
changing the terms of the debate on cotton from criticism of subsidies to criticism of 
the competitiveness of African cotton sectors. 
International debate on developed country cotton subsidies was accompanied 
throughout by highly vocal opposition to ‘unfair subsidies’ from civil society 
organisations. Indeed, without civil society pressure, it is unlikely that the Sectoral 
Initiative on Cotton would have come about. Chapter six explores in detail the 




The principal lesson to be drawn from the events sketched in this chapter is 
that the world trade system is not rules-based, but power-based, in that stronger 
countries are able to effect outcomes in trade negotiations that are contrary to the 
rules, and that African farmers who participate in the global cotton value chain are in 
a particularly vulnerable position. US and EU cotton subsidies are extremely costly 
to African producers. However, they are not the only factors affecting farmers’ 
incomes. What is more, given the power-based nature of the world trade system, 
challenging these subsidies has been a relatively risky strategy for cotton-producing 
African countries. While the United States pays Brazilian farmers nearly $150 
million a year to avert retaliation against its cotton subsidy regime, it has offered 
only $5 million to West African cotton sectors, in the form of ‘aid’. Indeed, this 
rather paltry amount can be seen as another vehicle for the advancement of US 
economic interests, since it also promotes the introduction of biotechnology 
controlled by US firms, and by increasing pressure for – and ‘assistance’ with – 
deeper liberalisation and privatisation of African cotton sectors. 
                                                        
115 US$7 million, of which only $5 million is ‘new money’ (Oxfam/Green 2005, p. 12). 
116 Since non-food products made from GM cotton are not required to be labelled as such, there is no 
GM segment of the world cotton fibre market and no price premium linked to GM. 
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Analysis of liberal reform of African cotton sectors, promoted by the 
international financial institutions, demonstrates that not all functions previously 
carried out by single channel marketing systems are readily transferred to the private 
sector. A major problem identified with the liberalisation and privatisation of cotton 
sectors is the provision and recovery of input credit following the disestablishment of 
seed cotton purchasing monopsonies. This aspect is inextricably linked to the 
paradox of resource-poor farmers being reliant on expensive inputs. Pressure to keep 
using pesticides and synthetic fertilisers is linked to the imperative to maintain high 
quality fibre and high yields in order to remain competitive in international markets.  
It is only in the long term that the impacts of cotton sector reform on the 
provision of public goods such as agricultural extension, research and development 
will be seen. Meanwhile, sectors have fared better where they have been 
concentrated and when there has been effective co-ordination or co-operation 
between actors. Sector-wide institutions that bring together all stakeholders and 
regulatory bodies with real powers have been shown to be a minimum requisite for 
averting disaster. The experiences of Côte d’Ivoire and Benin warn of the 
implication of political interests in the management and reform of African cotton 
sectors: this is a theme all-too-pertinent to Mali, and which runs throughout the rest 
of this thesis. 
In Mali, cotton has brought wealth to rural communities, both in terms of 
private income and collective goods, such as infrastructure and healthcare centres. It 
has also brought poverty in the form of debts and a widening socio-economic gap 
between rich and poor households. The factors that originally discouraged peasants 
from adopting export-oriented cotton production have remained salient: cotton is 
labour and capital intensive, and vulnerable to fluctuations in the world market. An 
elite of cotton producers has gained a political voice since the early 1990s, with the 
creation of the first cotton union, SYCOV. While the CMDT and its French partners 
set out to educate SYCOV’s leaders about the world market and convince them to 
work together in pursuit of mutual interests, the union’s material dependence on the 
establishment has ensured their compliance. Cotton leaders have been drawn into 
webs of patron–client relations, while the vast majority of farmers in Mali remain 
inadequately represented and continue to suffer from the contradictions of cotton 
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policies. In his study of African farmers in the cotton commodity chain, Bassett 
(2008, p. 59) concludes that ‘Cotton producers and their supporters must struggle in 
both local and global arenas to increase their share of world market price as a step 
toward improving rural livelihoods in West Africa.’ The subsequent chapters explore 
this struggle, but also a wider one, in which some African smallholders question 
whether participating in the global cotton value chain is really the best strategy for 
enhancing their livelihoods. 










Research aims and objectives 
The aim of this research is to understand how civil society networks operate 
and what factors affect the impacts they have on livelihoods and on democratic 
participation in governance in local, national and international arenas. Within this 
broad aim, a specific objective of this research is to consider campaign networks as 
viewed from the standpoint of their beneficiary-participants. As mentioned in chapter 
one, this research aim was motivated in part by personal experience of working in a 
civil society network, as a campaigner with a Northern-based international NGO. 
The choice of research topic was motivated by my personal curiosity and my 
personal values. I wanted to know what grassroots participants and intended 
beneficiaries thought of the campaign, and I believed their perspectives were 
important. Christians (2005, p. 142) notes that Max Weber considered it normal and 
unproblematic that the researcher’s initial choice of topic be motivated by value 
judgments. The personal motivation for this research coincided with the empirical 
observation that international NGOs are focusing their efforts increasingly on 
transnational campaign networks and that there is increasing emphasis within this 
trend on deepening the involvement of Southern actors within these networks. The 
choice of research objective and of specific research questions was further motivated 
by a review of the literature on civil society networks, as detailed in chapter two, 
which points to the need for further research into power, values, interests and 












1. What are the perspectives, values and interests of (potential) actors in the 
transnational civil society networks? 
2. How do these perspectives, values and interests relate to the political arenas 
in which actors are situated and to the multiple political arenas through which 
network relations flow? 
3. How are actors’ different perspectives, values and interests mediated through 
network relations? What role does power play in these processes? 
4. How does transnational civil society action impact on the multiple political 
arenas through which network relations flow, in particular, on the livelihoods 




In order to narrow the focus of research, I set out to follow two lines of 
enquiry, one on opposition to privatisation of the cotton company (Compagnie 
Malienne pour le Développement des Textiles, CMDT) and the other on the 
campaign against US and EU cotton subsidies. I had identified these themes as 
significant political topics during fieldwork research for my Masters dissertation in 
2005. I wanted to observe real-time interactions between actors in a natural setting, 
but found that actors had largely moved on from activity around these two themes by 
the time I was conducting fieldwork research for this thesis. This meant that the data 
I could obtain on these two themes were largely limited to actors’ retrospective 
accounts given in interviews and to the contents of documents and other social 
artefacts. Nonetheless, I conducted participant observation at Malian social forums 
(Forum des Peuples), and observation at the offices of civil society organisations in 
Bamako. In addition to these two lines of enquiry, I decided to look at the work that 
two of the main actors in these case studies were subsequently doing in the cotton 
zone. The distinction between organisations and individual actors was blurred 
because, in both cases, the individuals had influenced the choice of work they were 
doing on behalf of their respective organisations. One of the actors was an Oxfam 
worker who was working with local cotton co-operatives through a Malian farmers’ 






association; the other was the president of a Malian NGO, based in Bamako, who 
was acting as a national level broker between a British NGO, Environmental Justice 
Foundation (EJF), and members of local cotton co-operatives. 
Early in the research process, I attempted to map out the transnational civil 
society network of actors involved in campaigning around cotton in Mali. This 
approach is similar to that used in social network analysis.117 However, I found this 
approach unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. There was a high degree of overlap 
between organisations and considerable blurring between individuals and 
organisations. The fluidity of relationships was such that it was difficult to take a 
‘snapshot’ of the social network. The three influence diagrams in appendix two 
represent an attempt to present snapshots for three different years, 2003, 2005 and 
2007. The process of attempting to map actors and their relationships prompted me 
to question whether there was a delimitable network engaged in civil society activity 
on cotton in Mali. The network analysis approach could have been applied in the 
case of a single, highly-organised campaign, such as that of the campaign against US 
and EU cotton subsidies, but the objectives of this research project were broader: to 
consider how such a campaign fits into the wider social and political environment; to 
consider non-participation as well as participation; and to consider the effects of the 
campaign on its would-be-beneficiaries. 
Through the difficulties that I experienced in gathering information in order 
to map actors and their relationships, I found out that the very definitions of these 
elements, which comprise civil society networks, were the subject of controversy 
among the actors themselves. I decided that this controversy, which is part of the 
ongoing process of network formation (cf. Henry, Mohan and Yanacopulos 2004, p. 
850), was the most interesting subject of research and the most pertinent to 
answering the research questions. I opted to carry out qualitative research in order to 
give prominence to the actors’ own interpretations and analyses of their relationships 
rather than developing my own interpretations of these relationships at an early stage 
of the research. This fieldwork methodology was influenced by the actor-oriented 
approach (Bebbington et al. 2003, p. 7). Observation and participant observation 
allowed study of interactions between actors, and interviews were used to facilitate 
                                                        
117 See, for example, Knoke and Yang (2008). 






enquiry into actors’ motivations and beliefs. This seemed to me to be the best way to 
work towards a degree of value neutrality – or more accurately, of value relevance – 
in the research process, as advocated by Max Weber (Christians 2005, p. 142).  
From the outset, I considered taking an ethnographic approach in order to 
gain insights into actors’ subjective perspectives and to observe their interactions in a 
natural setting. However, in addition to the obstacle noted above of seeking to 
research past events, I found that participation in campaign activity was not an 
everyday or core activity for many of the actors involved, even at the level of 
farmers’ unions. I decided against spending an extended period of time in a rural 
research site so as to avoid becoming immersed in agronomic concerns. A further 
obstacle to using ethnographic methods was access. The Oxfam worker mentioned 
above, who was a key gatekeeper, would not permit me to conduct participant 
observation on the grounds that the working relationships between the actors 
involved were already too strained. Instead, a combination of semi-formal and 
informal interviews were used, together with documentary analysis. Participant 
observation was used in following the Malian NGO, AMADIP. Interviews were also 
conducted with staff of AMADIP and EJF. These research methods are discussed in 
greater detail below. 
 
Research sites 
The fieldwork research for this thesis entailed following chains of 
relationships within networks of actors operating at global, national and local levels. 
The selection of research sites was inspired by multi-sited research: ‘Multi-sited 
research is designed around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, or juxtapositions of 
locations’ (Marcus 1995, p. 105). In the research, global, regional, national and local 
arenas were defined in terms of the focus of activities. Most organisations defined 
themselves in terms of a single arena, for example, as a national NGO or as a West 
African regional farmers’ network, but they often intervened in multiple arenas. 
Most individuals operated in more than one arena, for example, a representative in a 
regional network also held a national level position, participated in meetings of the 
World Trade Organization, and managed a family farm in his village of origin. 






In West Africa, research was conducted in Bamako and in Dakar, Senegal, 
and with farmers and farmer representatives in Mali’s cotton zone. Bamako, the 
capital of Mali, was selected as the hub of civil society activity on cotton in Mali. 
Dakar was selected because it was the location of the regional offices of the NGOs 
Oxfam and ENDA from which much of their campaigns and advocacy work on 
cotton in West Africa was coordinated. Beyond analysing documents produced in the 
UK by NGOs, only a very small amount of fieldwork was done in the UK, with 
campaign actors who had returned there after working in West Africa. The reason for 
this was in order to maintain the focus on West African actors rather than on the 
internal workings of Northern-based NGOs.  
In Mali, in addition to Bamako, the main sites chosen for fieldwork research 
were the locales of Koutiala and Fana, in the South East of the country (see figure 1 
on page iv). These were chosen through purposive sampling (Blaikie 2000, p. 205) as 
sites for semi-structured interviews, since they had contrasting reputations as 
politically ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ arenas.118 Koutiala, where the peasant movement 
emerged in the early 1990s,119 is a large town with a high level of cotton-based 
industry as well as an important market. Fana is a small market town, located on an 
arterial trunk road between Bamako and Segou. Interviews were conducted both in 
the centre of these small towns and in surrounding hamlets (Kodabougou, Wolodo, 
Dien, Moribila) so that voices from both centre and periphery might be heard.  
 
Fieldwork 
Qualitative, primary data were generated from individuals in semi-natural 
social settings through semi-structured interviews; in natural social settings through 
observation, participant observation and informal interviews; and from social 
artefacts (e.g. petitions, newspaper reports, project evaluation reports) through 
documentary analysis. 
I began the fieldwork stage of research for this thesis with a period of training 
in the Bamanankan language in Bamako from July to September 2006, at the start of 
which I took the opportunity to attend the Forum des Peuples social forum in Gao as 
                                                        
118 See Docking (2005, pp. 217–219). 
119 See chapter three, p. 55. 






a participant observer. In October 2006, shortly after I had begun informally 
interviewing civil society actors in Bamako, I suffered an assault, after which I left 
the field. I returned for an extended period from the start of June 2007 to the end of 
February 2008. 
I began this main period of fieldwork by attending the Forum des Peuples 
social forum in Sikasso as a participant observer in early June 2007. I then embarked 
on an attempt to map out the civil society actors involved in campaigning on cotton 
in Mali by conducting formal and informal interviews, and by attending relevant 
public events, mostly in Bamako. In July 2007, I took an opportunity that arose to 
observe the national parliamentary elections in Niono, where I was also able to 
observe a meeting of a newly-founded rice farmer’s union. From there, I joined the 
Malian NGO, AMADIP, on its research tour of the cotton zone in July and August 
2007, observing the NGO at work in villages and hamlets around Koutiala, Sikasso 
and Bougouni. Following this, Moctar Coulibaly of AMADIP, whom I informally 
helped with English-French translation, sought agreement from their British 
counterpart NGO, EJF for me to join their joint tour of the cotton zone later in the 
year. Before responding to this request, EJF staff asked Moctar Coulibaly to hire a 
French-English interpreter for their tour. I helped Moctar to look for a suitable 
Malian candidate but we were unable to find any to satisfy EJF’s requirements of a 
high level of English at a relatively low rate of pay. Eventually, Moctar nominated 
me; EJF offered me the job; and I accepted it on condition that I could act as a 
participant observer. I also provided free accommodation at my home in Bamako for 
the two EJF workers during their stay in Mali. The joint EJF–AMADIP tour of the 
cotton zone (Fana, Koutiala, San, Sikasso, Bougouni) took place in November 2007. 
In September, October and December 2007, I conducted formal and informal 
interviews and observation with civil society actors and farmer representatives in 
Bamako. In January 2008, I travelled to Dakar, Senegal, in order to interview staff at 
the regional headquarters of Oxfam and ENDA. In February 2008, in addition to 
continuing my work in Bamako, I conducted interviews and observation in Fana and 
nearby hamlets (Dien, Wolodo, Kodabougou) and in Koutiala and nearby Moribila. I 
concluded the fieldwork in October 2008 with follow-up interviews with two NGO 






workers in the UK who had been informants in Mali; a formal interview in London 
and an informal one in Oxford. 
 
There were advantages and drawbacks to each of the methods of data 
collection that I used. Clearly, an advantage of conducting participant observation as 
an interpreter was that it secured my access to the EJF–AMADIP tour of the cotton 
zone, but a disadvantage was that I was so busy interpreting that I did not have much 
time to make my own fieldnotes. In the evenings, I was able to make some notes on 
the evolving relationship between AMADIP and EJF, and their interactions with 
other organisations. But I was not able to note down much of the rich data provided 
by EJF’s interviewees. A verbal agreement to share this data was subsequently 
withdrawn due to concerns over data protection on the part of the EJF staff member’s 
line manager. Indeed, from an ethical perspective, it was possible to obtain informed 
consent from these interviewees in some, but not in all, cases. For the most part, I 
gathered field observations and notes of informal interviews, not linked to 
individuals by name.  
The main method of data collection I used was formal interviewing. This had 
an advantage in terms of ethics; it was clear to informants how I would use the 
information they gave me. As mentioned above, it also enabled me to find out about 
events in the past, and about actors’ subjective perspectives. Interviewees were 
selected through ‘snowball’ sampling (Blaikie 2000, p. 205), which identified 
individuals who had worked together in the network. I attempted to use the 
signatories to two petitions as populations from which to select interviewees, but the 
data from only one of these petitions were available. In the case of that petition, not 
all of the names were legible and I was not able to locate all of the individuals whose 
names were legible. Thus I was obliged to use the snowball method for finding 
people who had signed either petition, largely through the recommendations of the 
petition organisers and of research assistants at each locality. This was how I made 
contact with the interviewees in Wolodo, Kodabougou and Dien. I was also keen to 
interview some individuals who had not participated in either petition, and I used the 
snowball method for that, too, in particular through a research assistant who had 






acted as a local point of contact for the NGO tours in which I acted as a participant 
observer. This was how I made contact with the interviewees in Moribila. 
A comprehensive list of formal interviews conducted is provided in appendix 
one. Forty-four interviews were conducted in total. The breakdown by locality was 
as follows: Bamako (17), Dakar (2), London (1), Fana (8), Dien (4), Wolodo (1), 
Kodabougou (1), Koutiala (8), Moribila (2). However, the location of interview was 
not overly significant in many cases, for example, of farmer representatives who 
travelled frequently between Bamako and their home towns or villages in the cotton 
zone, and of NGO workers who travelled frequently between Dakar and Bamako. 
A limitation of all interviews was that the accuracy of the data depended 
upon the quality of the informants’ memories. To some extent this limitation was 
mitigated by the research focus on attitudes and opinions rather than facts, and the 
use of multiple informants and social artefacts to corroborate reported events. 
However, it was common for farmer interviewees in the cotton zone to be unable to 
recall which petitions they had signed, because, they said, CMDT agents were 
always coming to ask them to sign various pieces of paper. This frequent remark was 
in itself quite telling of the power relationship between the CMDT and farmers.  
Another challenge arose from the use of multiple languages. Most of the 
research was conducted in French, which is a second language for me, as it was for 
most of the interviewees. A few interviews were conducted in English, with native 
speakers. In the cotton zone, however, I employed research assistants to act as 
interpreters as well as gatekeepers and, in some cases, chauffeurs. Informants chose 
between speaking Bamanankan, Minyanka or French. In practice, most spoke a 
hybrid of Bamanankan and French. My rudimentary knowledge of Bamanankan was 
sufficient to notice rare occasions when the interpreter did not interpret my question 
accurately or missed out information given in reply. I also had the advantage of 
direct translation of interview transcripts from Bamanankan to English with the help 
of a native speaker after leaving the field. The main challenge I found in terms of 
language was the paucity of vocabulary among informants in the cotton zone, or, as I 
suspected was also the case, a tendency to talk around the subject rather than to 
speak frankly. Idiomatic use of language was common, which was pleasingly poetic 
but left unwanted scope for interpretation. At the interview stage, I attempted to 






address this through follow-up questions, and, at the analysis stage, I used the whole 
interview to inform my interpretation of specific phrases. 
The way in which I conducted fieldwork was affected by my own personal 
identity and subjectivities. The reality of being a British woman researching the 
male-dominated world of African farmer organisations was that it was uncomfortable 
most of the time. My reaction to culture shock and experiencing an ‘outsider’ 
identity was to build up social ties with people I had met in Bamako during a 
previous fieldtrip but who would not be informants for this study. When I returned to 
the field after the assault in 2006, I relied on my social networks for a sense of 
security to an even greater extent, and I avoided situations in which I would be alone 
or isolated. It was not possible to avoid such situations entirely while conducting 
research, but if it were not for these fears over personal safety, I would have travelled 
independently in the cotton zone and in pursuit of certain potential interviewees more 
than I did.120 More generally, security was a concern when travelling to certain areas, 
for example, the village of Moribila between Koutiala and San, even in the company 
of Malian NGO workers, because of the high incidence of hijacking and armed 
robbery in the area, a phenomenon that has since escalated to levels of international 
concern.121 
I found early on that asking informants to sign consent forms was an 
inappropriate tool for making research ‘ethical’ in the field. The very use of the 
written word on paper and the power-symbol of a signature reinforced the power 
relationship between interviewer and interviewee, in a context in which farmers were 
wary of being duped into signing away their land rights. In Mali, social ties are a 
better-trusted system of protection than is the legal-juridical system. Thus the social 
ties that I had built up in Mali were valued highly by my informants as a form of 
reassurance that I was trustworthy and that if I let them down, they knew who to 
complain to. Each of my gatekeepers in rural areas would introduce me to 
interviewees with a long preamble, naming all the individuals, families and 
organisations through whom they knew me. I presented myself and my research 
                                                        
120 Baz Lecocq (2002) argues that fears over personal safety significantly affected research decisions 
he made during fieldwork in Mali. 
121 Police would only allow us to continue on the road if we paid for two Tuaregs armed with AK-47s 
to ride in the back of our pick-up (fieldnotes, Koutiala, 12/11/07). 






project; showed the informant my dictaphone, explained that I needed it to help me 
remember exactly what they said and asked their permission to record; and asked 
whether they wished to be cited by name or anonymously. Once permission was 
obtained and confidentiality preference stated, I indicated that I would begin 
recording and asked the interviewee to introduce themselves in their chosen manner.  
All interviewees gave full consent at the start of the interview, some emphatic 
that their names, occupations and locales be stated clearly. However, two 
professional interviewees requested anonymity part-way through the recording when 
discussing particularly sensitive matters. Both informants were concerned to avoid 
souring professional relationships. Mid-way through one of these interviews, when I 
rather naïvely posed a question as to how a farmer leader whose reputation was 
tarnished by allegations of corruption had nonetheless been elected president of a 
national union, the informant became suspicious of me, suggesting that I could not 
be a research student because I knew too much. Trust was quickly regained, however 
(my naivety all too obvious), and I realised that the informant was worried about 
being quoted publicly as saying something that might make him a target of 
politically-motivated harassment, which might range from threats to arbitrary 
imprisonment or a beating. I gave assurances of anonymity and later emailed a 
censored copy of the interview transcript to the informant to reassure that no 
controversial comments would be linked to the informant’s name.  
Two interviewees protected themselves from being misquoted – or perhaps 
from saying too much – by insisting on bringing witnesses into the interview with 
them. Initially I was concerned that the presence of witnesses would distort the data 
and ensure that only public rather than hidden transcripts would be revealed. But, 
from an ethical perspective, it was paramount that the informants felt safe. Once they 
felt safe, the informants actually spoke quite openly while remaining comfortable 
with the interview process. 
In using the snowballing method for obtaining contacts for interview, I was 
keenly aware of the need to avoid putting informants at risk (professionally, 
politically or personally) by giving away any information that might lead to their 
identification in connection with the expression of certain opinions or my obtention 
of certain information. I felt very uncomfortable in this situation. Particularly with 






regards to the politically-sensitive data, I felt as though I were inadvertently peeking 
into Pandora’s Box and I wanted to close the lid quickly. At the same time, I was 
curious and I felt I needed to understand more, while my sense of justice motivated 
me to get to the bottom of the stories and viewpoints participants had shared with 
me. But I kept reminding myself that I was an academic researcher, not an 
investigative journalist. I tried to maintain a broader perspective, to explore how 
these shadowy machinations (which I was unlikely ever to uncover fully) – and 
moreover the fear and outrage that interviewees expressed (whether justified or not) 




The data were analysed by grouping together similar statements from the 
informants’ responses and entering them into a matrix with information about the 
speaker: their place of residence/work, their occupation, their organisational 
affiliation, any social positions held, and whether they had taken part in campaigning 
either on cotton subsidies or on privatisation/liberalisation. In the case of cotton 
farmers and their representatives, their membership of any farming union or past 
participation in cotton strikes were noted, and used as indicators of the history, level 
and nature of their political activity. Similarly, other types of data such as field 
observations, informal interviews, email communications and written documents 
were grouped both according to theme and according to context. Informants’ reports 
of events were cross-checked with other informants’ testimonials and with 
newspaper reports and organisations’ reports; while the opinions they expressed were 
compared and contrasted.
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Chapter five 
Opposition to liberalisation of the cotton 




This chapter looks at civil society opposition to the cotton sector reform 
programme in Mali. It examines the responses of cotton farmers and their 
organisations to the reforms, and considers their relationships (or lack thereof) to 
domestic and transnational civil society networks. The chapter looks at the roles of 
an international non-governmental organisation (NGO), Oxfam, which worked with 
producer groups on the issue, and of groups from wider civil society in Mali, which 
led a petition against privatisation of the Malian cotton company, CMDT 
(Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement des Textiles). The background to the 
reforms, including the domestic and international policy contexts in which they are 
situated, was detailed in chapter three. 
The interventions by an international NGO and by a national NGO coalition, 
examined in this chapter, involved attempts to facilitate the participation of Malian 
farmers in the debate over cotton sector reform. One of the main critiques of 
participatory development is that it is attempted without an adequate understanding 
of how power operates in the context in question (Hickey and Mohan 2004). In this 
case, civil society opposition to the cotton reforms was not connected – or not 
connected effectively – between local, national and international arenas; this chapter 
investigates why. 
The idea to explore a case in which a transnational advocacy network did not 
emerge is inspired in part by the need, identified in chapter two, to understand the 
political arenas in which potential network actors are situated, and in part by 
Crenson’s (1971) study, comparing the emergence and non-emergence of air 
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pollution as a political issue in two American cities.122 The differences between 
Crenson’s study and this case are vast, however; the machinations of politics in this 
case were far from subtle, and opposition to privatisation featured strongly as a 
political issue. Yet, where there was potential for the mobilisation of a strong, 
transnational civil society movement against liberal reform of Mali’s cotton sector, 
none emerged. By exploring the wider political context and paying attention to a 
campaign issue that did not develop into the basis for concerted transnational action, 
this case study sheds light on aspects of the construction of transnational civil society 
networks which might otherwise remain obscure. 
The main argument of this chapter is that civil society opposition to liberal 
reform of Mali’s cotton sector was not connected – or not connected effectively – 
between local, national and international arenas because there were diverse interests 
at stake, there was competition between alternative framings of debate, and there was 
an inadequate analysis of power by potential network actors. Part of the explanation 
for this disjuncture lies in the adherence of the international NGO to its own agenda, 
driven by priorities shaped in the international arena, and by its lack of understanding 
of the local and national political arenas in Mali. 
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first looks at the programme for 
reform of the cotton sector in Mali, and at the somewhat belated attempts by 
producer leaders to develop a united position on the policy changes. It considers the 
support offered to the producers by an international NGO, and notes that some 
farmers began to voice their concerns through a social forum organised by a coalition 
of national NGOs. The second section looks at how the World Bank responded to 
slow implementation by the Malian Government of the unpopular reforms, and how 
the Government in turn secured the co-operation of cotton union leaders for a 
liberalised price-setting mechanism demanded by the Bank. The third section 
considers the perspectives of organisers of, signatories to, the petition against 
privatisation of the CMDT. It compares them with those of the cotton farmers’ 
leaders and considers why they differ. This final section also reflects on issues of 
                                                        
122 Carpenter (2007) makes a rare attempt to theorise why some topics are taken up as issues by 
transnational advocacy networks while others are not. Although Carpenter’s insights bear some 
relevance here, it is not so much issue non-emergence but the disjointedness of a potential network 
that is the focus of this chapter. 
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representation and advocacy, and the potential contributions of civil society 
organisations, both national and international. 
 
 
Cotton sector reform and producers’ responses 
In February 2001, the Government of Mali set up a task force, the Mission de 
Restructuration du Secteur Coton (MRSC), reporting directly to the Prime Minister 
and charged with ‘elaborating, coordinating, monitoring and implementing’ reform 
of the cotton sector (Republic of Mali 2004, p. 2). The MRSC organised the États 
Généraux du Secteur Coton in April 2001, in which representatives of the CMDT, 
the Government, donors and producers were invited to participate. At this meeting, 
producer organisations, encouraged by the Association des Organisations 
Professionelles Paysannes (AOPP), voiced their opposition to the privatisation 
agenda put forward by the Government. In an interview, AOPP External Relations 
Secretary, Ibrahima Coulibaly outlined the position that his organisation took at the 
cotton sector meeting. 
 
We fought a lot against privatisation because we think that it is not the 
solution and, despite the fact that cotton has problems, it is not the act of 
cutting up the company, selling it to private interests that is going to sort 
out farmers’ problems – at the risk of creating more problems for 
farmers. […] So for us it [the solution] wasn’t really privatisation but 
cleaning up the management of the company – reducing the personnel 
perhaps, I don’t know, or the operating costs or other things – but really 
managing the company well so that it might be profitable without being 
privatised. That was our position.123  
 
The AOPP acknowledged the problems with the CMDT but argued that its 
management should be improved rather than the company privatised. 
The output of the États Généraux du Secteur Coton was integrated into the 
cotton sector development policy (Lettre de Politique de Développement du Secteur 
Coton, LPDSC), which was adopted by the Council of Ministers on 6 June 2001. But 
                                                        
123 Interview with Ibrahima Coulibaly, AOPP External Relations Secretary and President of CNOP, 
Bamako, 17/01/08. Original: On s’est beaucoup battus contre la privatisation parce que nous pensons 
que ce n’est pas la solution et, malgré le fait que le coton connaît les problèmes, ce n’est pas le fait de 
découper la société, de la vendre à des privés qui va régler les problèmes des paysans au risque de 
créer encore de problèmes aux paysans. 
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as the following citation from the policy paper shows, the producers stood little 
chance of resisting liberal reform of the sector: 
 
The Government stays loyal to its policy of liberalisation of the economy 
translated by a disengagement of the State from productive, industrial 
and commercial activities in favour of the private sector and local groups. 
At the Etats Généraux du Secteur Coton, the Government recalled that a 
sector as large as the cotton sector could not remain outside of this 
policy. But it has been made clear that every reform of this sensitive 
sector should be measured, well thought through and consensual. This is 
why it is envisaged that in a timely manner awareness-raising activities 
will be carried out among producers on the incontrovertible reforms of 
the sector. (République du Mali 2001, p. 2, emphasis added, my 
translation)124 
 
The central thrust of the cotton sector development policy as laid out in the 
LPDSC was the withdrawal of the State from the productive, industrial and 
commercial activities of the CMDT. The CMDT was to refocus its activities on the 
industrial and commercial aspects of the cotton sector, and to withdraw from public 
services, agricultural extension services, input and equipment provision, and 
transportation. This was to entail a corresponding reduction in personnel. The 
financial capital of the CMDT was to be opened up to producers and workers. 
Producers were to be involved in providing the services they themselves required. In 
recognition of the fact that as they stood in 2001, producer organisations did not have 
the legal status to allow them to become shareholders in the CMDT and were not 
capable of taking over the functions of service provision, the policy provided for 
capacity building of managerial skills and organisation among producers.125 
The action plan that accompanied the policy anticipated the installation of a 
private company in the zone administered by the Office de la Haute Vallée du Niger 
(OHVN), with shares to be ceded by June 2002.126 The cotton oil and other by-
                                                        
124 Original : [L]e Gouvernement reste fidèle à sa politique de libéralisation de l’économie se 
traduisant par un désengagement de l’Etat des activités productives, industrielles et commerciales au 
profit du secteur privé et des collectivités locales. Le Gouvernement a rappelé lors des Etats Généraux 
du Secteur Coton, qu’un secteur aussi important que la filière coton ne pouvait pas rester à l’écart de 
cette politique. Mais il a été précisé que toute réforme de ce secteur sensible devrait être mesurée, 
réfléchie et consensuelle. C’est pourquoi il est envisagé de mener dans les meilleurs délais des actions 
de sensibilisation auprès des producteurs sur les réformes incontournables de la filière. 
125 This aspect of the reforms is discussed in chapter six. 
126 According to the first revision of the timetable, which was agreed on 3 October 2001. 
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products industries were also to be liberalised, and the cotton oil company, 
HUICOMA, to be privatised by June 2002, with the State retaining a maximum of 
twelve percent of shares in the company. Liberalisation of the entire cotton sector 
was to be completed between 2003 and 2005, including opening up to competition, 
to new operators and the privatisation of the CMDT. The State was ultimately to 
hold no more than twenty percent of shares in the cotton company (or companies) 
(République du Mali 2001). 
The sales of shares in HUICOMA and in the OHVN zone were not 
completed by June 2002. The Government under President Konaré had prepared the 
way for the sales. But Konaré stepped down in June 2002 having served two terms in 
office, the maximum allowed by the constitution. Amadou Toumani Touré (known 
as ATT) was elected as an independent candidate and formed a government in which 
all the major parties were represented. The timing of the general election probably 
delayed the sales, but then the outbreak of civil war in Côte d’Ivoire in September 
2002 made successful privatisations impossible. Until then, most of Mali’s cotton 
and cotton oil had been trucked through Côte d’Ivoire to the port of Abidjan for 
export. Donors assessed that this slippage of the reform timetable was due to ‘market 
risks arising from the sub-regional crisis’ and was not the fault of the Malian 
Government (ADF 2007, paragraph 3.1.3). As such, it did not hinder the payment in 
December 2003 of the second tranche of the Third Structural Adjustment Credit 
(SAC III) under the HIPC framework. HUICOMA was eventually privatised in 
2005, and the sale of assets in the OHVN zone was subsumed into the programme 
for the complete privatisation of the CMDT. 
While implementation of the cotton sector reform programme progressed 
slowly, the cotton producer organisations had much-needed time to regroup. At the 
États Généraux du Secteur Coton, the cotton producers’ organisations were in 
disarray following the 2000/01 strike that split the union movement. It was because 
of this lack of capacity in the unions that the main challenge to the liberalisation 
policy at this time came from the AOPP. The AOPP evolved out of the Commission 
Paysanne, a network of peasant organisations supported by the French NGO, 
Agriculteurs Français et Développement International (AFDI). It was formally 
established as an association of peasant organisations in 1995. In 2001, through the 
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work of its cotton commission, the AOPP was ‘able to bridge some of the divides 
between different union leaders that had become major cleavages during the strike 
and try to get more of a united producer voice to engage with government and the 
Bank.’127  
In April 2001, SYCOV convened an extraordinary congress of its members to 
replace the incumbent national president of the union, Yaya Traoré, before the end of 
his term in office. The newly elected president was Ampha Coulibaly, who had been 
president of the rebellious Koutiala regional branch of SYCOV that called the 1998 
strike. By 2002 there were four cotton producers’ unions in Mali: SYCOV and 
SYVAC in southern Mali; SPCK and SYPAMO in the Kita region of western Mali. 
They started to work together as a semi-formal group, known as the Groupement. 
SYCOV’s new president, Ampha Coulibaly, also became president of the 
Groupement until he was replaced in both roles by Bakary Togola of Sikasso in 
2003/04.128 In 2004, the group of unions was officially recognised as the 
Groupement des Syndicats des Cotonniers et Vivriers du Mali (GSCVM), and it 
replaced SYCOV as the channel through which the Government negotiated with the 
producers (ENDA Diapol 2008, p 48). 
In order for producers to take on the responsibilities envisaged for them in a 
liberalised cotton sector, a new form of producer organisation was deemed 
necessary. Law no. 01-076 on the registration of co-operative societies was passed 
on 18 July 2001, giving legal status to co-operatives but not to village associations. It 
would take some time to transform each and every village association into a co-
operative, not least because the initiative for change came from the top down. By 
2007, the co-operatives would be organised into a pyramid-shaped federation, which 
will be considered in detail in chapter seven. In the meantime, it was the unions, the 
Groupement and the AOPP’s cotton commission that stood between farmers and the 
reforms.  
As one of the stronger national civil society organisations in Mali, the AOPP 
attracted the support of the international NGO, Oxfam. In October 2002, 
representatives from the AOPP and Oxfam went together to Washington DC to lobby 
                                                        
127 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
128 Interview with Ampha Coulibaly, Koutiala, 23/02/08. 
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the World Bank directly on the cotton privatisation agenda.129 This initiative was led 
by the AOPP representative, Ibrahima Coulibaly, who used his personal contacts at 
the World Bank. He reported, however, that he felt that this strategy had proved 
futile: “I myself- We went all the way to Washington. … We campaigned all the way 
to Washington. But what? That does no good. … That doesn’t change the position of 
the Bank. It changes nothing.”130 
Oxfam staff working with farmers’ organisations in West Africa were well 
aware that issues to do with privatisation and liberalisation were at the forefront of 
people’s concerns. Nevertheless, at international level, Oxfam’s attentions were 
subsequently diverted to its campaign against US and EU cotton subsidies, which 
will be considered in detail in the next chapter.  
 
They’re not exactly competing agendas but, you know, at a global level, 
because of the prominence of the WTO process, and because that was 
kind of the target in terms of Oxfam’s global campaigning, the 
organisation was very much focused on the issues that could be directly 
linked to the WTO process.131 
 
At national level in Mali, however, Oxfam continued to support the AOPP, 
which was ‘fighting a little bit of a rear guard action to try and oppose privatisation’ 
at a time when the policy was already beginning to be implemented.132 The 
international NGO helped to fund a series of activities organised by the AOPP’s 
cotton commission from early 2003 onwards.133 These activities included advocacy 
training, travelling to other countries to learn about experiences of privatisation 
there, and informing grassroots farmers about the reforms through radio.134 
Keifa Diarra was part of a delegation of Malian producers who travelled to 
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Cameroon and Chad to learn about the processes 
of privatisation and liberalisation of the cotton sectors in those countries. He 
                                                        
129 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07; interview with 
AOPP External Relations Secretary, Bamako, 17/01/08. 
130 Interview with Ibrahima Coulibaly, AOPP External Relations Secretary, Bamako, 17/01/08. 
Original: Moi, je suis- On est allé jusqu’à Washington. On est allé. On a fait la campagne jusqu’à 
Washington. Mais qu’est-ce que- ? Ça sert à rien, ça sert à rien. Ça ne change pas la position de la 
Banque. Ça ne change rien.  
131 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
132 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
133 See influence diagram for campaign actors in 2003, in appendix two. 
134 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
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discussed his experience of the trip during an interview conducted in 2008, at which 
time he was SYCOV’s regional president in Fana and secretary general at national 
level. 
 
the countries that went through privatisation before us, not one of those 
countries copes. We started with Benin, which was the showcase, where 
we all went on a study tour there to see what happens at the outset … and 
in the end we realised that it was worthless. […] So, after the tour of 
Cameroon, of Benin, of Chad, of Burkina Faso, of Côte d’Ivoire, we 
understood that privatisation- not one of their companies could bear it 
any longer. The only one that could manage it a little well was the one 
that had Burkina. At the time Burkina had not really opened its door. It 
had only just opened its capital to producers and it stopped there. So we 
could understand that over there and over here it’s the same, that’s why 
it’s ok.135 
 
Keifa Diarra’s perspective was echoed by the then SYCOV leader, Ampha 
Coulibaly, who reported having taken part in a study trip to Burkina Faso, Benin and 
Côte d’Ivoire that was financed by the World Bank and the French development 
agency, AFD.136 Cotton producer leaders in Mali looked to Burkina Faso, where 
reforms were relatively minimal, as a model of privatisation to be followed. They 
accepted the opening up of the capital of the cotton company to producers and the 
taking over of certain functions by producer organisations, but they wanted to retain 
an otherwise integrated system involving a single cotton company.  
Ampha Coulibaly said that on their return from their regional tour, the farmer 
leaders told the Malian State that they did not want ‘savage privatisation’ and that the 
State would just have to wait because the farmers were not well organised yet: co-
                                                        
135 Keifa Diarra, SYCOV Regional President, Fana, 19/02/08. Original: les pays qui nous ont précédé 
à la privatisation, aucun de ces pays ne s’en sort. On a commencé par le Bénin qui était la vitrine, où 
on a tous fait le voyage d’étude là-bas pour voir ce qui se passe au départ … et finalement on a 
compris que ça ne vaut rien. […] Donc après le tour du Cameroun, du Bénin, du Tchad, du Burkina 
Faso, de la Côte d’Ivoire, on a compris que la privatisation au- aucune de ses sociétés ne le supportait 
plus. Le seul qui le supportait un peu bien c’était l’une qui l’avait le Burkina. Et à l’époque le Burkina 
ne s’était pas en porte vraiment ouvert. Elle avait tout juste ouvert son capital aux producteurs et ça 
s’arrêtait là. Donc on pouvait comprendre que chez eux et chez nous c’est la même chose c’est 
pourquoi ça va.  
136 Interview, with Ampha Coulibaly, Koutiala, 23/02/08. 
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operatives would have to be set up in every village and, even at the time of speaking 
in 2008, this mission had not been completed.137 
 
If today [in 2008] you see that the privatisation is still being 
implemented, that it hasn’t yet been completed in Mali, it’s us the 
producers who have blocked it. It’s us, it’s us who have said ‘No, we 
don’t want savage privatisation’. Indeed, it’s us that always say, ‘We’re 
not organised; we’re not organised; we’re not organised’. … But if today 
in 2008 we tell them we are not organised. If I say to you ‘Wait, I’m not 
organised. You must wait for me until next year.’ Next year I say, ‘ah, I 
am still not organised. You must give me more time.’ I am obliged to go 
ahead. There is nothing else to say. That’s where we are today.138 
 
The cotton producers’ organisations were not ready to undertake the new 
roles envisaged for them in a liberalised cotton sector. This was indeed given as a 
reason for delays in the implementation of the reforms (World Bank 2006, p. 12). 
Ampha Coulibaly claimed that this feet-dragging was a deliberate delaying tactic on 
the part of the cotton unions.139  
Meanwhile, increasing numbers of farmers got involved in an annual social 
forum, the Forum des Peuples, organised by a coalition of civil society groups, 
CAD-Mali (Coalition des Alternatives Africaines Dette et Développement).140 In 
2004 the forum was held in Kita and a group of ten farmers from Fana went to the 
forum to express their discontent regarding the privatisation of the CMDT.141  
 
                                                        
137 Interview with Ampha Coulibaly, Koutiala, 23/02/08. Original: on ne veut pas la privatisation 
sauvage. 
138 Interview with Ampha Coulibaly, President of the Regional Union of Cotton Producer Co-
operatives of Koutiala and San, Koutiala, 23/02/08. Original: Aujourd’hui si on voit que la 
privatisation est en cours jusqu’à présent ce n’est pas réalisée au Mali, c’est nous les producteurs qui 
ont débloqué. C’est nous, c’est nous qui a dit « non, on ne veut pas la privatisation sauvage ». Or c’est 
nous toujours on dit que « nous on n’est pas organisés ; nous on n’est pas organisés ; nous on n’est pas 
organisés ». … Mais si aujourd’hui en 2008, bon, on leur dit on n’est pas organisé. Si je te dit 
« attends, moi je ne suis pas organisé. Il faut m’attendre l’année prochaine ». L’année prochaine je dit 
« ah, jusqu’à présent je ne suis pas organisé. Il faut me donner encore un temps » Je suis obligé d’y 
aller. Je n’ai pas autre mot à dire. On est à ce face là aujourd’hui.  
139 Serra (2012) argues that delays in implementation have had some positive benefits in terms of 
gradual shaping of the reforms to the preferences of Malian actors and increasing consensus, 
acceptance and ownership of the reforms. 
140 Interview with Mme A. Barry, President of CAD-Mali, Bamako, 25/02/08. Original: La première 
édition, il y avait 400 participants dont environ 300 était des paysans ; la deuxième édition où il y 
avait 650 participants dont 450 était des paysans, la troisième édition où il y avait 750 participants 
dont 500 était des paysans et à Fana où vous étiez il y avait 1500 participants dont environ 1000 
étaient des paysans. 
141 Interviews with several farmers, Fana, 17/02/08. 
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When the railway was privatised, there were difficulties for the 
population of Kita, cutting their resources and paralysing the village of 
Kita. These difficulties were explained to us at the Kita forum in 2004. 
Us, we are in a cotton zone and we don’t know if the CMDT, which is 
our resource, will be sold and we will experience the same difficulties as 
Kita. …[W]e said to ourselves that it’d be better to come explain our 
discontent faced with the problems of the privatisation of the CMDT.142 
 
The group had been approached by one of the forum organisers, CAD-Mali 
Press Officer Modibou G. Coulibaly, who originated from Fana and who had 
established the local community radio station, Radio Fanakan. Modibou Coulibaly 
(CAD-Mali) reported that, at the Kita forum in 2004, some individual SYCOV 
leaders spoke in favour of privatisation: ‘we called them “the sell-outs”’.143 He 
reported that the main conclusion of the discussion at the 2004 forum was that the 
CMDT should not be privatised but that farmers should be integrated into the 
company’s management and represented on its governing board so as to avoid a 
repetition of the mismanagement that had crippled the company and cheated the 
producers. The Fana delegation’s request to host the following year’s forum was 




Cotton union leaders comply with implementation 
The timetable for cotton sector reform underwent a number of revisions. In 
2004, privatisation of the CMDT was due to be completed by 2006. But then 
President Touré dispensed with protocol and wrote a personal letter to the director of 
the World Bank to delay privatisation until 2008.  
 
In the summer of 2004, the President of Mali informed the Bank of the 
Government decision to postpone the privatization of CMDT by two 
                                                        
142 Interview with Mamadou Konaté, President of the local Chamber of Agriculture in the commune 
of Gigya, Fana, 17/02/08. Original: Quand le chemin de fer a été privatisé il y a eu des difficultés au 
niveau de la population de Kita en coupant leurs ressources et paralyser le village de Kita. Ces 
difficultés nous ont été expliquées lors du forum de Kita en 2004. Nous, nous sommes dans une zone 
cotonnière et on ne sait pas si la CMDT qui est notre ressource sera vendu et qu’on va rencontrer les 
mêmes difficultés que le Kita. …[O]n s’est dit qu’il sera mieux de venir expliquer nos 
mécontentements face aux problèmes de la privatisation de la CMDT.  
143 Interview with Modibou Coulibaly, CAD-Mali activist, Bamako, 13/02/08. 
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years from 2006 to 2008, because of: (a) the delay in selecting an 
investment bank to advise the Government on the privatization; (b) the 
need for more time to strengthen producer associations; and (c) the 
Presidential election scheduled for the Spring of 2007. This important 
announcement from the President of Mali was taken as a sign of the lack 
of political commitment on the part of the Government for the 
privatization of CMDT, and contributed to the delay in processing the 
operation. (World Bank 2006, p. 12) 
 
The fact that President Touré sought to delay privatisation of the CMDT to 
avoid jeopardizing his chances of a second term in office did not go unnoticed by at 
least one civil society activist in Mali.144 In opting for 2008, he ignored the 
recommendations of the very government body he had set up to implement the 
reforms, the MRSC, which ‘had prepared a strong technical case to postpone the 
privatization until 2010’ (Bergamaschi 2008, p. 239).  
As the tone of the above citation from the World Bank document suggests, 
the President’s move also provoked tension between the Government and Bank staff 
working with the country.  
 
the donors were kind of vitriolic about how – I mean, not just the obvious 
ones as well – they took it kind of personally the fact that ATT wrote to 
Wolfensohn and in a sense went over the head of the donor community 
and said, ‘We want to delay privatisation’. And there was a lot of very 
bad feeling about it. It was like they’d been betrayed. … It was kind of 
extraordinary.145 
 
President Touré had won a temporary reprieve for the cotton sector. But he 
had exhausted any bargaining power he had with the Bank, and this episode would 
prove to be a turning point in the implementation of the reforms. 
Mid-way through the agricultural year 2004/05, while negotiations for a 
fourth structural adjustment credit (SAC IV) were under way, the World Bank 
demanded that the Government reduce the promised producer price for that year in 
line with the plummeting world market price. Farmers had already taken out credit 
for inputs and sown their crops on the basis of the price fixed at the start of the year. 
To lower the price at that stage would have had devastating consequences for rural 
                                                        
144 Interview with Moctar Coulibaly, president of AMADIP and CAD-Mali activist, Bamako, 
22/10/07. 
145 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
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livelihoods, and the Government feared another farmer revolt, so it refused.146 In 
defence of the Government’s stance, the Minister of Agriculture pointed to a letter 
from the CMDT’s French shareholder, DAGRIS, stating that the company would not 
support a reduction in the producer price and would cover any deficit (above 8 
billion F CFA) that might ensue.  
A large deficit did result but DAGRIS reneged on its promise. (World Bank 
2006, p. 13). The World Bank subsequently pushed for a new price-setting 
mechanism that would link the producer price to world market prices, and keep it 
within a narrow band between 160 and 175 F/kg. When the Malian Government 
rejected this price range, the SAC IV negotiations broke down. 
 
Because the Government’s initial approach would put the burden of the 
unfinanced gap wholly on the budget, the Regional Operations 
Committee (ROC) decided in September 2004 to defer authorizing 
appraisal until the Government provided an acceptable response to the 
concerns raised in the pre-appraisal Aide-memoire, namely: (i) how the 
deficit from the 2004/05 season would be covered; and (ii) how the 
producer price-setting mechanism would be strengthened to avoid setting 
an unsustainable price in the future. (World Bank 2006, p. 13) 
 
The suspension of the SAC IV authorising appraisal in effect meant a 
suspension of World Bank aid to Mali worth a potential US$50 million (Oxfam 
2006, p. 20). This experience deepened a split in the Government between the cash-
strapped Ministry of Economy and Finance, eager to off-load the burden of the fund-
sapping CMDT, and the Ministry of Agriculture, which opposed privatisation of the 
company (Bergamaschi 2008, p. 238). The Ministry of Agriculture was 
‘progressively marginalized’: ‘Donors chose the institution they were willing to 
negotiate with, and it was the Ministry of Economy and Finance that signed the price 
scheme in January 2005’ (Bergamaschi 2008, p. 238). 
The pressure put on Mali by the World Bank to adopt this very specific 
domestic policy of the price-setting mechanism became the subject of two Oxfam 
briefing papers, but not until a few years after the event. In 2006, Oxfam released 
‘Kicking the Habit’, criticising World Bank conditionality, which included a case 
                                                        
146 ‘The Government was apprehensive that reducing the price from CFAF 210 to 190 per kilogram 
after it had been set would result in a farmer revolt of similar or worse proportions than in 2000.’ 
(World Bank 2006, p. 13) 
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study of cotton privatisation in Mali (Oxfam 2006). This paper was drafted for a 
meeting of donors in Norway because the theme was of particular interest to the host 
nation.147 It was followed by a second briefing paper, ‘Pricing Farmers out of 
Cotton’, with a similar focus (Oxfam 2007).  
 
The timing of that [2006] report had a lot less to do with what was going 
on on the ground in Mali and a lot more to do with that debate happening 
at international level. I mean it was quite sort of disconnected to be 
perfectly honest from the national level.148 
 
In an interview, an Oxfam staff member reported that at the time, Oxfam’s 
organisational priorities were still centred on its campaign on cotton subsidies, and it 
did not have the necessary staff in place in Washington to track World Bank activity: 
‘And I think there was quite a number of people, both in Washington and here 
[Mali], that have always felt that we should have been working much more focusing 
on the Bank.’149 Despite the opinions of some individuals there was hardly any civil 
society counter-pressure on the World Bank. In this constrained policy-making 
context, attention in Mali remained focused inwardly on negotiations between the 
Government and the producers.  
In December 2004, the AOPP Cotton Commission ran a workshop for cotton 
farmer leaders to develop a united position on the proposed price-setting mechanism. 
The three-day workshop was funded by Oxfam and was facilitated by an AOPP 
technical assistant on secondment from the French development agency, AFD. In an 
interview, an international NGO worker described the process whereby, despite this 
support, cotton producer representatives failed to negotiate with the Government in 
the interests of the producers as a whole.150 A government representative who had 
been invited to attend on the final day of the workshop arrived instead at the start of 
day one. He had already been on a tour of the cotton zone with the Prime Minister 
and the cotton union representatives to discuss the proposed price-setting 
                                                        
147 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
148 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
149 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
150 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
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mechanism. The union representatives returned from this tour with ‘a slightly 
ambivalent position’ of reluctant compliance with the policy change.151  
It was the government representative and not the unionists who arrived at the 
workshop with all of the meeting notes from the tour. The farmer leaders complained 
that they had not had an independent consultation with their constituents on the 
policy. The government representative offered funding for them to conduct such a 
consultation, writing out a cheque on the spot. The union leaders became 
preoccupied with discussing the details of this consultative mission: ‘who was going 
to which region and how many cars they’d need’. The NGO worker reported feeling 
uncomfortable with the way in which the farmer leaders took the government money 
and let themselves be completely distracted from analysis of the price-setting 
mechanism: ‘I spent most of the meeting arguing with [top cotton union leader] in 
the breaks about whether or not we were going to pay a per diem for the chauffeur 
which was just like, “Is this really the only interesting thing you have to say to 
me?”’152 
The cotton farmer leaders eventually carried out an independent consultation 
in the cotton zone and came up with a critique of the price-setting mechanism and 
suggestions of ways in which it could be modified. Yet they did not negotiate any 
significant changes to the proposed mechanism. ‘In spite of all that, they just signed 
it. … There was a lot of muttering. Some of the other regional to national level 
leaders were uncomfortable with it, I think.’153 Neither did the farmer leaders secure 
any significant benefits in return for cotton producers. Despite prompting from 
facilitators, they did not make any demands on the Government with respect to the 
considerable sum owed by the CMDT to the farmers from the loss of their support 
fund through CMDT mismanagement and embezzlement.  
The interviewee reported that the farmer leaders would not engage in 
discussion about their negotiating strategy: ‘I mean there were all sorts of issues like, 
why would they discuss it with people like us? As in, you know, ex-patriot NGO 
workers or ex-patriot technical assistants. You know, fair enough at one level.’154 
                                                        
151 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
152 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
153 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
154 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
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Yet the only negotiating strategy that could be deduced, according to the witness, 
was union leaders seeking to obtain from the Government an office and other 
resources to formally establish their Groupement of cotton unions. The NGO worker 
questioned to what extent the union leaders’ behaviour was due to ‘lack of capacity 
in terms of lack of experience of actually leading those kind of processes and having 
a negotiating agenda’ and to what extent it was to be explained in terms of ‘all sorts 
of other ways in which negotiations happen, which are much more to do with 
specific sets of interests or even individual interests, or political interests’. 
 
For me it is one of the defining moments of my time here because it just 
made me realise that I haven’t got a clue what is going on! And that, you 
know, this idea that you kind of capacity build people around advocacy 
in some sort of mechanical way is just [breaks off, speechless].155 
 
As president of GSCVM, Bakary Togola signed agreement with the 
Government of Mali to a new price-setting mechanism on behalf of the country’s 
cotton producers. A World Bank credit of US$25 million was subsequently 
forthcoming: ‘on January 13, 2005, the authorities signed an acceptable Protocol on 
cotton pricing. On this basis, the ROC granted the authority to appraise and negotiate 
on February 1, 2005. … The Credit was finally approved by the Bank Board on 
March 22, 2005’ (World Bank 2006, p. 13).  
Throughout the history of the cotton farmer movement in Mali, discussed in 
chapter three, those leaders who have maintained their positions have tended to be 
those who have complied with the governing authorities’ demands, and may have 
accepted bribes to do so. Cotton farmers interviewed during fieldwork in southern 
Mali in 2007–08 expressed extreme frustration with their leader for signing 
agreement to the new pricing mechanism, which they did not support. Yet, despite 
the unpopularity of his actions, Bakary Togola was elected president of the 
Assemblée Permanente des Chambres d’Agriculture du Mali (APCAM) for a five-
year term and was invested in office by the Minister of Agriculture on 18 July 2005.  
In the preceding month, the Government had demonstrated its renewed 
commitment to the privatisation process with the sale of the majority of shares in 
                                                        
155 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
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HUICOMA to Groupe TOMOTA, the largest privately-owned Malian company. A 
report by The Oakland Institute (2011, p. 31) argues, ‘This was a highly 
controversial transaction that resulted in massive lay-offs and special tax incentives 
being accorded by the Ministry of Finance to the Tomota Group, after a selling 
process involving restricted bids.’156 The Tomota Group has subsequently been 
involved in a contentious project to expand industrial cultivation of oil-producing 
crops, including jatropha for agrofuel, on one hundred thousand hectares of land at 
the Office du Niger irrigation scheme (The Oakland Institute 2011). 
Although union leaders considered privatisation to be generally detrimental 
to the cotton sector, they were not opposed to all of the measures brought in by the 
reform programme. Isaline Bergamaschi (2008, p. 237) notes that ‘Malians within 
and outside of government did not form a united front. Indeed, the interests at stake 
on the Malian side were very diverse, even among the anti-privatization group.’ As 
mentioned above, union leaders welcomed the entry of producers into the financial 
capital of the company and the increased participation of producers in the running of 
the sector. Responsibility for the provision of ‘non-strategic’ inputs (for food crops) 
was transferred from the CMDT to the cotton unions (GSCVM). Bakary Togola, 
GSCVM President, was implicated in two scandals involving the over-invoicing of 
imported herbicides for the 2005/06 and 2006/07 agricultural years (Traoré/Le 
Républicain, 22/07/08). Alexis Roy (2010a) describes how the top representatives of 
the four cotton unions that constitute the GSCVM collaborated in this reaping of 
rewards from their new roles in the liberalising cotton sector. 
 
They [the unionists] shared the roles, but also the resources, by diverting 
the tendering procedures and overcharging the producers they were 
supposed to be representing for the agricultural inputs supplied. Their 
disagreements of the past temporarily put aside, the union leaders were 
now more occupied with sharing this manna among themselves than in 
fighting privatization. (Roy 2010a, p. 307) 
 
In the absence of a transparent and accountable system of producer 
representation, the transfer of responsibilities to producers merely represented a 
                                                        
156 The Oakland Institute’s (2011) report cites the following online source: 
www.reussirbusiness.com/10329-Mali-Cession-de-HUICOMA-au-groupe.html, which was verified 
and consulted on 13/08/12. 
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transfer of certain rent-seeking opportunities from the cotton company to a select few 
cotton farmer representatives.  
 
 
Broader civil society groups mobilise against privatisation 
In July 2005, civil society groups mobilised against privatisation of the 
CMDT at the Forum des Peuples in Fana.157 The event would feed into the 
polycentric World Social Forum, one ‘centre’ of which was held in Bamako in 
January 2006. Forum organisers, CAD-Mali, and one of their coalition members, the 
Coordination National des Organisations Paysannes (CNOP),158 led a petition 
expressing opposition to the privatisation of the CMDT and to the introduction of 
genetically modified (GM) cotton seeds.159 The petition organisers, who were aware 
of pressure on the Government from Monsanto and USAID to introduce GM crops in 
Mali, feared that opening up the cotton sector to private companies would open the 
door to GM cotton without democratic consultation or an effective regulatory 
framework. The petition was hand-printed in the Bamanan language onto huge sheets 
of Malian cotton cloth. In the period leading up to the forum, the organisers took it 
on a tour of provincial towns (Bougouni, Sikasso, Koutiala, Ségou, Niono and Kita) 
where they linked up with local farmer representatives. Through community radio 
stations they broadcast invitations to farmers in outlying villages to come to town to 
discuss the petition and to sign it if they were in agreement. During the forum, the 
petition was a springboard for discussion at the conférence populaire paysanne. At 
the end of the event, participants marched through Fana chanting, ‘Non à la 
privatisation’ and ceremoniously presented the petition to the local authorities.160  
The same international NGO worker who had witnessed the signing of the 
new pricing mechanism attended the Fana forum and was critical of the campaign 
against privatisation of the CMDT, regarding it as a belated input from ‘civil society 
groups who really had not been very engaged with the farmers’ organisations back 
                                                        
157 See influence diagram of campaign actors in 2005, in appendix two. 
158 The CNOP was officially founded in 2004. 
159 For a copy of the CAD-Mali petition, see appendix three. 
160 Fieldnotes, Fana, 09/07/05. Note: This fieldwork research conducted in 2005 contributed to my 
masters dissertation (Coughlan 2005). 
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when it mattered in 2000/01’.161 For this informant, the 2005 campaign against 
privatisation of the CMDT came ‘at a point when farmers’ organisations have really 
let go of that because it wasn’t going anywhere.’ The campaign was viewed not only 
as behind the times and disconnected from farmers, but as contrary to their interests 
as they now perceived them. 
 
And I think, for a lot of them, why would they be loyal to the CMDT? … 
And whilst they see a lot of negative examples, they also see what 
happened in Burkina. … You know, there are people also who see it as 
an opportunity.162 
 
The informant commented that, rather than a position ‘worked out in a 
dynamic with farmers’ organisations’, the campaign against privatisation of the 
CMDT seemed to be more part of an ‘on-going anti-privatisation stance’ by groups 
that had tried and failed to stop privatisation of electricity and of the railways. 
Many of the forum organisers were indeed educated urbanites, brought up on 
a diet of socialist politics, for whom ‘privatisation’ was taboo.163 Informal interviews 
with forum organisers in 2005 revealed, however, that their opposition to 
privatisation was based less on socialist ideology per se than on their fear that 
privatisation would result in a loss of sovereignty, since it was assumed that any 
private investors would be foreign.164 The takeover of the cotton oil industry by a 
Malian company was itself controversial, as mentioned above, but it was also 
relatively exceptional. Foreign-owned companies have invested in strategically 
important sectors in Mali. Malian railways, for instance, were bought by Franco-
Canadian consortium Transrail in 2003. The company prioritised more profitable 
freight over passenger transportation. Through lack of investment, the Dakar-
Bamako line deteriorated to the extent that it was subsequently closed to passengers 
between Dakar and Kayes in western Mali.165 Petition co-ordinator Moctar N. 
                                                        
161 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
162 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
163 It should be noted that when activists spoke against privatisation they were referring to the sale of 
the CMDT to private companies, not to the ceding of a portion of shares to producers. During a focus 
group interview with young forum organisers in Bamako in June 2005, for instance, one of the 
participants pointed out that something needed to be done about the bad management of the CMDT 
and that the producers should enter into the capital of the company. (Fieldnotes, Bamako, 12/07/05). 
164 For further elaboration of this point please refer to my masters dissertation (Coughlan 2005, p. 38). 
165 www.seat61.com/Senegal consulted on 12/08/10. 
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Coulibaly commented that given the strategic importance of cotton in Mali, 
privatisation would be bad for the economy in general, and for cotton farmers in 
particular.166 Civil society activists felt they had some right to express opposition to a 
policy that would have knock-on effects on the entire population.  
It is also worth noting that the petition organisers were of the same social 
strata as many of the CMDT’s employees: farmers’ sons who were educated to 
degree level in Bamako before taking up posts with the company. For this group, the 
CMDT represented their best chance of employment in the relatively lucrative 
bureaucracy. 
Petition organisers connected with farmers not through the cotton unions at 
national level but through an umbrella group of farmers’ organisations, the CNOP, 
which facilitated contact with farmer representatives in the provincial towns. Vice 
President of the CNOP, Souleymane M Keita, shared the fear of losing yet another 
national asset to foreign ownership. 
 
Mali, at the time of the independences, was one of the first to build small 
national industries. Over time we noticed that all were sold off, sold at a 
low price. And then we didn’t know what was done with all that money. 
So, cotton that we had left, with its processing units that are a bit a part of 
our sovereignty, if we must sell those factories too, it’s a part of the 
country’s sovereignty that goes with them. Because cotton has generated 
a lot of interest in our countryside. It’s true that there have been problems 
around it, but there have nonetheless been big development interventions 
around cotton, notably in terms of literacy, infrastructure, roads, in terms 
of the advancement of rural women, et cetera. So, in privatising, are all 
these benefits going to be kept?167 
 
The petition organisers found an ally in the farmers’ umbrella group. One of 
the main aims of the petition, according to CAD-Mali’s Moctar N. Coulibaly, was to 
                                                        
166 Interview with Moctar Coulibaly, CAD-Mali activist, Bamako, 22/10/07. 
167 Interview with S M Keita, Vice President, CNOP, Bamako, 12/02/08. Original : Le Mali au 
moment des indépendances, a été l’un des tous premiers à bâtir des petites industries nationales. Au fil 
du temps on a constaté que tout était bradé, vendu à bas prix. Puis on ne savait pas qu’est-ce qui était 
fait avec tout cet argent. Bon le coton qui nous a resté, avec ses unités de transformation qui est un 
peu une partie de notre souveraineté, si on doit aussi vendre ses usines, c’est une partie de la 
souveraineté du pays qui s’en va avec. Parce que le coton a suscité beaucoup d’intérêt dans notre sous 
pays là. C’est vrai il y a eu des problèmes autour, mais il y a quand même eu les grandes actions de 
développement autour de coton, notamment au niveau d’alphabétisation, en matière d’infrastructure, 
routière, en matière de promotion de la femme rurale, et cetera. Donc est-ce que en privatisant, tous 
ces acquis vont être gardé ?  
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encourage debate about privatisation in rural areas. He said that the text was drawn 
up so as to explain the stakes of privatisation rather than simply to assert opposition. 
He claimed that the State never explained privatisation to the population, but gave a 
false impression through radio broadcasts that it would improve matters for 
farmers.168 An official questionnaire that farmers were required to complete posed 
only four closed questions on the policy changes (Traoré/Le Républicain, 22/07/08). 
In terms of the position of the petition organisers in the wider political 
landscape in Mali, there was significant overlap between association with CAD-Mali 
and membership of the left-wing opposition party, SADI (Solidarité Africaine pour 
la Démocratie et l’Indépendance). The headquarters of the two organisations were 
located across the road from one another in Bamako until 2008, when the SADI 
office moved a few streets away. In Koutiala, a stronghold of the SADI party,169 the 
local branch of CAD-Mali occupies the same building as the local Kayira radio 
station, which is effectively an arm of SADI. One CAD-Mali activist interviewed 
seemed to have difficulty in distinguishing her membership of one organisation from 
that of the other.170 Indeed, in an informal interview, the then national president of 
CAD-Mali commented on the difficulties she faced in keeping the two organisations 
separate. She felt SADI regarded CAD-Mali as a fertile recruitment ground and that 
some SADI members sought to capture CAD-Mali for party political ends.171 
In Koutiala, two CAD-Mali activists, interviewed separately, expressed 
opposition to privatisation of the CMDT not from an ideological perspective but in 
terms of distrust of the ruling elite.172 One was a Fulani herder and one a cotton 
farmer’s wife. They claimed that President ATT and his entourage were seeking to 
purchase the CMDT in order to plunder it for private gain. Upon questioning they 
confirmed that they had heard suggestion of a link between the country’s national 
debt and the policy of privatisation but, ironically, the supposed debt and 
development activists did not believe this to be true. The CAD-Mali local branch in 
                                                        
168 Interview with Moctar Coulibaly, CAD-Mali activist and president of AMADIP, Bamako, 
22/10/07. 
169 SADI held the parliamentary seat for Koutiala from 2002-2007 when it lost the election after in-
fighting between candidates. In 2009 Koutiala town elected a SADI mayor, one of ten SADI mayors 
in the Koutiala region. 
170 Interview with Kadija Traoré, CAD-Mali activist, Koutiala, 21/02/08. 
171 Fieldnotes, Mme Barry’s house, Bamako, 25/02/08. 
172 Interviews with Adama Bocoum and Kadija Traoré, CAD-Mali activists, Koutiala, 21/02/08. 
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Koutiala was immersed in community development activities and minor conflict 
resolution. There was little evidence of success in linking global debates to local 
level, though one member had attended the World Social Forum in Nairobi where 
she participated in a discussion on safe drinking water.173 
The petition organisers’ opposition to privatisation of the CMDT was indeed 
contiguous with their opposition to privatisations in other sectors in Mali. Their 
analysis of the policy was variously coloured by notions of sovereignty, socialism, 
and opposition politics conceived in terms of distrust of the current power-holders. 
Educated activists in Bamako articulated the policy’s relation to international 
institutions, but the campaign was focused inwardly on domestic policy debate. The 
petition was entirely separate, however, from the negotiations that had been going on 
between the Government and the cotton unions on the policy. Civil society activists 
claimed some legitimacy to speak against a policy that they felt would harm the 
nation as a whole.  Yet the petition was not necessarily disconnected from farmers. 
Its organisers actively sought to encourage farmers to debate the cotton sector 
reforms at local level.  
Fieldwork interviews were conducted with farmers and other rural dwellers 
who had signed the Forum des Peuples petition against privatisation of the CMDT. 
Eight interviews took place in Fana; four in the nearby hamlet of Dien; and one in 
each of the more remote hamlets of Wolodo and Kodabougou. Eight interviews were 
conducted in Koutiala. Also interviewed were farmers in the small town of Moribila, 
north of Koutiala, who had not encountered the petition (two interviews, involving 
three farmers in total). The interviewees gave their perspectives on the proposed 
privatisation and on their own participation (or lack thereof) in the policy-making 
process. 
Four out of eight interviewees in Koutiala who had signed the Forum des 
Peuples petition were critical of the Government’s role in the proposed 
privatisation.174 This view was expressed by cotton farmer Bourama Goita, who was 
later elected mayor for the SADI party in the commune of Goadji Kao, Koutiala. 
Bourama Goita had been a founding members of SYCOV and had participated in 
                                                        
173 Her trip was financed by France Libertés – Fondation Danielle-Mitterand. 
174 Interviews with F. Sumunu, B. Goita, A. Boucoum, and K. Traore, Koutiala, 20–21/02/08. 
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cotton strikes but was now disillusioned with the union. He argued that the 
Government should take responsibility for the mismanagement of the CMDT, reform 
the company, put producers on the governing board, and thereby avoid privatisation.  
 
They say each time that the CMDT is not well managed, so the 
Government takes money to complete the price of cotton. But it’s false. 
But who is the CMDT? It’s the Government! The Government can well 
enough follow the CMDT in its actions. From that basis, the company 
could be made to work well. If the people work in a wrong way, crafty 
guys, manipulation just about everywhere, but that cannot work well.175 
 
A similar opinion was expressed by Fode Sumunu, a retired CMDT agent, 
also a SADI supporter, who reported having marched with other workers in protest at 
the proposed privatisation.176 He reported that the CMDT was even found to have 
over-invoiced stationery to the value of two, three or four thousand francs CFA to 
cover up the gap in its finances.177 Bourama Goita described how corruption 
permeates every level of the cotton company, citing the example of CMDT lorry 
drivers who illegally sell diesel to villagers when they go to collect seed cotton, 
noting that the villagers see nothing wrong in this and that the supervisors are well 
aware of the practice.178 
Three interviewees in Koutiala referred to the much-criticised privatisation of 
HUICOMA and to the closure of its oil-processing plant in Koutiala.179 They 
emphasised the area’s dependence on cotton and the inter-linked nature of 
inhabitants’ livelihoods.180 This point was echoed by three interviewees in hamlets 
                                                        
175 Interview with Bourama Goita, cotton farmer, Koutiala, 21/02/08. Original: Ils disent chaque fois 
que la CMDT n’est pas bien géré, alors le gouvernement prend de l’argent pour compléter le prix du 
coton. Mais c’est faux. Mais la CMDT c’est qui ? C’est le gouvernement ! Le gouvernement peut bien 
suivre la CMDT dans ses actions. À partir de là maintenant, la société pourrait bien être travaillé. Si 
les gens travaillent de tort, travaillent-, des malins gars, la manipulation un peu partout, mais ça ne 
peut pas bien marcher. 
176 Interview with Fode Sumunu, retired CMDT agent, Koutiala, 20/02/08. 
177 Interview with Fode Sumunu, retired CMDT agent, Koutiala, 20/02/08. Original: on a même fait la 
facturation des bics à deux milles, trois milles, quatre milles pour boucher le trou. 
178 Interview with Bourama Goita, cotton farmer, Koutiala, 21/02/08. Original: Même les chauffeurs-
là de la CMDT aujourd’hui qui partent dans les campagnes pour ramasser le coton, eux ils tous 
vendent le gazon. Dans les villages, personne n’est contre ça. Et puis les responsables le savent très 
bien. Les chauffeurs aussi sentent que les responsables savent. 
179 Interviews with F. Sumunu, B. Goita, and K. Traoré, Koutiala, 20–21/02/08. 
180 A specific example cited by Fode Sumunu was local women who produce and sell soap made from 
cotton oil (interview, Fana, 20/02/08).  
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around Fana.181 These were farmers who had signed the Forum des Peuples petition 
but who were not ostensibly engaged in party politics. One was a member of 
SYCOV, one of SYVAC; both of whom had participated in cotton strikes. 
Interviewees in and around Fana were generally more accepting, however, of the 
Government’s claim that its hands were tied and it could not avoid privatising the 
CMDT because it was too large a financial burden.  
Some interviewees in Fana referred to a prime ministerial visit to the town, 
which took place in 2005 after the Forum des Peuples. During this public meeting, 
farmers expressed their opposition to the privatisation policy. One interviewee, 
Seydou Touré, recalled that he was designated as a spokesperson for the farmers.182 
He told Prime Minister Ousmane Issoufi Maïga that they did not want privatisation 
because of the negative experiences of cotton farmers in neighbouring countries 
faced with privatisation of their respective cotton companies. Among their 
grievances were problems of input supply, costs of transport to market, and the 
cessation of infrastructure maintenance. The Prime Minister responded by saying 
that it was the CMDT and not the farmers’ fields that would be privatised. The 
farmers interviewed seemed to regard this statement as a closing of the debate. 
 
The Prime Minister said, ‘You farmers, your fields are not being sold. 
Your farming materials are not being sold. Your hoe is not being sold. 
It’s the CMDT that is being sold.’ Well, we don’t have any power. We 
said, ‘Sell it.’ ‘If it’, it was said, ‘if it pleases you, sow cotton; if not, 
leave it.’ We understood.183 
 
It would seem that the Prime Minister had conducted a very successful public 
relations exercise in Fana. Another interviewee, Seydou Touré, cited his words in 
explaining local farmers’ switch from cotton to maize cultivation.184 The farmers 
interviewed seemed satisfied that they had expressed their concerns, been heard by 
the Prime Minister and responded to, and were now ready to accept the executive 
                                                        
181 Interviews with A. Fomba, Dien; B. Diarra, Kodabougou; and B. K. Traoré, Wolodo; 17–18/02/08. 
182 Interview with Seydou Touré, cotton farmer, Fana, 17/02/08. 
183 Interview with Mamadou Konate, cotton farmer, Fana, 17/02/08. Original: Premier Ministre ko 
‘Awma. Awn chikelaw, awn ka furuw man fere. Awn be chike kow man fere. Awn ka daba man fere. 
CMDT de be fere.’ Bon, sé te awn ye. Nous ko, ‘B’a fere.’ ‘N’a’, o kora, ‘n’a diara awn ye a na kòòri 
dja; a ma la hem.’ An y’a famu. 
184 Interview with Seydou Touré, cotton farmer, Fana, 17/02/08. 
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decision taken, even though it was contrary to their wishes. Yet the exchange also 
underlined the farmers’ subordinate position in relation to the governing authority.  
It is instructive here to refer back to the forms of farmer consciousness 
discussed in chapters two and three. The Prime Minister’s framing of the situation 
drew upon a sense of the partial autonomy of the peasantry, a notion identified by 
Isaacman (1993) in relation to apparently passive strategies of peasant resistance. 
This sense of partial autonomy has long been eroded in Mali’s cotton zone, however, 
through policies that have promoted dependence on cotton. This may be why the 
point, which in other contexts would appear obvious, was made so clearly by the 
Prime Minister, and why it made such an impression on farmers. It also allowed for a 
diplomatic resolution of the situation, in which farmers could adopt a ‘public 
transcript’ of respect for authority, while acting on a ‘hidden transcript’ of 
powerlessness over government policy but control over their own, physical 
resources. The Fana farmers’ sense of partial autonomy may have been reinforced by 
the presence of alternative livelihood strategies, including maize cultivation, and by 
talk of an organic cotton project coming to the area. 
One interviewee in Fana who had signed the petition in 2005 said he had 
since changed his mind and was now in favour of privatisation of the CMDT.185 At 
the time of interviewing in 2008 he gave over three out of twelve hectares of his 
middle-sized farm to cotton186 and, in addition to farming, he worked as a trader. He 
said that producers and private companies might understand one another and, in that 
case, privatisation might work well. He distrusted the CMDT and said that it was 
CMDT agents who went into the bush to tell people that if the CMDT is privatised it 
won’t be good for farmers.  
In Dien, a hamlet just outside Fana, cotton farmers were indeed worried by 
the prospect of having to deal with private traders instead of the CMDT.187 These 
farmers had signed the Forum des Peuples petition and were members of SYVAC. 
Their fears of privatisation included: not being able to make a profit, not being able 
                                                        
185 Interview with Aziz Bagayogo, Fana, 17/02/08. 
186 Figures for two village areas in Southern Mali given in Moseley (2005, p. 44, Table 6) show farm 
size to average 12.4 ha of which 3.4 ha are cultivated in cotton (27.4%). However in Moseley’s study, 
in farms of comparable size (around 12 ha), a slightly higher proportion of land was given over to 
cotton (29.4% Djitoumou and 33.1% in Siwaa) than on Bagayogo’s farm (25%). 
187 Interviews with A N Fomba and Bakary Fomba, cotton farmers, Dien, 17/02/08. 
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to negotiate the price of cotton, no longer having the price fixed at the start of the 
season, and no longer being able to buy inputs on credit. One interviewee expressed 
concern that there would be redundancies of CMDT workers.188 It is worth noting 
that some farmers take seasonal work with the cotton company to supplement their 
income. Echoing informants in several locations, Amadou Nekita Fomba said 
simply, ‘In Mali there is nothing but the CMDT now.’189 Yet interviewees in Dien 
showed deference to the Government’s decision to privatise in light of its financial 
difficulties and the mismanagement of the CMDT.  
 
It’s the donors that finance the CMDT. … The CMDT itself is not well 
managed. So the State imposes on the CMDT to privatise. We the 
peasants don’t have our problem with that. Our problem is only to be 
equipped with inputs and all.190 
 
Another cotton farmer by the name of Amadou Fomba said, ‘Unless the 
leader takes that position, we can do nothing to stop the policy of privatisation.’191 
Farmers interviewed in the hamlets of Wolodo and Kodabougou were 
similarly concerned by the prospect of privatisation of the CMDT and had signed the 
Forum des Peuples petition.192 These were farmers who had not participated in any 
strikes. In Wolodo, Bah Kissiman Traoré suggested striking was a self-seeking 
activity and he preferred to pursue good farming techniques. While Bafing Diarra in 
Kodabougou said that he had always favoured dialogue with the CMDT. Both 
farmers expressed unwillingness to give up the CMDT as a national asset. 
 
There are a lot of companies that have been privatised – the railways, 
SOTELMA, EDM, Hotel de l’Amitié, SONATAM. If today the CMDT 
will be privatised what will become of the peasants? When it was 
                                                        
188 Interview with Amadou Fomba, cotton farmer, Dien, 17/02/08. 
189 Interview with A N Fomba, cotton farmer, Dien, 17/02/08. Original: Mali kono, CMDT doron 
sisan. 
190 Interview with Bakary Fomba, cotton farmer, Dien, 17/02/08. Original: Ceux sont les bailleurs qui 
financent la CMDT. … La CMDT même n’est pas bien géré. Donc l’état impose à la CMDT de 
privatiser la CMDT. Nous les paysans, donc, nous on n’a pas notre problème à cela. Notre problème 
c’est seulement d’en doter en intrants et tout. 
191 Interview with Amadou Fomba, cotton farmer, Dien, 17/02/08. Original: Fo nakan yemonkon ye o 
disposition ta nota i madala na biseka faikai moube abali. 
192 Interviews with B K Traoré, Wolodo, and Bafing Diarra, Kodabougou; both 18/02/08. 
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through that that everyone was satisfied. Because no family here, where 
we live, can say that they don’t benefit from the CMDT.193 
 
Bafing Diarra reported that he had heard, during the Forum des Peuples, 
accounts from farmers from neighbouring countries who suffered extremely late 
payment for their cotton harvests following privatisation. He believed traders would 
benefit from liberalisation at the expense of farmers. He worried about obtaining 
input credit and losing the CMDT agricultural extension service, which, he said, 
accompanies the farmer to the point where he can repay the credit. He also believed, 
however, that farmers could do nothing to stop the policy of privatisation as it was 
imposed from above, ultimately by ‘Americans’. He said they were told so at a 
CMDT training meeting in Fana in 2005. He had said his word on privatisation; now 
he had to accept the decision of the governing authorities. 
Bah Kissiman Traoré expressed dissatisfaction with the Government at what 
he regarded as an unacceptable lack of consultation with farmers on the policy: 
‘Even the head of the household consults the family before selling the oxen.’194 For 
his part, B K Traoré felt he had not had the opportunity to ‘say his word’ on the 
proposed policy, and because of this, he found the Government’s decision hard to 
accept. 
In Moribila, a small town north east of Koutiala, just off the road towards 
Kimparana, farmers interviewed had not encountered the Forum des Peuples 
petition, nor had they participated in cotton strikes.195 Cotton farmer Alphonse Kone 
worried about privatisation because, he said, they don’t know when it will happen 
and how it will be.196 He had heard on the radio that the State gets into debt to 
finance the CMDT as it is bankrupt. He said farmers are powerless to stop the 
privatisation or any other policy for that matter: even if they protest, they will not be 
listened to.  
                                                        
193 Interview with Bafing Diarra, cotton farmer, Kodabougou nr Kouroukoro, 18/02/08. Original: 
Huicoma privatisera, radio mali privatisera, EDM, hotel de l’amitie, SONATAM, Train sira ni be 
privatisera. O toumana haou bedjigui toube finkele mouka ni oye an be ka missi baye ni haou bebi o 
nonobo ni oye CMDT o fana privatiseli koumabe sena. Yali haou mounou ye malideye ni ahou ye 
koukono moyye ahou djigui debe moukeleka bler. 
194 Interview with B K Traoré, cotton farmer, Wolodo, 18/02/08. Original: Mais sani akase baga 
ferelima i ba fo i ka doudeyer. 
195 Interviews with Michel and Joseph Dembele, and with Alphonse Kone, Moribila, 23–24/02/08. 
196 Interview with Alphonse Kone, Moribila, 24/02/08. 




Opposition to liberalisation of the cotton sector and privatisation of the CMDT 
114 
All but one of the interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with farmer 
representation, and some were scathing in their criticisms. The most common 
complaint was that the leaders of the syndicats did not consult farmers or feed back 
information as they should. Some accused the leaders of complicity with the 
Government, and portrayed them as the corrupt clients of those in power. There was 
also frustration with the divisions between the different syndicats. Siaka Traoré, a 
farmer in Fana, said that every effort had been made to tear up the union movement 
so that they would not all speak the same language. He described unionism in Mali 
as ‘a system of government’.197 The worst criticism was reserved for the top cotton 
farmer representative, Bakary Togola, who was accused of falsely claiming to act in 
the name of all cotton farmers while in reality acting alone in his own interest. Some 
interviewees commented that representation had become worse since the 
establishment of a system of unions of cotton farmers’ co-operatives.198 
The farmers interviewed voiced a number of other concerns besides that of 
privatisation. A universal complaint was the low price farmers received for the sale 
of their cotton. At least as significant for the interviewees as the low price of cotton 
was the high price of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, and the indebtedness that 
ensued from buying such products on credit. Another area of concern was low yields, 
which were linked to soil fertility and ‘age’,199 and to alternate episodes of drought 
and flood. A number of farmers said they wanted support to develop the use of 
‘traditional’ or organic fertiliser, or to switch to growing organic cotton. While others 
wanted to diversify to food crops such as maize, beans, sesame and peanut. One 
interviewee said the Government should help farmers to access these new markets. 
All but one of the farmers interviewed opposed privatisation of the CMDT; 
the only interviewee who was in favour of the policy was himself a trader who may 
stand to gain from the changes. In their study of Malian farmers’ perspectives on 
privatisation of the CMDT, Dougnon et al. (2010) conclude that a mentality of 
                                                        
197 Interview with Siaka Traoré, Fana, 17/02/08. Original: Il y a assez de syndicalisme au Mali, les 
paysans maintenant- mais c’est un système du gouvernement. 
198 For more on this, see chapter six. 
199 This was of particular concern in Koutiala and Moribila, which are located in a long established 
and increasingly dry cotton-growing area. Ampha Coulibaly, UR-SCPC President, Koutiala, argued 
that even with unfavourable prices for buying inputs and selling cotton, a farmer could make a decent 
living if he could maximise his yields. He wanted a thorough analysis of the fertility of soils in the 
Koutiala area. (Interview, Koutiala, 23/02/08). 
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dependence in relation to the paternal Malian State may have weakened the potential 
of the reforms to produce a successful outcome. 
 
This policy was surprisingly controversial. One can argue perhaps that 
dirigisme had become so deeply-rooted that farmers were unable to see 
the new policies as an opportunity but saw them instead as a breaking of 
a moral relationship – ‘leaving farmers as orphans’. (Dougnon et al. 
2010, p. 13) 
 
Farmers’ sense of dependence on cotton is certainly one element of their 
responses to the policy liberal reform. Dougnon et al.’s conclusion does not, 
however, adequately represent the range of farmers’ responses cited in their own 
paper or presented in this chapter. Some farmers’ responses exhibited a proletarian-
style defence of their livelihoods, seeking a measure of influence over management 
of the commodity chain. Other farmers expressed a sense of their ‘partial autonomy’ 
(Isaacman 1993); that they could not oppose national – let alone international – 
policy, but could resist passively by withdrawing not only their labour but also their 
land from cotton cultivation. The majority of farmers interviewed during fieldwork 
research sought to retain the cotton company as a national institution, while at the 
same time they deplored the misconduct of certain staff and managers. Interviewees 
in Koutiala were highly critical of the Government’s role in the privatisation, 
depicting it as evading accountability for the mismanagement and embezzlement that 
has ruined the company. Farmers interviewed in more peripheral areas tended to be 
less oppositional. The farmers’ interview responses highlighted the social 
significance of consultation, on one hand, and of deference to authority, on the other.  
Questions remain, however, as to why farmers did not effectively voice their 
opposition to privatisation of the CMDT or complaints about the lack of consultation 
through the cotton unions. Ismael Coulibaly of the CNOP, who helped to organise 
the petition’s tour of the provinces, commented that local level union leaders were 
keen to support the petition in order to enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of their 
constituents. 
 
There were a few misunderstandings between the unions, the leaders and 
their base. Their base was not very, very happy about certain things. 
They say the leaders don’t negotiate well with the Government. That’s 
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why when we introduced ourselves they were very happy because they 
found in us an ally to validate their right. And it’s because of that that the 
petition was signed by hundreds and hundreds of people.200 
 
The petition against privatisation drew attention to the divide between the 
farming elite and grassroots farmers. As noted above, the position of the cotton 
farmers’ unions on the reforms was ambiguous.  
Among the cotton leaders interviewed there was a strong sense that it was not 
possible to stop the reforms and that time and energy was better spent preparing 
farmers for the inevitable changes to come.  
 
In reality we don’t want privatisation but we ask ourselves if our 
companies still have the means because – with the price of cotton on the 
international market – if the State doesn’t help them, I wonder whether 
the cotton companies can still take the matter of cotton in charge. And 
the World Bank was categorical: it said it will not finance the budget of a 
state that pays the deficit of cotton.201 
  
Producer leaders have been successfully ‘educated’ to become co-managers 
of the sector. This is one reason that their perspectives differ from those of grassroots 
farmers. Since the reforms were considered inevitable, politically savvy producer 
leaders would be more concerned to position themselves so as to be amongst the 
winners in the reformed sector. 
More broadly, the different reactions to cotton liberalisation and privatisation 
may reflect a growing divide between family farming and agribusiness. The then 
president of CAD-Mali, Mme Barry, remarked that there were ‘big farmers’, ‘already 
launched into agribusiness’, who ‘take the leadership to make this privatisation a 
                                                        
200 Interview with Ismael Coulibaly, Vice President, CNOP, Bamako, 21/02/08. Original: Il y avait 
quelques mésententes entre les syndicats, les dirigeants et leur base. Leur base n’était pas très très 
contente de certaines choses. Ils disent que les dirigeants, ils ne négocient pas bien avec le 
gouvernement. C’est pour cela que lorsque nous on s’est présentés ils étaient très contents parce qu’ils 
trouvaient en nous un allié pour faire valeur leur droit et c’est pour cela que la pétition a été signée par 
des centaines de centaines de personnes.  
201 Keifa Diarra, General Secretary of SYCOV, Fana, 19/02/08. Original: En réalité nous on ne veut 
pas la privatisation mais on se demande si nos sociétés ont encore les moyens – parce que avec ce prix 
du coton sur le marché international – si l’état ne les aide pas, moi je me demande si les sociétés 
cotonnières aussi peuvent prendre même la question du coton en charge encore. Et la banque 
mondiale a été catégorique : elle dit qu’elle ne financera pas le budget d’un état qui paye le déficit de 
coton. 
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reality’.202 Wealthier farmers have less to fear from privatisation and liberalisation 
and even stand to gain from some of the changes. They are better able to cope with 
the volatility of seed cotton prices that is likely to increase when farmers have to deal 
directly with private companies trading on the world market. As discussed in chapter 
three, producers who are able to mobilise greater resources are better able to expand 
cotton production in years when prices are high. One aspect of the reforms in Mali 
could be particularly advantageous to wealthier cotton farmers: the restructuring of 
farmer organisation into affinity-based co-operatives.203  
Setting aside the reasons for the gulf between the cotton farmer leaders and 
their base, the question remains as to how farmers might bring their leaders to 
account to ensure that their views are represented at national level. As noted above, 
the Forum des Peuples petition fed into the polycentric World Social Forum held in 
Bamako in 2006. At this event, the international NGO worker cited above 
complained that there was much anti-privatisation rhetoric that was disconnected 
from what the farmer leaders were actually doing in negotiations with Government, 
and yet there was no overt challenging of the leaders, some of whom were there in 
person.204 Just as during the negotiations on the new price-setting mechanism, the 
international NGO worker was left wondering whether the producers have their own, 
mysterious ways of handling the power play or whether they are ultimately 
powerless. 
 
[T]here were significant proportions of the, you know, genuine producer 
representatives or producer movement who know that [a top Malian 
farmer leader] is like, you know, compromised in all sorts of ways. 
…[M]aybe they do have a strategy to deal with it. I don’t know. But he- I 
mean, well maybe it’s just because the situation is he’s just too politically 
protected and, I mean, that’s all there is to it. But, you know, this is kind 
of where my understanding reaches its limits. I mean he’s known to have 
been involved in all sorts of fraudulent things: [muffled] input 
distribution. There was a journalist who was brave enough to publish an 
article on it about a year ago. It’s well-known.205 
 
                                                        
202 Interview with Mme A Barry, Bamako, 25/02/08. Original: Donc on a les grands agriculteurs qui 
sont là qui sont déjà lancé dans l’agro-business et c’est eux qui prennent le leadership pour que cette 
privatisation soit une réalité.  
203 This aspect will be considered in detail in chapter six. 
204 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
205 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
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Ismael Coulibaly commented that local level union leaders were highly 
receptive to the social forum as ‘a space of free expression’.206 A talking shop of 
non-directed criticism may be one sense given to this phrase; or it may imply a lack 
of free expression normally.  
Ismael Coulibaly reported that he and CNOP colleagues had encouraged 
farmers to participate in the forum on the basis that it was not a form of direct 
lobbying but rather an opportunity to speak freely, ‘in their own name’, without the 
constraints imposed on them by their union leaders.   
 
It’s very important. It’s minimal, but it’s important. Because when you 
are in organised systems, when the president speaks, it’s over. There are 
those who are not in agreement with the president. But the social forum 
was a platform so that they too might express themselves to say, ‘No, we 
are not in agreement even with our leaders.’207 
 
This explanation echoes the farmers’ comments, cited above, which reflect 
the social impossibility of challenging authority directly once an executive decision 
has been taken. Cotton farmers used the petition and the social forum as vehicles to 
express their opposition to privatisation, which they felt unable to express through 
their unions.  
Nonetheless, Ismael Coulibaly of the CNOP described the cotton unions as 
the ‘legitimate defenders’ of cotton farmers on the issue of privatisation. He saw the 
roles of CAD and CNOP as ‘raising awareness’ among unionists so that they might 
take up the petitioners’ concerns in their dealings with government. He also 
emphasised that the petition was a matter of stating a position on the policy, not an 
attempt to impose that position on the Government.  
 
We presented a position but we cannot say do or don’t do. We can form a 
social movement but the Government can refuse. … They have the 
                                                        
206 Interview with Ismael Coulibaly, CNOP Vice President, Bamako, 21/01/08. Original: un espace de 
libre expression. 
207 Interview with Ismael Coulibaly, Vice President, CNOP, Bamako, 21/02/08. Original: C’est très 
important. C’est minime mais c’est important. Parce que quand vous êtes dans les systèmes organisés, 
quand le président dit, c’est fini. Il y en a qui ne sont pas d’accord avec le président. Mais le forum 
social était une platforme pour que eux aussi puissent s’exprimer pour dire que non, on n’est pas 
d’accord même avec nos dirigeants.  
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means of repression… The people is obliged to accept because it can do 
nothing.208 
 
Moctar N. Coulibaly of CAD-Mali described how the petition organisers had 
repeatedly requested an audience with the Prime Minister to hand over the petition 
but each time their demand was ignored or refused.209 The pattern of co-optation and 
repression of opposition is not unique to the case of cotton in Mali. Tiecoura Traoré, 
the leader of a citizens’ collective against rail privatisation (Cocidirail), who resisted 
co-optation by the authorities, has been the target of repeated attacks and 
imprisonment in response to his campaigning efforts.210 
In this authoritarian, indeed repressive context, national civil society 
organisations saw a vital role for themselves in defending the interests of rural 
people who were not being adequately represented through the cotton producers’ 
organisations. In 2008, CAD-Mali launched its own advocacy training course for 
rural communities.211 National NGOs may be well-placed to understand domestic 
politicking. However there remains a gulf between the experiences and perspectives 
of national NGO workers and the rural people they hope to ‘empower’. The 2006 
Forum des Peuples, held in Gao, was devoted to evaluating the previous forums. A 
major theme that emerged from the workshop I attended was the continuing lack of 
mutual comprehension between ‘peasants’ and ‘intellectuals’.212  
While interviewing cotton farmers in Miena, near his hometown of 
M’Pessoba, Moctar N. Coulibaly (CAD-Mali and AMADIP) expressed extreme 
frustration at their fearful and fatalistic attitudes. The farmers, who were visibly 
                                                        
208 Interview with Ismael Coulibaly, Vice President, CNOP, Bamako, 21/02/08. Original: On a montré 
une position mais on ne peut pas dire faîtes ou ne pas faire. On peut faire un mouvement social mais 
le gouvernement il peut refuser. … Ils ont les moyens de répression… Le peuple est obligé d’accepter 
parce qu’il ne peut rien. 
209 Interview with Moctar Coulibaly, CAD-Mali activist and AMADIP president, Bamako, 22/10/07. 
210 In his post as leader of the railway workers’ union, Tiecoura Traoré resisted co-optation by the 
authorities and campaigned against privatisation of Malian railways, another measure prescribed by 
the World Bank under HIPC. He was illegally dismissed without compensation. Since the railways 
have been in the hands of private operators, Traoré has campaigned with a civil society collective, 
Codicirail, to highlight the new companies’ mismanagement and the devastating effects on the 
communities around the railway line. On 5 June 2008, on the eve of one such protest march in 
Bamako, police stopped Traore while he was filming scenes around the railway line. According to a 
Cocidirail press release (Bamako, 9 June 2008), Traoré was arrested, beaten and imprisoned; he 
sustained injuries to his shoulder and lips. The march, for which due notice had been given, was 
declared “not authorised” at the last minute. 
211 Interview with Mme A Barry, President, CAD-Mali, Bamako, 25/02/08. 
212 Fieldnotes, Gao, 15/07/06. 




Opposition to liberalisation of the cotton sector and privatisation of the CMDT 
120 
nervous about discussing the matter with us, said that they were scared to speak out 
and say that they were not being represented by their union leaders. 
 
One said, ‘You speak at the appropriate level. When you’re at the 
bottom, you speak to others at the bottom; you don’t speak to those at the 
top.’ I asked, ‘Why? What will happen if you do?’ He said, ‘You will be 
eliminated’, and he made a slit throat gesture.213 
 
As will be shown in chapter seven, these farmers’ fears of repression within 
their representative structures were exacerbated by events that took place in 2007. 
The difference in perspectives between the farmers and the national NGO worker 





Effective opposition to the cotton sector reform programme would have 
required a two-pronged approach, targeting the Government of Mali and the 
international financial institutions (and by extension donor governments) 
simultaneously. Internationally-connected debt activists in Bamako appeared well-
placed to target both, but they struggled to reconcile domestic and international 
framings of the issue, which – though logically compatible – tended to compete with 
one another in public debate. Meanwhile, Oxfam’s priorities at international level 
were directed to its campaign on subsidies, examined in the next chapter, and the 
NGO’s analysis of domestic Malian politics was found to be lacking. 
While the World Bank openly withheld funds from the Malian Government 
in a bid to push forward liberal reform of the nation’s cotton sector, the 
Government’s strategy to ensure the compliance of farmer leaders was more obscure. 
Since democratisation in the early 1990s, Mali has struggled to allow political space 
for the expression of alternative perspectives through civil society action. As 
mentioned in chapter three, even during Konaré’s presidency, when an effort was 
made to encourage public debate, the 1998 cotton strike in Koutiala was initially 
                                                        
213 Fieldnotes, Miena, 17/11/07. 
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suspected of being a vehicle for the political opposition and was brutally put down. 
Under President Amadou Toumani Touré’s aid-dependent ‘consensus’ politics, with 
its room for manoeuvre being severely restricted by the international financial 
institutions, there was even more reason for the power-holders to be fearful of revolt 
and to crack down on non-conformists. By attempting to work through formal 
channels without fully understanding the workings of domestic politics, the 
international NGO was at serious risk of being used merely as a source of 
development rent in the form of project funding and per diems.  
Broader civil society groups mobilised against liberalisation of the cotton 
sector, focusing in particular on privatisation of the CMDT. They felt justified in 
doing so because reform of a sector as strategic as cotton would impact on the 
economy of the nation as a whole. Some individuals within these groups were 
actively involved in opposition politics. These national civil society groups lacked 
political clout and their petition was ignored by the Government. Neither the 
authorities nor the international NGO – nor even some of their own number – 
regarded them as legitimate spokespersons on an issue of cotton sector policy. The 
Forum des Peuples petition came at a time when implementation of the reforms was 
well underway, and it was entirely disconnected from the on-going negotiations 
between the cotton unions and the Government. However, evidence from fieldwork 
research shows that it received support from many grassroots farmers and local level 
union leaders.  
While some farmers constructed their viewpoints in terms of political 
opposition to the current power-holders, for many of those interviewed, the 
significance of the petition lay in the opportunity it offered to voice their discontent 
with a policy that they hardly hoped to influence given their relatively subordinate 
positions. The cotton sector reforms offered opportunities to some, wealthier 
farmers, and certainly to the union leaders. But the majority, who did not stand to 
benefit, seemed to be unable or unwilling to hold their official representatives to 
account. National NGOs that were concerned to support the marginalised 
demonstrated a better grasp than did their international counterpart of the power play 
that effectively silenced opposition to cotton sector liberalisation and privatisation of 
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the CMDT. Yet they did not manage to make any significant impact in terms of the 
empowerment of the poor majority of cotton farmers. 
The diversity of actors’ interests, framings of debate and modes of political 
participation goes some way towards explaining why there was limited success in 
connecting public opposition to liberal reform of Mali’s cotton sector across local, 
national and international arenas. This case shows how difficult it is to make 
campaigns reflect complex realities: framings of the debate both as donor-imposed 
policy and as Malian Government failures are logically compatible but, in practice, 
the promotion of either frame was interpreted as a negation of the other. The events 
retold in this chapter have reminded us, as do Hickey and Mohan (2004, p. 10), of 
the importance of viewing development as an historical process of social change. 
Given that formal civil society at national level in Mali is largely dysfunctional or at 
any rate operating according to an entirely different set of rules, this impacts on 
attempts to extend civil society action to international level. This argument will be 
developed further in the next chapter.  
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Chapter six 
The campaign against US and EU cotton 





This chapter looks at the civil society activity that lay behind the campaign 
against US and EU cotton subsidies, which focused on negotiations at the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in the early to mid 2000s, and was led by the 
international NGO, Oxfam, as part of its global Make Trade Fair campaign. The 
chapter considers the workings of the transnational network behind the campaign and 
relationships between actors within the network, but goes a step further – in 
recognition of the need to situate transnational networks in the wider political context 
– to look at dynamics within Malian and West African civil society through the lens 
of interaction with the global cotton campaign. The trajectory of the WTO 
negotiations on cotton subsidies was detailed in chapter three. 
This chapter responds to the call by Henry, Mohan and Yanacopulos (2004) 
for more empirical research to examine power and values within transnational 
development networks. As outlined in chapter two, these authors argue that network 
construction is an on-going and emergent process, which involves contestation 
between actors. More specifically, Berry and Gabay (2009) argue that global civil 
society has been mistakenly theorised as a realm of liberal-cosmopolitan values, 
whereas a more accurate portrayal would acknowledge parochialism and tensions 
between civil society actors. A central challenge in the theory and practice of 
transnational civil action is how to reconcile the multiple scales – local, national, 
regional, and global – across which networks must operate (see, for example, Stokke 
and Mohan 2001). Unequal power relations, and diverse values and interests, affect 
the formation of transnational networks and their relationships to the external 
environment, which they seek to influence. Consideration of the ways in which these 
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differences are dealt with in transnational advocacy campaigns is closely related to 
the notion of accountability, which Jordan and van Tuijl (2000) suggest should be 
conceptualised in terms of political responsibility to the most vulnerable 
stakeholders. 
The international campaign for the elimination of unfair US and EU cotton 
subsidies was an ambitious attempt to link political arenas and, supposedly, to carry 
West African farmers’ concerns right to the top of global trade governance. 
However, the local, national, regional and international political arenas were not as 
well connected as they might have been in the campaign. Jordan and van Tuijl 
(2000) offer a typology of transnational advocacy campaigns: this campaign most 
closely resembles the ‘disassociated campaign’, which has a low level of political 
responsibility to the local level. The evidence presented in this chapter tallies with 
Gray’s (2008) study, which draws on his own fieldwork research to show how 
international rhetoric about subsidies is disconnected from local realities in Burkina 
Faso. In conclusion to the same volume, however, Gray and Moseley (2008) are 
wholly uncritical of the Malian cotton unions and Oxfam’s Make Trade Fair 
campaign; indeed they praise them as promising for the future. An external 
evaluation of the Oxfam campaign was far more critical,214 as is the assessment made 
in this chapter. 
The campaign against cotton subsidies involved an alliance between civil 
society organisations and West African governments. International NGOs and 
Geneva-based civil society organisations provided African governments with much-
needed technical assistance, which increased their capacities for negotiating with the 
United States and the European Union at the World Trade Organization. The 
campaign also provided an opportunity for West African governments to work in 
close collaboration with cotton farmer leaders. Observers of the campaign, Pesche 
and Nubukpo (2005) comment that ‘The denunciation of an external enemy and the 
identification of a simple target (US subsidies) allow African states to gloss over any 
analysis of their own responsibilities regarding the difficulties facing their cotton 
industries.’ (p. 47). Yet, they argue, ‘to bestow overriding importance on the 
                                                        
214 Promises to Keep: an evaluation of implementation of Oxfam’s strategic plan 2001-2006, February 
2006 
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instrumentalisation games that took place could overshadow recognition of the fact 
that committed African stakeholders were strengthened in the process that 
contributed to the failure of the Cancùn conference’ (ibid., p. 48). This chapter 
argues that the process of the campaign against cotton subsidies, including the 
alliance it entailed between civil society and government, served to strengthen one 
faction in the West African farmers’ movement at the expense of another. 
This chapter demonstrates that civil society participation in governance in the 
global arena can undermine democratic accountability in the national political arena. 
This happened in the case of the campaign against cotton subsidies because power 
relations between actors, and the diversity of actors’ interests and values, were not 
sufficiently recognised or dealt with accountably by actors in the transnational 
advocacy network. Alternative perspectives were marginalised through the framing 
of debate, which was reinforced by the ways in which particular modes of political 
participation were used in the campaign. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section looks at the genesis 
of the campaign against US and EU cotton subsidies. The second section outlines the 
evolution of the cotton subsidies campaign, focusing in particular on the period from 
2001 to 2003. The third section explores divisions in civil society in the period 
following the Cancùn WTO Ministerial conference of September 2003 up to and 
including the Hong Kong WTO of December 2005. The fourth section builds on civil 
society actors’ perspectives on the campaign that are cited in the first two sections by 
including the responses of interviewees from Mali’s cotton zone, which are 
compared alongside the reflections of civil society interviewees. 
 
 
The genesis of the campaign 
Four representatives of African cotton farmers launched an online appeal in 
November 2001 for the elimination of US and EU cotton subsidies.215 The appeal 
was signed by François Traoré, president of the Burkinabè union of cotton co-
operatives, UNPCB; Ampha Coulibaly, then president of Mali’s cotton and food 
                                                        
215 The appeal appeared on the website of ABC Burkina, a non-governmental organisation run by 
French missionary Fr Maurice Oudet. See appendix four for a copy of the text. Source: 
www.abcburkina.net/content/view/418/44/lang,fr/ consulted on 06/05/11. 
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crop producers’ union, SYCOV; and farmer representatives from Benin and 
Madagascar.   
 
These subsidies [which benefit EU and US farmers] have 
perverse effects on the economies of poor countries, because they 
artificially stimulate production and lead to overproduction, and thus the 
fall in prices on the world market. By subsidising their cotton producers, 
the USA and EU seriously threaten African cotton, and so the future of 
millions of producers, and the economies of numerous countries such as 
Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali.  
…We solemnly ask the USA and the EU to abolish subsidies to 
their cotton producers.216 
 
Fieldwork research into where farmer leaders got the idea from for this 
declaration was inconclusive. Ampha Coulibaly, who signed the internet appeal on 
behalf of Mali’s cotton producers, said that the cotton-producing countries consulted 
here and there until they heard about US subsidies and their impact. When pressed, 
he said that he and other cotton farmer leaders got their information from media 
sources.217 However, in an interview, an international NGO worker raised the 
question of whether their sources of information may have included the French 
cotton ginning and marketing company, Dagris.218 
The connection between falling world cotton prices and rich country 
subsidies was not obvious at the turn of the millennium.219 The ICAC model 
developed by Carlos Valderrama in 1999/2000 was the first to link low world market 
prices to domestic support subsidies.220 It circulated at a time when some farmer 
leaders in West Africa began working more closely with cotton companies and 
                                                        
216 Appel commun des producteurs de coton de l’Afrique, November 2001. Source: 
www.abcburkina.net/content/view/418/44/lang,fr/ consulted on 06/05/11. For original text see 
appendix four. 
217 Interview with Ampha Coulibaly, President of the regional union of cotton co-operatives of 
Koutiala and San, Koutiala, 23/02/08. Similarly, in a documentary film, Un Homme Intègre à l’OMC 
(A Man of Integrity at the WTO) (J.P. Lepers, France 2003), the Burkinabè farmer leader, François 
Traoré is depicted as making the connection between US cotton subsidies and the lot of African 
farmers while listening to the radio. 
218 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
219 Factors affecting prices included the general decline in the terms of trade and China’s swings in 
supply and demand. Indeed, the sharp fall in the world cotton price in 1999/2000 coincided with 
China becoming a net exporter of cotton in that year.  
220 The ICAC model was the basis for both Watkins’ (Oxfam 2002a) calculations and the case that 
Brazil brought against the US at the WTO.  
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governments,221 and when there was closer networking of cotton companies across 
Africa.222 At the time, in the early 2000s, prices paid to West African producers were 
not directly linked to the world market but were set in negotiations between cotton 
companies, governments and farmer leaders. The cotton producer leaders’ appeal for 
the elimination of US and EU cotton subsidies reflected the kind of awareness of 
factors affecting the world cotton market that Dagris/CFDT had long worked to 
cultivate in the minds of producer leaders, as noted in chapter three. 
The link between world market prices for cotton and farm incomes in West 
Africa was not a direct one until liberal reform of cotton sectors was implemented in 
the mid–2000s, as discussed in chapter five. In the early 2000s, farmer leaders knew 
that liberal reform was being pushed by the World Bank and that if reform 
proceeded, it would expose them directly to the volatile world market. Thus, the 
issue of US and EU cotton subsidies was one of many issues of concern to farmer 
leaders, and one about which there was relatively low awareness at grassroots level. 
But it was on this matter that four farmer leaders chose to speak out. The issue of US 
and EU cotton subsidies was also one in which some members of staff at the 
international non-governmental organisation, Oxfam, saw an opportunity.  
In 2001, there was a decisive shift in Oxfam International’s organisational 
priorities towards transnational advocacy and popular campaigning on world trade 
rules and practices. The Make Trade Fair campaign was the ‘flagship’223 of Oxfam 
International’s Strategic Plan 2001–2006, ‘Towards Global Equity’. The campaign 
was underpinned by Oxfam’s trade report, ‘Rigged Rules and Double Standards’, 
published in 2002. Its lead author, Kevin Watkins, adapted the ICAC model, which 
was being used by Brazil as it prepared to take its case against the United States to 
the World Trade Organization. Watkins estimated the losses in foreign exchange 
                                                        
221 Traoré led the UNPCB onto the board of management of the cotton company, SOFITEX in 1999, 
alongside French shareholders, DAGRIS and the national government. In Benin, the main 
stakeholders in the cotton sector began working together through the Association Interprofessionelle 
de Coton in 2000. In Mali, producer leaders, the cotton company and the government discussed issues 
affecting the cotton sector at the Etats Généraux du Secteur Coton in April 2001, in the aftermath of 
the mass boycott that halved the country’s production in 2000.  
222 Cotton companies from across Africa met in Cotonou, Benin in June 2001 and agreed to set up the 
African Cotton Association (established 2002). Source: 
http://africancotton.net/en/resources/itemlist/category/3-resources consulted on 18/12/11. 
223 Promises to Keep: an evaluation of implementation of Oxfam’s strategic plan 2001-2006, February 
2006, p 29. 
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earnings due to US cotton subsidies for selected African countries. The results were 
published in 2002 in a separate Oxfam briefing paper, ‘Cultivating Poverty: the 
impact of US cotton subsidies on Africa’. An interviewee who worked for the 
international NGO commented that staff ‘knew that this Brazil thing [the case at the 
WTO against the US cotton subsidy regime] was going to blow up into a big issue 
globally …  so … it was very sort of judicious timing in terms of doing that piece of 
analysis [Oxfam/Watkins 2002a].’224 The international NGO’s organisational 
priorities were shaped in part by this perceived opportunity at the international level. 
The Doha round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations became the 
primary focus of Make Trade Fair, and the cotton arm of the campaign in particular.  
By working together, Oxfam and the African farmer leaders were able to 
launch a transnational campaign that appeared to boast both international expertise 
and grassroots legitimacy. As noted above, however, foreign subsidies was only one 
of many concerns prioritised by West African famers, and perhaps the least grounded 
at the grassroots level. An interviewee who worked for Oxfam described how, in the 
early 2000s, the choice of strategic direction for civil society advocacy on cotton was 
a source of contention between staff members working in different sections of the 
NGO, and between the NGO and its partner organisations. 
 
that’s always been a bit of a tension really between people working at a 
global level, with the WTO as their focus, and people like me and some 
of my colleagues and some of our partners [for whom] the much more 
immediate reality is the context of privatisation and liberalisation 
because that’s what ultimately makes you vulnerable to the global market 
context.225 
 
These criticisms of Oxfam’s cotton campaign highlight the organisation’s 
shortcomings over the period from 2001 to 2006 in realising its ‘one programme’ 
                                                        
224 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
225 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. Similar comments 
were made by Oxfam staff in West Africa as part of an internal evaluation of the cotton campaign, 
cited in Promises to Keep, an external evaluation of the implementation of Oxfam’s strategic plan 
2001–2006 (2006, p. 46): ‘Initially it was a challenge for country teams to respond to “imposed” 
campaign priorities. While the situation has improved, further work needs to be done. The campaign 
again raised the issue of Oxfam’s role in Southern advocacy and the perception that Oxfam was 
privileging cotton over issues which were perceived as being more important by local and regional 
actors.’ 
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approach,226 which is designed to do just what Stokke and Mohan (2001) advocate: 
to integrate the NGO’s activities between local, national, regional and global arenas 
within a single, coherent and consensual strategy.  
This section has outlined the dual origins of the campaign against US and EU 
cotton subsidies, from an international NGO, Oxfam, and a group of West African 
farmer leaders. It has pointed to contention over the choice of the campaign subject 
matter, both within West Africa and within the NGO. The rest of this chapter looks 
in more detail at the challenging global to local interaction that took place through 
the cotton campaign, beginning in the next section with the first stage of the 
campaign, which culminated in a strong civil society presence at the 2003 WTO 
Ministerial Meeting in Cancùn, Mexico. 
 
 
Rolling out the campaign: building a transnational movement 
International NGOs, Oxfam and ENDA, backed West African producer 
leaders to lobby their governments, then subsequently worked together with 
governments to bring their case to the World Trade Organization.227 The NGOs and 
the farmer organisations also turned their attention to raising awareness and a critical 
mass of support at grassroots level, both in the North and in West Africa. NGO 
workers and farmer leaders attended WTO ministerials to inform and lobby African 
countries’ trade negotiators and those of their adversaries, the United States and the 
European Union, and to keep their cause in the media spotlight. 
Initially, the farmer leaders’ internet appeal for the elimination of US and EU 
cotton subsidies was received negatively by their governments. In an interview, the 
Malian farmer leader, Ampha Coulibaly, recalled the displeasure of government 
officials on finding that the farmers’ representative had spoken out independently on 
the matter. 
 
Those subsidies – it was me who was the first to sign. At the time, I was 
president of the union group. I signed with François, François of Burkina, 
                                                        
226 ‘Promises to Keep: an evaluation of implementation of Oxfam’s strategic plan 2001–2006’, 
February 2006, p. 43. 
227 See appendix two for an influence diagram of the main actors in campaigning on cotton in Mali in 
2003, discussed in this section. 
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François Traoré: it was he who signed and, me too, I signed. Four 
countries; but Mali was one of them. After that the other countries got 
together. But we were criticised. We had problems. I can say that even 
here in Mali, I had some small problems. Because I signed something in 
the name of the producers. Well, did that please the Government? Well, I 
was criticised. I was called to the Department of Agriculture. They talked 
of a lot of things. I said it concerns no-one but us, the producers, in our 
capacity as the top representatives. I have a mandate to sign things like 
that in the name of producers, so it concerns no-one but us, the 
producers.228  
 
Transnational civil society collaboration on the cotton campaign began when 
international NGOs intervened to ensure that the producer leaders were listened to by 
their own governments. Together, Oxfam and Senegal-based international NGO, 
ENDA Diapol, were instrumental in bringing farmer leaders into high level 
discussions between Agriculture Ministers, regional banking and governance 
institutions,229 and cotton companies230 (Pesche and Nubukpo 2005).231 With the 
backing of NGOs, and organised through a regional network, ROPPA,232 producer 
leaders pressed their national governments to take a strong line on subsidies in 
international trade negotiations.233  
West African national governments with large cotton sectors clearly had an 
interest in challenging foreign cotton subsidies, an interest that they shared with 
producer leaders and with their commercial partners, notably Dagris. But the 
governments had to weigh the potential benefits of challenging the domestic subsidy 
                                                        
228 Interview with Ampha Coulibaly, President of the regional union of cotton co-operatives of 
Koutiala and San, Koutiala, 23/02/08. Original: “Les subventions-là, c’est moi qui était le premier à 
signer. À l’époque c’est moi qui était le président du groupement syndicat. J’ai signé avec François, 
François du Burkina, François Traore : c’est lui qui a signé et moi aussi j’ai signé. Les quatre pays; 
mais le Mali fait parti. Après ça les autres pays s’est réuni. Mais on était critiqué. On a eu des 
problèmes. Je peux dire même au Mali ici j’ai eu des petits problèmes. Parce que moi j’ai signé 
quelque chose aux noms des producteurs. Bon, est-ce que ça plaît au gouvernement ? Bon, j’ai étais 
critiqué. J’ai été appelé au ministère de l’Agriculture. Ils ont parlé de beaucoup de choses. J’ai dit ça 
n’engage que nous les producteurs en tant que les premiers responsables. J’ai un mandat de signer des 
trucs comme ça aux noms de producteurs, donc ça n’engage que nous les producteurs.”  
229 West African Development Bank; ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), 
WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union). 
230 Cotton companies formed the African Cotton Association in 2002. 
231 Pesche and Nubukpo (2005) give a detailed history of the processes of networking and negotiation 
that took place in West Africa leading to the submission of the Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton 
to the WTO in April 2003. 
232 Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de Producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, founded in 
Cotonou in July 2000, www.roppa.info 
233 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
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regimes of the United States and the European Union against other concerns they 
might have brought to the table and, above all, against the risks of reprisals from 
these two powerful actors in the world trade system. A major point of contention 
within the anti-subsidies camp, described by Pesche and Nubukpo (2005), was over 
the choice of course of action, between those who wanted to lodge a complaint with 
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body and those who advocated negotiation with the 
United States and European Union. The latter camp won, resulting in the submission 
by four countries – Mali, Benin, Burkina Faso and Chad – of the Sectoral Initiative 
in Favour of Cotton to the WTO in May 2003. 
In order to take the issue forward successfully, the African governments 
needed technical assistance, research and legal expertise. This was provided by a 
network of civil society organisations, including Oxfam; a Senegal-based 
international NGO, ENDA Diapol; and Geneva-based institutions, the IDEAS 
Centre234 and ICTSD;235 with some assistance coming from official regional 
institutions, ECOWAS and WAEMU (Pesche and Nubukpo 2005, pp. 49–50). A 
strong presence in Geneva was crucial. At the time, only two of the Cotton Four 
(Benin and Mali) had permanent representations in Geneva, where the WTO is based 
(Pesche and Nubukpo 2005, p. 50). Oxfam opened its office there in 2002 (Anderson 
2007, p. 93),236 and Burkina Faso and Chad have since set up permanent 
representations in the city. Oxfam’s decision to open its Geneva office reflected a 
strategic choice to focus on the WTO process, while the NGO refrained from 
allocating resources to alternative strategies: ‘because of other stuff going on, we 
haven’t had very much capacity in Washington to track these [World Bank and IMF] 
issues.’237 
The popular mobilisation phase of the campaign aimed to raise awareness 
and a critical mass of support at grassroots level, both in the North and South, in this 
case specifically in the United States, the European Union and West Africa. The 
focal points of the campaign were the big international meetings of the WTO in 
                                                        
234 International trade, Development, Economic governance Advisory Services Centre. IDEAS Centre 
describes itself as an independent, non-profit organisation. See www.ideascentre.ch 
235 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. ICTSD describes itself as an 
independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation. See www.ictsd.org 
236 See also www.ipngos.org/ngoprofiles/oxfam_genev.html consulted on 19/01/12. 
237 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
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Cancùn in September 2003 and in Hong Kong in December 2005. The principal 
methods of mobilising popular support for the campaign were through global media 
coverage of the impacts of subsidies on cotton farming in Africa and a global ‘Big 
Noise’ petition calling for an end to ‘unfair’ cotton subsidies, defined as subsidies 
that distort the world cotton market. The complexities of the cotton global value 
chain and of rural poverty in West Africa were crystallized into a simple campaign 
message: that US and EU cotton subsidies stimulate over-production of cotton in 
those countries, which artificially lowers world prices, causing cotton-exporting 
African countries to lose export revenues, and deepening poverty for African cotton 
producers.  
In addition to decisions about the allocation of resources, discussed above, 
the choice of a high profile multinational or ‘global’ model of campaign narrowed 
the focus of civil society action. According to this model, which is inspired by 
commercial marketing strategies, a simple campaign message delivers a high impact. 
More subtle analysis of the complex factors affecting the populations of West 
Africa’s cotton zones was obscured.238 
 
because the focus for Oxfam, up until recently anyway, has been on the 
WTO issues, it’s quite hard to gain organisational space to work on other 
aspects, um, except in as much as they are seen as contributing to that 
agenda … because working within a sort of global campaigning 
framework, there’s always a preoccupation with having kind of simple 
and clear and sort of identifiable messages and not kind of muddying the 
story too much.239 
 
The Oxfam-led global campaign against US and EU cotton subsidies was 
highly successful at gaining media attention: ‘By 2002–2003, we already had a 
number of journalists writing about the negative impacts of subsidies.’240 Regular 
articles published in top American, British and European newspapers helped to 
                                                        
238 Similar concerns were expressed in Promises to Keep (2006, p. 47), which cited the North-South 
Institute’s evaluation of Oxfam’s cotton campaign in West Africa (2001–2006): “While we 
understand that a media campaign requires some sharpness…a “sharp”message… that ignores 
ground realities has (rightly) been viewed with suspicion. […] Many external stakeholders feel that 
Oxfam’s campaign model for cotton oversimplifies a complex issue….Going forward we do not think 
that there needs to be a trade-off between a sharp campaign message and a nuanced approach to how 
campaigning and research are conducted…” (Original emphasis). 
239 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
240 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
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change the terms of the debate on cotton subsidies in those countries and at the 
WTO, a transformation that is considered, by evaluators and by an Oxfam staff 
member who worked on the campaign, to be one of its most significant outcomes.241  
Viewed from West Africa, however, the media-oriented nature of the 
campaign produced ‘all sorts of contradictions.’242 
 
Because of the nature of media-oriented campaigning, we had situations 
where we had a lot of pressure to produce evidence or, you know, 
anecdotal, other kinds of evidence that [US and EU] farm subsidies are 
having a direct impact on [West African] people’s incomes. But I mean, 
in any sort of rigorous sense, they weren’t really having a direct impact 
on people’s incomes because the prices were regulated at national level 
until 2005, when the Bank came in and sort of strong-armed the 
government into changing the price mechanism.243 
 
Later in the same interview, the NGO worker commented, ‘in some ways, the 
negative impacts on the ground could have been a lot more to do with national level 
issues.’ The narrow focus of the campaign against subsidies was rather dissociated 
both from Mali’s national political arena and from certain processes of supranational 
governance to which it was connected.  
Oxfam staff in West Africa worked to contribute signatures for the NGO’s 
worldwide ‘Big Noise’ petition, which united numerous concerns under the simple 
headline message, ‘Make Trade Fair’. As part of the Big Noise petition, Oxfam 
supported West African farmer leaders to gather farmers’ signatures to a petition 
calling on West African trade negotiators to push for the elimination of US and EU 
subsidies that distort the world market. Oxfam twice worked with West African 
farmers on the Big Noise petition targeting WTO ministerial meetings, first in 
Cancùn in September 2003, then in Hong Kong in December 2005.  
For Oxfam, this ‘popular mobilisation’ work was co-ordinated by Oxfam 
America staff from the NGO’s West Africa Regional Office in Dakar. In 2003, much 
of the work was carried out by the Regional Communications Officer. But at the start 
of 2005, the full-time post of Popular Mobilisation and Media Co-ordinator was 
                                                        
241 See for example, Promises to Keep (2006, p. 36). Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) 
worker, Bamako, 17/09/07.  
242 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
243 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
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created, and filled by Dominique Jenkins, an American with an interest in social 
marketing.244 In addition to mobilising farmers, Oxfam sought to raise general public 
awareness of trade issues. The NGO worked on the Make Trade Fair campaign with 
student activists in Dakar, including Mamadou Barry, who was one of the founders 
of PEACE, the Platform of African Students to Make Trade Fair.245 PEACE formed 
officially in 2004 and contributed to the Big Noise petition for the Hong Kong WTO 
meeting.246 Oxfam’s Dominique Jenkins also recalled working with a local 
organisation on a fair trade cotton fashion show to raise awareness of trade justice 
issues, and on the West African part of a worldwide celebrity photo shoot project in 
which celebrities endorsed the Make Trade Fair campaign.247  
Oxfam worked to raise awareness of trade issues among the general public in 
West Africa, but these activities were largely confined to Senegal, and Dakar in 
particular. An Oxfam staff member who worked on the campaign noted a 
discrepancy in participation in the 2003 campaign between Senegal and other West 
African countries that had more at stake in the cotton subsidies campaign. 
 
That was in 2003, pre-Cancùn, and the actual numerical strength of the 
mobilisation then was fairly small. I think in total probably a quarter of a 
million signatures were gathered in four countries in West Africa, of 
which by far the most in Senegal, not one of the C4 countries.248 
 
In Mali, activity on the Make Trade Fair campaign was relatively low-key 
and focused on farmers in the country’s cotton zone, with a total of 1,300 signatures 
collected for the Cancùn petition,249 whereas the totals for Senegal and Burkina Faso 
were 100,000 and 80,000 respectively.250 By 2005, the political arena of producer 
organisations in West Africa had changed radically, producing a much larger 
                                                        
244 Interview with Dominique Jenkins, Oxfam America West Africa Region Popular Mobilization and 
Media Co-ordinator, Dakar, 02/02/08. 
245 Plateforme des Etudiants Africains pour un Commerce Equitable. Interview with Mamadou Barry, 
PEACE activist, Dakar, 04/02/08. 
246 Interview with Mamadou Barry, PEACE activist, Dakar, 04/02/08. See also ‘PEACE sheds light 
on trade injustice’, source: www.maketradefair.com/en/index.php?file=events_senegal02.htm 
consulted on 31/01/12. 
247 Interview with Dominique Jenkins, Oxfam America West Africa Region Popular Mobilization and 
Media Co-ordinator, Dakar, 02/02/08. 
248 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
249 Interview with Lassine Sidibe, Executive Secretary, AOPP, Bamako, 29/08/07. 
250 ‘White Gold Turns to Dust’, Oxfam Briefing Paper 58, March 2004, pp. 6–7. 
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mobilisation, centred this time in Burkina Faso. This will be considered in detail in 
the next section.251 
For the 2003 Big Noise petition, the participation of West African farmers 
was co-ordinated by the regional network, ROPPA. In Mali, at the time, the national 
platform of ROPPA was the AOPP, the Association of Professional Peasants’ 
Organisations,252 to which the country’s cotton unions are affiliated. AOPP External 
Relations Secretary, Ibrahima Coulibaly, commented that the organisation was keen 
to take part in the Cancùn petition. 
 
Well, the petition, it was a project, firstly, global, and which was piloted 
by … Oxfam, particularly what we called the Big Noise. It was a 
campaign which effectively had as its objective to draw the attention of 
the political authorities, to support above all the African governments so 
that they might resist at the WTO ministerial conference in Cancùn. So 
we participated because we were convinced that it was a combat worth 
pursuing, and which led effectively to the blockage of negotiations at 
Cancùn.253 
 
In Mali, the AOPP co-ordinated the 2003 Big Noise petition with guidance 
and support from Oxfam. The NGO provided a draft text on which to base the 
petition254 and a ‘very very small amount’ of funding.255 The petition was conducted 
in August 2003, ahead of the WTO ministerial meeting in September of that year. 
Since this fell during a period of intense activity in the agricultural calendar, the 
AOPP’s political office-holders were unavailable as they are, by statute, professional 
farmers. The collection of signatures was carried out by the organisation’s technical 
support staff instead.256 The petition was taken to all five regions of the cotton zone 
                                                        
251 Compare influence diagrams of campaign actors for 2003 and 2005, in appendix two. 
252 Association des Organisations Professionnelles Paysannes, www.aopp-mali.org. The term, 
‘professional’ is employed in the title to differentiate those for whom farming is their main occupation 
from ‘hobby farmers’ or those who use farming to supplement their income from another profession 
(Interview with Issa Coulibaly, Cotton Advisor, AOPP, Bamako, 27/08/07). 
253 Interview with Ibrahima Coulibaly, External Relations Secretary, AOPP, Bamako, 17/01/08. 
Original: Bon, la pétition c’était un projet d’abord global, et qui était piloté par … Oxfam, surtout ce 
qu’on appelait le grand bruit, the big noise. C’était une campagne effectivement qui avait comme 
objet de tirer l’attention des autorités politiques, de soutenir surtout les gouvernements africains pour 
qu’ils puissent résister à la conférence ministérielle de l’OMC à Cancùn. Donc on a participé parce 
que nous sommes convaincus que c’était un combat qui valait la peine d’être mené, et ce qui conduit 
effectivement au blocage des négociations à Cancùn. 
254 Interview with Souleymane Diarra, AOPP Commissions Co-ordinator, Bamako, 17/01/08. 
255 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
256 Interview with Souleymane Diarra, AOPP Commissions Co-ordinator, Bamako, 17/01/08. 
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by five teams, each composed of two members of AOPP staff. The signatures were 
later compiled in Bamako and presented to the Minister of Trade shortly before the 
Cancùn WTO meeting. 
Speaking about his experience of taking the 2003 petition out to rural areas, 
the AOPP’s Lassine Sidibe commented that the peasants he met felt that international 
matters are very far away from them; that they are matters to be resolved between 
states.257 This view was echoed by a number of farmers interviewed during 
fieldwork. The variety of perspectives voiced by farmers will be compared towards 
the end of this chapter. At this point, it is worth noting that only one of the twenty 
farmers interviewed in the cotton zone clearly recalled having participated in a 
petition for Cancùn that had been brought by the AOPP. Nonetheless, the experience 
made a lasting impression on Amadou Nekita Fomba, president of the cotton 
producers’ co-operative of Dien, a hamlet outside Fana. 
 
The issue of subsidies: we heard about it, and we spoke a lot about it as 
well. We prepared a petition in that way, to go to Cancùn. Cancùn. That 
was with the petition. Our Minister took the same petition with him to 
Cancùn. The subsidies issue, we put a lot of effort into it. We put a lot of 
effort into it. I can say, by the way, they themselves gave us a response: it 
cannot be dropped in a single day, but they heard what we said. On that 
first day, we were not appreciated by the country, the United States 
people, but it didn’t stop, it didn’t stop. So they said they heard the 
campaign, so it will go little by little. It will not end in one day but it will 
go little by little. That’s what they said to us.258 
  
The interviewee emphasised that through their participation in the campaign, 
he and fellow farmers made themselves heard by the Americans.  
The campaign against US and EU cotton subsidies in West Africa was not 
initiated by grassroots farmers, since it was leaders working at national and regional 
                                                        
257 Interview with Lassine Sidibe, AOPP Executive Secretary, Bamako, 29/08/07. Original: Les 
paysans pensent que les questions internationales sont très loin d’eux, que c’est les questions qu’on 
doit régler entres états. 
258 Interview with Amadou Nekita Fomba, cotton farmer, Dien, 17/02/08. Original: Subventions-ko 
aw ye do me ola ani kuma chaman chaman fo fana na. An bora ye petition fana gla o chogo kelen-na 
ka ta Cancùn. [Eh?] Cancùn. Awn fana ye petition gla o chogo kelen-na, ka ta Cancùn. Ani petition 
fana ça... Awn ka ministeri tara ni o fana petition ye a bolo Cancùn. Donc, eh, subventions-ko, awn ye 
layini chaman ke a kan. Awn ye layini chaman ke a kan. N’be se ka fo o la, u-yere accord di an ma: te 
na se ka dabla don kelen, mais u yan k’an kuma men. O don folo-yere an man ben pays jamana Etats-
Uni mogow-ma, o mais a tè da bla, a tè da bla. Donc o ko’u ye kuma men, donc o bè don-doni bo a la. 
A tè ban don kelen-na mais o be do bo a la. U ye o de fo awn ye na. 
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level who were aware of exogenous factors affecting the world cotton market. But 
the petition created an opportunity to discuss these little-known-about issues with 
ordinary farmers. An Oxfam staff member who worked on the 2003 Big Noise 
petition in West Africa commented that this was an important element of the project, 
in terms of the positive knock-on effect on the perceived legitimacy of the national 
level farmer organisations involved.  
 
for organisations like AOPP, the more that they can be working at the 
grassroots and talking to people at the grassroots and communicating 
with them, the more it kind of legitimises their organisation.259  
 
The relatively small scale of the 2003 petition project would seem to have 
limited its impact in this regard, given that only one farmer interviewed was able to 
name the AOPP in connection with the cotton subsidies campaign. 
Comments made by staff of both Oxfam and the AOPP reflect a sense that 
the petition was first and foremost a lobbying tool, to enhance the political clout of 
national level farmers’ organisations vis-à-vis their governments. An Oxfam worker 
interviewed noted that this was a new experience for both government ministers and 
farmer leaders. 
 
I think it was quite successful in that (a) it did provide a way for the 
producer organisations to engage with their ministers and say we have X 
number of people who are concerned about this issue. And we certainly 
got feedback from some of the ministers, particularly the then Senegalese 
Trade Minister … basically saying, ‘This is kind of new to me, going to 
the trade negotiations with a constituency behind me saying we want you 
to negotiate on this.’ So that was quite a sort of powerful moment. … I 
think for the producer groups … they realised that this could be a very 
useful tool.260 
 
Similarly, Souleymane Diarra (AOPP) said that the first edition of the 
petition (in 2003) was very formal in that it was done so that they could really have 
their shoulders next to their leaders.261 Indeed, representatives from the AOPP 
                                                        
259 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
260 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
261 Interview with Souleymane Diarra, AOPP Commissions Co-ordinator, Bamako, 17/01/08. 
Original: la première édition a été vraiment formalisé plus que la deuxième édition. … Formalisé 
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attended the Cancùn WTO meeting in person, as part of the NGO delegation, which 
also included ENDA (Senegal), Oxfam International and its many country 
affiliates.262 Lassine Sidibe (AOPP) remarked that they took part in daily briefings 
with the official government delegation, and both he and Ibrahima Coulibaly (AOPP) 
said they believed the blockage of negotiations that ensued at Cancùn was due in 
large part to this participation of civil society.263 
 
 
Rolling out the campaign post-Cancùn: divisions in West Africa 
At the international level in Cancùn, the cotton subsidies campaign seemed to 
be relatively successful. The campaign did not produce the change in US and EU 
policy that it sought, but it garnered strong support in the media, from the public and, 
at least initially, within the WTO, where it contributed to an unprecedented blockage 
of negotiations.264 Back in West Africa, however, the fall-out from Cancùn was 
controversial. Fieldwork research indicates that two principal objections to the 
campaign were raised by civil society actors in Mali at this time: (i) that the voice of 
Oxfam dominated at the international conference, marginalising the voices of 
African civil society actors; and (ii) that the focus of the campaign was too narrow, 
obscuring alternative analyses of problems affecting African farmers and, in so 
doing, by-passing other solutions to those problems. The campaign exposed tensions 
which led to a split in the farmers’ movement in West Africa.265  
In an interview, out-spoken Malian activist and former government 
minister,266 Aminata Dramane Traoré expressed frustration that most of the political 
space at the Cancùn WTO conference was occupied by large NGOs, and Oxfam 
Great Britain in particular.267 She singled out Oxfam GB for monopolising the debate 
                                                                                                                                                             
c’est-à-dire que on l’a fait pour vraiment avoir des épaules auprès de nos dirigeants. Donc on a fait la 
liste des gens et nous avons transmit tous les papiers au Ministre de Commerce. 
262 List of NGOs that attended the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference. Source: 
www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_e.htm consulted on 02/02/12. 
263 Interview with Lassine Sidibe, AOPP Executive Secretary, Bamako, 29/08/07; interview with 
Ibrahima Coulibaly, External Relations Secretary, AOPP, Bamako, 17/01/08. 
264 For more details on what happened at the WTO meeting in Cancùn in 2003, see chapter three. 
265 For an overview of changes discussed in this section, compare influence diagrams of campaign 
actors for 2003 and 2005, in appendix two. 
266 Mali Minister of Culture 1997–2000 (during Konaré’s second presidential term). 
267 Interview with Aminata Dramane Traore, Bamako, 28/02/08. 
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on cotton, noting that this was not true of all Oxfam affiliates. It was in response to 
this experience at Cancùn that the civil society organisation of which she is 
President, Le Forum pour un Autre Mali, organised a series of events called La Fibre 
Africaine (The African Fibre) in 2004. The aim of La Fibre Africaine was to 
mobilise grassroots farmers to participate in the cotton subsidies campaign and, 
indeed, these events featured quite strongly in some of the recollections of farmers 
interviewed during fieldwork research. When asked whether her position differed 
from that of Oxfam GB, Mme Traoré said, ‘OGB [Oxfam Great Britain] does not 
question the neoliberal model; OGB criticises the malfunctioning of the system 
without challenging the principle of an unjust globalisation.’268 Mme Traoré also 
commented that one reason she got involved in campaigning on cotton was to find 
ways for producers and artisans to work together to manufacture cotton products 
locally. 
Ibrahima Coulibaly of the AOPP said in an interview that he voiced his 
doubts about the cotton subsidies campaign to Oxfam staff after the Cancùn 
conference. His concerns were twofold. At the level of the world market, even if US 
subsidies were eliminated, which looked unlikely to happen, the problem of the low 
price of cotton would not be resolved because, in the absence of a system to regulate 
supply and demand, the US market share would be taken over by other large 
producers such as Brazil, Australia and New Zealand. Furthermore, the campaign 
against subsidies overlooked problems at the regional and national levels: (i) that it is 
the State and the cotton company, rather than the producers, which absorb profits 
made from the world market; and (ii) that the policy of export-oriented commodity 
production has created a system of dependence on cotton, in which the producers’ 
real needs—for food security and a positive credit balance—are not met. Lassine 
Sidibe of the AOPP raised the same concern about other large cotton producing 
countries supplanting the US if it did cut its subsidies, and he argued for regulation 
of the world market. He also argued in favour of adding value to Mali’s cotton by 
                                                        
268 Original: OGB ne met pas en question le modèle néolibéral; OGB critique le dysfonctionnement du 
système sans remettre en question le principe d’une mondialisation injuste. 
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processing it within the country, noting that it is the fact of exporting a primary 
commodity that lies at the heart of the problem.269 
Like Aminata Dramane Traoré, Ibrahima Coulibaly singled out Oxfam GB 
among all Oxfam affiliates as the one NGO that did not want to hear this discourse of 
the limitations of the focus on subsidies, ‘because’ he said, ‘it disrupts their 
campaign.’270 
 
If US subsidies are eliminated, if the producers earn nothing – in Africa, 
in Mali, in other countries – from their production, it is pointless. … It 
could be a success for the NGOs, but it is not a success for us. … For us, 
it’s our lives, it is not a campaign – it is not just a campaign; it is our 
lives that are at stake.271 
 
Ibrahima Coulibaly went on to say that he believed that staff at Oxfam GB 
were more preoccupied by their own jobs than by the real problems of peasants. He 
described large NGOs as ‘large machines of job creation,’ which continue ‘to sell a 
negative image of subsidies because that mobilises compassion at global level.’272 
Criticisms of Oxfam’s – notably Oxfam GB’s – ways of working in advocacy 
campaigns, which were voiced by civil society partners and allies from different 
regions of the global South at this time, percolated into a revision by Oxfam 
International of its guidelines for Southern campaigning and advocacy.273 After 
months of discussion between Oxfam affiliates, the new guidelines were finally 
agreed on the 31st January 2004, and they were distributed to staff throughout the 
NGO over the subsequent months. The guidelines advised such measures as 
subsuming Oxfam’s own brand to those of its partners and allies when supporting 
them in their advocacy and campaigns in their own countries, unless there is a 
                                                        
269 Interview with Lassine Sidibe, AOPP Executive Secretary, Bamako, 29/08/07, from fieldnotes. 
270 Original: parce que ça dérange leur campagne. 
271 Interview with Ibrahima Coulibaly, AOPP External Relations Secretary, Bamako, 17/01/08. 
Original: si on élimine les subventions aux Etats-Unis, si les paysans ne gagent pas – en Afrique, au 
Mali, dans d’autres pays – de leur production, ça ne sert à rien. … Ça peut être une réussite pour les 
ONG, mais ce n’est pas une réussite pour nous. […] Pour nous c’est nos vies, ce n’est pas une 
campagne – ce n’est pas qu’une campagne ; c’est nos vies qui sont en jeu. 
272 Interview with Ibrahima Coulibaly, AOPP External Relations Secretary, Bamako, 17/01/08. 
Original: Oxfam GB … les gens là sont plus préoccupés par leurs propre jobs que par les vrais 
problèmes des paysans. … Ces grosses ONG … c’est des grosses machines de création d’emploi. … 
Le job doit continuer; on doit continuer à vendre une mauvaise image des subventions parce que ça 
mobilise la compassion au niveau mondial. 
273 Oxfam International Southern Campaigning and Advocacy, 31 January 2004. 
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justification for not doing so; taking extra care when discussing international policies 
with national governments; involving partners, allies and staff upstream in the 
development of campaign strategies and policies for early identification of points of 
difference and potential conflict between affiliates and with partners; and negotiating 
positions with partners and allies before lobbying ministers at international 
conferences. 
 
The overall strategy and OI’s [Oxfam International’s] role need to be 
defined together with partners and allies in the national context at the 
very beginning of the approach. This process should identify likely 
impacts and risks, and thus priorities. OI regional and country teams 
should avoid the situation of instrumentalisation of either Oxfam by 
Governments or of Oxfam utilising counterparts.274 
 
Over the same period there emerged a Southern-initiated global alliance for 
action on poverty, styled as a transnational social movement. According to its 
website, the idea for the Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP) was first 
aired at a meeting of Southern civil society activists, including Kumi Naidoo (then 
CIVICUS), hosted by Graça Machel in Mozambique, during September 2003, the 
month in which the Cancùn WTO took place. GCAP was launched officially on 1st 
January 2005 at the World Social Forum in Brazil, initially as a year-long campaign 
but the alliance was repeatedly extended and is currently set to run until 2015. GCAP 
had an effect at the level of branding – with Oxfam’s brand being subordinated to 
that of GCAP, which has more of a ‘Southern’ identity – but it did little to change 
Oxfam policy or strategy in the cotton campaign over the period considered in this 
chapter. 
Oxfam’s Make Trade Fair campaign was made part of the Global Call to 
Action Against Poverty. In the UK, GCAP was represented by the Make Poverty 
History (MPH) coalition. Oxfam’s own brand was subordinated to that of MPH but 
the NGO continued to dominate its partners and allies in terms of the content and 
strategy of the campaign, keeping a tight grip on a campaign message that was not 
radical enough for the majority of the MPH coalition. MPH was criticised by voices 
                                                        
274 Oxfam International Southern Campaigning and Advocacy, 31 January 2004, page 4, original 
emphasis. 
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inside and outside the coalition for relying too heavily on media celebrities and for 
being ‘too cosy’ with the British Government.275  
In West Africa, Oxfam ploughed on with the cotton subsidies campaign, this 
time linking it to the Global Call to Action Against Poverty and targeting the 2005 
WTO ministerial conference in Hong Kong.276 But Oxfam was faced with a situation 
in which there was significant disagreement about the campaign among its Southern 
partners in the West African farmers’ movement and, indeed between different 
Oxfam affiliates working in the region. The 2004 Oxfam International guidelines for 
Southern Campaigning and Advocacy advise that if this situation arises in a case of 
engagement with national ministries on international issues, it calls for ‘a careful and 
conscious political judgement … about whether to proceed.’277 In West Africa, in 
2004–2005, Oxfam did proceed with the cotton subsidies campaign nonetheless. 
In 2004 disagreements over the cotton subsidies campaign raged within the 
regional producers’ network, ROPPA. Ibrahima Coulibaly described how ROPPA 
made a stand against the narrowness of the cotton campaign, but Oxfam found an 
alternative partner to work with. 
 
Oxfam Great Britain has never wanted to understand the problem. … 
That’s why at one point we, ROPPA, did not want to follow. And we did 
not follow. They continued their partnership. They continued to mobilise 
a lot of money, even now, on the issue of subsidies – while the peasant is 
at a complete dead end. We must get out of that problem. We must help 
family farming – which is to diversify; to have perspectives other than 
cotton. That is the deep divergence between us.278 
                                                        
275 One reason for this may be that some managers lacked support for the new guidelines and gave 
only very weak instructions to staff to follow them. The guidelines were distributed to Oxfam GB 
staff with a covering email from Justin Forsyth, then Campaigns and Policy Director, which states, 
“while they do provide much more clarity they are open to interpretation and Jasmine [Whitbread; 
then OI Director] and I want to make clear that we do not want you to take a conservative 
interpretation of these principles and guidelines.” (Email communication 04/03/04.) Later the same 
year Justin Forsyth left Oxfam to work as Special Advisor on International Development to Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, where he became a focus of controversy over the alleged co-option of the Make 
Poverty History campaign by the Blair government (Katherine Quarmby, “Why Oxfam is failing 
Africa”, New Statesman, 30 May 2005). 
276 Note, for example, the use of the GCAP white band symbol by student activists promoting the Big 
Noise petition in Dakar in December 2005: “PEACE sheds light on trade injustice” 
www.maketradefair.com/en/index.php?file=events_senegal02.htm consulted on 31/01/12. 
277 Oxfam International Southern Campaigning and Advocacy, 31 January 2004. 
278 Interview with Ibrahima Coulibaly, AOPP External Relations Secretary and CNOP President, 
Bamako, 17/01/08. Original: Oxfam Grande Bretagne n’a jamais voulu comprendre le problème. ... 
C’est pourquoi nous à un certain moment, le ROPPA, n’a pas voulu suivre. Et nous on n’a pas suivi. 
Ils ont continu leur partenariat, ils ont continuer à mobiliser beaucoup d’argent, même maintenant, sur 
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At the time of interview, in January 2008, Ibrahima Coulibaly was both 
External Relations Secretary for the AOPP and President of the CNOP 
(Coordination Nationale des Organisations Paysannes). The CNOP dates back to a 
1996 meeting of producer organisations, but it was only in November 2004 that the 
CNOP was given legal status as Mali’s national platform of producers’ organisations. 
In November 2004, the CNOP replaced the AOPP as the national platform of 
ROPPA in Mali. This was a logical step given that the CNOP is an umbrella 
organisation, which includes the AOPP as a member, along with ten other producer 
organisations.279 In January 2009, following internal elections, Ibrahima Coulibaly 
stepped down from his post at the AOPP and has subsequently focused on his role 
with the CNOP. This correlates with a general shift in which the CNOP and ROPPA 
have gradually become the prime champions of family farming over export-oriented 
commodity production in Mali and West Africa. 
A new, cotton-specific association, AProCA (Association of African Cotton 
Producers)280 was formed in December 2004 by those producer leaders who sought 
to pursue the cotton campaign. According to an Oxfam worker, ‘AProCA… had 
mobilising around the WTO almost as a sort of raison d’être.’281 Alexis Anouan, Co-
ordinator of Agricultural Policy at ENDA Diapol, described how ENDA and Oxfam 
had wanted to work on cotton through ROPPA, but found cotton producers frustrated 
by a lack of commitment in the network to their specific interests. 
 
The cotton producers were members of ROPPA. The problem is that 
ROPPA was going to set up a cotton commission and this has never 
existed. And the cotton producers ended up seeing their incomes fall. 
                                                                                                                                                             
la question des subventions – alors que le paysan est dans un impasse total. Il faut sortir de ce 
problème-là. Il faut aider l’agriculture familiale – qui est diversifiée ; avoir d’autres perspectives que 
le coton. Donc c’est ça qui est la divergence de fond entre nous. 
279 One reason for the tardy recognition of the CNOP may be the overlap between the mandate it 
sought and that already held by the Chamber of Agriculture: ‘The CNOP, like the Permanent 
Assembly of the Chambers of Agriculture, claims exclusive legitimacy for the representation and the 
defence of the interests of agricultural family farmers and agricultural producers.’ 
Source: Presentation et Historique de la CNOP, www.cnop-mali.org/spip.php?article95 consulted on 
12/01/12. Original: La CNOP, comme l’Assemblée Permanente des Chambres d’Agriculture, 
revendique la légitimité exclusive pour la représentation et la défense des intérêts des exploitants 
familiaux Agricoles et des producteurs Agricoles.  
280 Association des Producteurs de Coton Africains. www.aproca.net 
281 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
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They said they were going to set up an association of cotton producers. 
We, in the framework of our activities, we had wanted to advance 
through ROPPA on the specific problems of cotton, but there were 
blockages at the heart of ROPPA. So when the cotton producers said, 
‘ENDA, Oxfam, come help us to set up an association of cotton 
producers’, we said, ‘Hold your general assembly and afterwards we will 
find the means to support you.’282 
 
Reaching into Central Africa, AProCA brought together cotton producer 
organisations from a slightly different set of countries than ROPPA, which defines 
itself as a West African network.283 An interviewee from Oxfam said that from the 
NGO’s outsider perspective, it had not anticipated the creation of AProCA but, in 
retrospect, the original farmers’ internet appeal against subsidies was a precursor to 
it.284 Both initiatives were led by François Traoré, President of the National Union of 
Cotton Producers of Burkina Faso (UNPCB), and now Chair of AProCA.  
Ampha Coulibaly, who signed the original appeal on behalf of Malian 
producers, cited the creation of AProCA as a positive outcome of the cotton 
subsidies campaign.285 He was replaced in his role as top Malian cotton leader by 
Bakary Togola in 2003/04. Around the same time, the group of Malian cotton and 
food crop unions, the GSCVM286 was officially recognised as the top national 
representative body for cotton farmers and it became the Malian affiliate of AProCA. 
In 2005, AProCA became Oxfam’s new primary Southern partner in the cotton 
campaign and that should have meant that the GSCVM would be its main conduit in 
Mali. However, an Oxfam staff member commented, ‘AProCA did try and work 
through the Groupement [GSVCM], but that was a complete failure: they didn’t do 
                                                        
282 Interview with Alexis Anouan, Coordinator of Agricultural Policy, ENDA Diapol (Senegal), 
Bamako, 12/02/08. Original: Les producteurs du coton étaient membres du ROPPA. Le problème 
c’est que le ROPPA voulait mettre en place une commission coton est ce n’a jamais existé. Et les 
producteurs du coton ont fini à voir leur revenu chuter. Ils ont dit qu’ils vont essayer à mettre en place 
une association de producteurs du coton. Nous dans le cadre de nos activités on avait voulu avancer 
dans le cas de ROPPA sur les problèmes spécifiques de coton, mais il y a eu des blocages au sein du 
ROPPA. Donc quand les producteurs du coton ont dit, « ENDA, Oxfam, venez nous aider à mettre en 
place une association de producteurs du coton », nous on a dit, « Faites votre assemblée générale et 
après nous on va trouver les moyens de vous accompagner. »  
283 At its inception, the new association involved representatives from twelve countries in West and 
Central Africa, including Mali, with the addition of Central African Republic in 2006.  
284 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
285 Interview with Ampha Coulibaly, President of the regional union of cotton co-operatives of 
Koutiala and San, Koutiala, 23/02/08. 
286 Groupement des Syndicats Cotonniers et Vivriers du Mali. 
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anything.’ Ironically, the task then fell back to Oxfam’s long-standing partner, the 
AOPP, despite the fact that representatives within the organisation had expressed 
reservations about the campaign. 
In December 2004 and January 2005, when AProCA took over on the cotton 
campaign, the AOPP was already committed to helping Oxfam America host a 
delegation of American cotton farmers led by Mary Robinson.287 Dominique Jenkins 
of Oxfam and Souleymane Diarra of the AOPP were involved in organising this 
media-oriented event.288 The visit, designed by Oxfam to highlight the campaign 
against US cotton subsidies, coincided with a moment of crisis in the Malian cotton 
sector, in which the World Bank withheld a structural adjustment credit to the Malian 
Treasury until a new market-sensitive mechanism was instituted to set the producer 
price of cotton. As discussed in the previous chapter, this episode cast doubt on the 
competence and credibility of the top cotton leader, Bakary Togola, who signed 
agreement to the new mechanism without the support of farmers and while failing to 
make any significant demands on the Government in return. It also cast an 
unfavourable light on Oxfam’s campaigning priorities. An Oxfam staff member 
commented, in relation to this coincidence of events, ‘I think there was quite a 
number of people, both in Washington and here [in Mali], that have always felt that 
we should have been working much more focusing on the [World] Bank.’289 
As the year progressed, attention turned to organising a petition targeted at 
the next WTO conference, set to take place in Hong Kong in December 2005. 
Dominique Jenkins described how Oxfam and AProCA met in Burkina Faso to plan 
the Hong Kong petition: ‘we had a target, we developed a general message, what the 
petition would look like, a budget, other organisations on a national level that we 
would pair with, and pretty much a strategy to collect the petition, as well as 
determine where and when it would be delivered.’290 Jenkins said that the 2005 Big 
Noise petition ‘sort of left Oxfam and was appropriated by many of our partners,’ a 
                                                        
287 Former president of Ireland and now a high-profile international campaigner on poverty and 
human rights. 
288 Interview with Dominique Jenkins, Oxfam America West Africa Region Popular Mobilization and 
Media Co-ordinator, Dakar, 02/02/08; interview with Souleymane Diarra, AOPP Commissions Co-
ordinator, Bamako, 17/01/08. 
289 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
290 Interview with Dominique Jenkins, Oxfam America West Africa Region Popular Mobilization and 
Media Co-ordinator, Dakar, 02/02/08. 
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process which would have been in keeping with the new ways of working under 
GCAP and Oxfam’s revised Southern campaigning guidelines. Another Oxfam staff 
member described the organisation of the petition for Hong Kong as ‘a more well-
oiled machine’ than the first attempt, with the farmers having more experience and 
Oxfam having more resources to support them, but noted that the success of the 
petition varied by country.  
In Mali, where AProCA’s national platform failed to perform, the petition 
was conducted by AOPP, this time by its political office-holders. The AOPP was 
aided in this task by Dutch NGO, SNV, and Swiss NGO, Helvétas, both of which 
have long worked with farmers in Mali’s cotton zone.291 Souleymane Diarra noted 
the less ‘formalised’ character of the second edition of the petition,292 which 
nonetheless contributed over 831,836 Malian signatures to the 2005 Big Noise 
petition:293 a vast increase on the 2003 total. Even so, the Malian total was dwarfed 
once again by that achieved in Burkina Faso, where over 1.6 million people signed 
up to the Big Noise in 2005, contributing more than half of the total 2.7 million 
signatures from West Africa. Not all of the Burkinabè signatures were to AProCA’s 
version of the petition, however. The Peasant Confederation of Faso launched its 
own petition reflecting the policy line of ROPPA, of which it is the national platform 
in Burkina Faso. AProCA’s petition focused on the ‘unfair’ and ‘exorbitant’ 
subsidies paid to US and EU producers, which distort the world cotton market,294 
while the Peasant Confederation’s petition called on the international community 
both to make trade fair and to recognise the right to ‘food sovereignty.’295 Signatures 
to both petitions were counted by Oxfam as part of the Big Noise.296  
                                                        
291 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07; interview with 
Ampha Coulibaly, President of the regional union of cotton co-operatives of Koutiala and San, 
Koutiala, 23/02/08. 
292 Interview with Souleymane Diarra, AOPP Commissions Co-ordinator, Bamako, 17/01/08. 
293 Source: www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/countries/mali_campaign.htm consulted on 31/01/12. 
294 http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200512090647.html consulted on 06/02/12. 
295 See appendix five for a copy of the text. Source: www.abcburkina.net/fr/nos-dossiers/vu-au-sud-
vu-du-sud/142-122-ption-en-faveur-dun-commerce-itable consulted on 06/02/12 and fieldnotes, Fana, 
06/07/05. ‘Food sovereignty’ designates the notion that peoples have the right to control the process 
whereby they ensure their own food security, an idea which was first developed by the international 
social movement, Via Campesina. 
296 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. See appendix five for 
a copy of the Conféderation Paysanne de Faso pettion. 
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The Peasant Confederation’s version of the petition circulated at Mali’s social 
forum, the Forum des Peuples, in Fana in July 2005.297 At a workshop on the cotton 
case at the WTO during this forum, an Oxfam America speaker gave a presentation 
on the cotton subsidies campaign, which attracted criticism from workshop 
participants and provoked quite heated debate. A speaker from French NGO, Peuples 
Solidaires accused Oxfam’s cotton subsidies’ campaign of playing into the hands of 
the protagonists of free trade, while the Oxfam speaker argued in favour of defending 
the stand made by African governments at the WTO in terms of the tactics of civil 
society working in alliance with government.298 Concerns about the campaign that 
were aired from the floor were in keeping with themes championed throughout the 
event, in favour of a reorientation towards domestic markets and local processing of 
cotton.299 
The campaign against cotton subsidies led to a yet closer alliance between 
civil society and government at the end of 2005, when cotton farmer leaders funded 
by AProCA attended the Hong Kong WTO conference as part of the official 
government delegations of their respective countries. AProCA, ROPPA, Enda 
Diapol, Oxfam International and numerous Oxfam country affiliates were all 
represented in the NGO delegation at Hong Kong.300 Keifa Diarra, a leader of 
SYCOV in Mali, was in the official delegation at Hong Kong.301 He explained that 
each State had been invited by the WTO to include one or two farmers in their 
official delegations, and the State could only bring farmers from national 
representative structures. It so happened that these national structures were also 
members of AProCA. Each State registered a couple of farmer leaders on its official 
delegation, but did not or could not pay their travel expenses. So AProCA sought the 
funding to cover all the costs. Upon arrival in Hong Kong, the farmers in the official 
delegations regrouped as AProCA but, unlike those who came in the NGO 
                                                        
297 Personal observation, fieldnotes, Fana, 06/07/05. Note: this fieldwork research informed my 
masters dissertation (Coughlan 2005). 
298 Fieldwork recording of Atelier VIII: Le dossier coton à l’OMC, Forum des Peuples, Fana, 
07/07/05. 
299 For elaboration of these points, see my masters dissertation (Coughlan 2005). 
300 NGOs Attendance to the WTO Sixth Ministerial Conference, Hong Kong, China, 13-18 December 
2005. Source: www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_e.htm consulted on 12/02/12. 
301 Interview with Keifa Diarra, SYCOV Fana Regional President and National Secretary-General, 
Fana, 19/02/08 
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delegation, they enjoyed unrestricted access to all of the conference proceedings. 
They dressed in uniforms of cotton cloth made in Burkina Faso and whenever there 
was a meeting on cotton, all the cotton producers would head towards the conference 
room to disrupt the meeting. 
 
The Ambassador of the United States wanted to go and cry, with us in 
one of those rooms. Because we annoyed him so much that he left that 
place, he went out. So in the end he was compelled to call our Minister, 
Mr Chogel, who was a spokesperson for the African Ministers, to say 
that, well, he understands our suffering, and it was in that that he 
promised to withdraw the subsidies by 2013. It was under pressure. It 
was under our pressure.302 
 
Keifa Diarra added that the US trade negotiator went on to promise an aid 
package that would begin in 2006, referring to the US West Africa Cotton 
Improvement Program (WACIP). He asserted that the concessions made by the US 
were a result of the pressure that he and other AProCA representatives had exerted at 
the Hong Kong WTO.  
As mentioned in chapter three, the US aid package (WACIP) included 
promotion of genetically modified (GM) cotton in the Cotton Four countries (Mali, 
Benin, Burkina Faso and Chad) plus Senegal.303 Biotechnology is another issue 
which divides opinion in the West African farmers’ movement. François Traoré of 
Burkina Faso, the main protagonist of the farmers’ campaign against US and EU 
cotton subsidies, is in favour of the use of biotechnology in cotton production.304 
Burkina Faso was the first West African country to trial Bt cotton.305 By 2010, Bt 
                                                        
302 Interview with Keifa Diarra, SYCOV Fana Regional President and National Secretary-General, 
Fana, 19/02/08. Original: L’Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis ne- voulait aller pleurer avec nous dans une 
des salles-là. Parce que on l’a tellement fatigué que finalement il a laissé le coin, il est sorti. Donc 
finalement il était obligé d’appeler notre ministre, M. Chogel, qui était une porte-parole des ministres 
de l’Afrique, pour dire que, bon, il comprend notre peine, et c’est dans ça qu’il a promis de retirer les 
subventions d’ici 2013. C’est sous pression. C’est sous notre pression.  
303 Source: USAID 2006: “activities include: Improving the technical, bio-safety and regulatory 
capacity for biotechnology-Bt Cotton through agriculture environmental studies, educational outreach 
to farmers on Bt cotton, and policy development training;” 
304 “François Traoré: Je ne suis pas contre les OGM”, LeFaso.net, 5 April 2005, 
www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article6357 consulted on 28/02/12. “Ce que je pense de la rencontre sur la 
partage d’expériences sur la culture du coton génétiquement modifié”, 3 January 2012, 
http://francoistraore.blogspot.com/2012/01/ce-que-je-pense-de-la-rencontre-sur-le.html consulted on 
28/02/12. 
305 ‘Burkina Faso commercialises GM cotton’, ICTSD, 25 July 2008, 
http://ictsd.org/i/environment/14348/ consulted on 28/02/12. 
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cotton accounted for sixty-five percent of the land planted to cotton in the country.306 
There is strong opposition to biotechnology, however, within the regional farmers’ 
network, ROPPA. Opposition is particularly strong in Mali, where a National 
Coalition for the Safeguard of the Genetic Heritage of Mali was formed. This 
coalition includes, among others, the CNOP, the AOPP, the Forum pour un Autre 
Mali, the Forum des Peuples, and a national co-ordinating body of NGOs (CCA-
ONG), all of which have been active in the campaign against GM, including 
translating information into national languages and organising petitions and protest 
marches.307 Despite intense civil society opposition, Mali’s national assembly passed 
a law regulating biosafety in November 2008, paving the way for the official 
introduction of GM crops into the country.308 
 
 
Perspectives on the campaign: a success for whom? 
Of the eighteen farmers interviewed in Mali’s cotton zone on the subject of 
the international campaign against US and EU cotton subsidies, only six reported 
having participated in the campaign. Two of these, Ampha Coulibaly and Keifa 
Diarra, cited above, had participated at high levels in the campaign while occupying 
national level posts in the cotton unions. The other four participated in the campaign 
by signing one of the petitions against subsidies. One of these, A N Fomba, also cited 
above, was enthusiastic about his experience of the campaign, but the other three 
expressed a variety of reservations. Seydou Touré, a cotton farmer from Fana, was 
critical of the United States’ promised timetable for the reduction of subsidies, 
indicating he felt it was too slow.309 Koutiala cotton farmer, Bourama Goita 
expressed his doubts that the United States would make any significant reforms to its 
subsidy regime as a result of the campaign. He insisted that while Malian farmers 
could express their opinions, they could not hold the US Government to account; ‘we 
                                                        
306 ‘Biotech Facts and Trends: Burkina Faso’, www.isaaa.org consulted on 28/02/12. 
307 Interviews with Salif Foulani Sissoko, CNOP, Technical Coordinator; Jean Coulibaly, AOPP 
President; Aliou Maiga, CCA-ONG Communications Officer; all held Bamako, 04/10/06. See also 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4445824.stm consulted on 28/02/12. 
308 “Biosécurité et les OGM au Mali”, Nouvel Horizon, 14 November 2008, www.malijet.com/ 
a_la_une_du_mali/8378-bios_curit_et_introduction_des_ogm_au_mali_les_d_put_s_ont_trahi.html 
consulted on 28/02/12. 
309 Interview with Seydou Touré, cotton farmer, Fana, 17/02/08. 
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only see our government’, he said.310 He argued that Malians had to find their own 
solutions, such as increasing access to farm equipment and low cost fertilizer. 
Similarly, Seydou Traoré, also of Koutiala, said, ‘The campaign against subsidies is 
a good thing but it has never achieved its objective, and the Government of Mali 
does not help the peasants.’311 Traoré complained that the campaign against subsidies 
had been compromised by corrupt union leaders. 
Of the remaining twelve farmers interviewed who did not participate in the 
campaign, nine nonetheless reported that they were aware of the issue of US and EU 
cotton subsidies, while three were entirely unfamiliar with the subject. The responses 
of all nine informants who were aware of the issue but had not had any contact with 
the campaign are indicative of the remoteness of the subsidies campaign from the 
lives of many grassroots farmers. Three of those nine interviewees had vivid 
recollections of hearing Government Ministers or the President of Mali speaking on 
the issue of US and EU cotton subsidies, two over the radio and one in person at an 
event in Bamako.312 In addition to the television and the radio, sources of 
information included the CMDT and the cotton unions, both of which, it was 
reported, cited foreign subsidies as an explanation to farmers who asked why the 
price paid to producers was low.313 In this way, the focus of attention on foreign 
subsidies has obscured other factors that may have contributed to the low producer 
price, such as inefficiencies and profiteering within the global value chain. 
As elaborated in the previous chapter, the farmers interviewed raised a 
number of concerns besides that of subsidies and indeed besides that of the low price 
they receive for cotton. Perhaps the most detailed argument for a broader analysis of 
the problems facing farmers in Mali’s cotton zone was made by Ampha Coulibaly, 
signatory to the original 2001 appeal against US and EU cotton subsidies. Speaking 
                                                        
310 Interview with Bourama Goita, cotton farmer, Koutiala, 21/02/08. Original: On ne voit que notre 
gouvernment. 
311 Interview with Seydou Traoré, cotton farmer, Koutiala, 21/02/08. Original: La campagne contre les 
subventions est une bonne chose mais il n’a jamais atteint son objectif, et le gouvernement du Mali 
n’aide pas les paysans. 
312 Interviews with cotton farmers: Bafing Diarra, Kodabougou, 18/02/08; Michel Dembele, Moribila, 
23/02/08; and Alphonse Kone, Moribila, 24/02/08. 
313 Interviews with Bakary Fomba, cotton farmer, Dien, 17/02/08; and Fode Sumunu, retired CMDT 
extension agent, Koutiala, 20/02/08. Also, interview with Ampha Coulibaly, Koutiala, 23/02/08. 
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in 2008, Ampha Coulibaly asserted that the most pressing problem for farmers in the 
Koutiala area was not that of price but of low yields. 
 
If in one hectare you produce one and a half tonnes [of cotton], you sell it 
at 160 francs [per kilo], if you do the calculation [earns 240,000 francs]. 
And he who has 200 francs as the price, he only produces 500 kilograms 
[of cotton] [earns 100,000 francs]. So you see there is a difference: the 
price is high but the yield is low. And if the yield is high, the price is low, 
but that can sort out the problems… that can satisfy the peasant and he 
gets himself less in debt, he will have fewer problems. So if we manage 
to get the solution to the yield at the level of the soil, so the peasant will 
be at ease: he will not have a lot of problems, he will not have a lot of 
debts.314 
 
It is worth noting that Ampha Coulibaly did not link low yields to any 
problem with pest management, which might have supported an argument in favour 
of the introduction of Bt cotton. Rather, he attributed low yields to soil ‘fatigue’ and 
called for a detailed analysis of the soils in the Koutiala area. In this, he saw ‘a big 
role for the State’315 in the co-ordination and execution of this kind of research and 
development. This brings the argument back around to the subject of privatisation of 
the CMDT and liberalisation of the cotton sector. Ampha Coulibaly suggested that 
donors might help to finance agronomic research but insisted that the State must play 
its role in Mali’s rural development. 
Overall, the responses of the farmers interviewed indicated that the campaign 
against US and EU subsidies had some merit in that it addressed one factor that 
currently has an adverse effect on their livelihoods, but that it had failed to bring 
about satisfactory change in regard to this issue, which was only one of a complex 
array of concerns for farmers. The campaign went some way towards making 
farmers aware of an international level factor affecting their lives but there was a 
                                                        
314 Interview with Ampha Coulibaly, President of the regional union of cotton co-operatives of 
Koutiala and San, Koutiala, 23/02/08. Original: Si dans un hectare tu produis une tonne et demie, tu le 
vends à cent soixante francs, si tu fais le calcul. Et celui qui a deux cents francs comme prix dans une 
hectare, lui il ne produit que cinq cents kilogrammes. Donc vous voyez il y a une différence : le prix 
est élevé mais le rendement est bas. Et si le rendement est élevé, le prix est bas, mais ça peut régler les 
problèmes… ça peut satisfaire le paysan et il se rend moins endetté, il aura moins de problèmes. Donc 
si on arrive à avoir la solution du rendement au niveau du sol, donc le paysan il sera à l’aise, il n’aura 
pas beaucoup de problèmes, il n’aura pas beaucoup de dettes. 
315 Original: un grand rôle pour l’Etat. 
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sense that this had served to divert attention from democratic accountability and 
pragmatic solutions at national level.  
By contrast, responses from international NGO workers interviewed 
indicated that they felt a principal success of the campaign against US and EU cotton 
subsidies was an enhancement of democratic accountability, both in the North, where 
citizens increasingly questioned their own governments’ subsidy regimes, and in 
African countries, where civil society organisations developed their capacities to 
influence their own governments.316 One Oxfam interviewee, cited below, took a 
very long term perspective on how civil society campaigns can bring about social 
change, which was in tension with views expressed by farmers and their 
representatives who sought urgent solutions to the problems they faced. 
 
I personally have never been of the school that believes strongly that this 
kind of campaigning is going to lead to very, very significant reform of 
US subsidies. And I’ve always been slightly wary of simplistic attempts 
to link change in the subsidies regime to actual issues of poverty in 
Africa. And um, for me, it’s much more something of symbolic value in 
terms of, you know, I think it genuinely has contributed to a different 
kind of a debate about trade issues and one that is much more widely and 
popularly understood, in both the North and the South. So I see those as 
much more tangible aims really. A lot of my colleagues wouldn’t agree 
with me.317 
 
This interviewee suggested that the campaign ‘also creates other kinds of 
organisational dynamics which may be empowering in other ways’. The campaign is 
thus viewed as contributing to the development of debate in the public sphere and to 
the development of civil society movements themselves. The pertinent question, 
however, from the point of view of many farmers and their representatives in Mali 
was precisely who in West African civil society has been empowered through the 
campaign against US and EU cotton subsidies.  
One national level farmer leader, who wished to remain anonymous, was 
clear whom he thought had been empowered though the campaign.  
 
                                                        
316 Interview with Dominique Jenkins, Oxfam America West Africa Region Popular Mobilization and 
Media Co-ordinator, Dakar, 02/02/08. 
317 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
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It’s François Traoré. He was chosen by the government of Burkina Faso. 
Everybody knows that. … And he is supported by Oxfam Great Britain. 
Oxfam supports these people. It’s that that’s a shame. … They have 
mobilised three billion francs CFA which they are in the process of 
giving to these people who do not fight for the interests of cotton 
producers. … They try to marginalise us in the debate, because they tell 
us, ‘You are not cotton producers.’ … They try to create a division by 
saying that it’s only those who have chosen to call themselves cotton-
producer organisations, that it’s they alone who have the right to talk 
about cotton today. It’s a division that has been supported by the 
politicians – for their interests, not for the interests of the peasants. And 
these people like [Bakary] Togola, like François [Traoré] have been the 
real artisans of this game.318 
 
The emergence of cotton-specific producer organisations, such as AProCA, 
has been facilitated by the cotton-specific focus of the campaign against cotton 
subsidies and its links to the WTO process. This has advanced the single-commodity 
perspective over the broad-based family farming approach; a move which has 
favoured the interests of the State, capital, and the West African cotton elite. 
The Oxfam worker, cited above, acknowledged the validity of concerns over 
the national cotton farmer leadership in Mali, and noted that a key learning outcome 
of the campaign for Oxfam has been understanding the need to work simultaneously 
at local and at national levels, in order to thoroughly enhance democratic 
accountability rather than boosting national level civil society structures which may 
be only nominally representative. 
 
But our strategic choice, which is following the strategic choice of the 
AOPP, is to say in this context, you have to strengthen the grassroots 
because ultimately that’s what’s going to demand more accountability at 
the national level. I mean that may also be a pie in the sky theory. … But 
I mean at least also by working at the local level, you can have a stronger 
grip on the extent to which you’re actually having any impact on 
                                                        
318 Interview with anonymous national level farmer representative, Bamako, 2008. Original: C’est 
François Traoré. Il a été choisi  par le gouvernement du Burkina Faso. Tout le monde le sait. … Et il 
est soutenu par Oxfam Grande-Bretagne. Oxfam soutien ces gens-là. C’est ça qui est dommage. … Ils 
ont mobilisé trois milliards de francs CFA qu’ils sont en train de donner à ces gens, qui ne luttent pas 
pour les intérêts des producteurs du coton. … On essaie de nous marginaliser dans ce débat, parce que 
on nous dit, “Vous n’êtes pas les producteurs du coton.” … On essaie de créer la division en disant 
ces organisations qui ont choisi de se dire organisations producteurs du coton, c’est eux seules qui ont 
le droit de parler du coton aujourd’hui. C’est une division qui a été entretenue par les politiciens—
pour leurs intérêts, pas pour les intérêts des paysans. Et les gens comme Togola, comme François ont 
été les vrais artisans de ce jeu. 
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ordinary men and women farmers. And in this context, it’s very difficult 
to have a grip on that if you’re working primarily at national level. So I 
mean I suppose that’s one of our lessons out of this whole experience: 
The need for us to focus more at local level at the same time as working 
at national level. And that partly being about trying to sort of strengthen 
that dynamic of accountability: big problem for all civil society 
organisations, but particularly for farmer organisations, which are, you 
know, effectively one of the only mass movements in West Africa.319 
 
Some of the subsequent changes to Oxfam’s work on cotton in Mali will be 




It might be argued that the campaign against US and EU cotton subsidies 
went some way towards informing grassroots farmers of supranational factors that 
affect their lives (even if they did so only indirectly in the early 2000s), and that it 
empowered them to speak out and even to bring about incremental change. The 
importance of this sense of having been heard by a powerful nation is evident in the 
interview response of Dien cotton farmer, A N Fomba, cited above. Without 
undervaluing the positive outcomes of the campaign experience for some farmers, 
what stands out from the fieldwork research is not that grassroots farmers were 
liberated by their newfound knowledge of the workings of the world cotton market, 
but that opposition to US and EU cotton subsidies became the priority for concerted 
transnational civil society action through a competitive process of agenda-setting; 
one in which grassroots farmers featured as objects of concern but barely at all as 
subjects with their own valid viewpoints. 
The politics of agenda-setting within civil society, which accompanied the 
cotton subsidies campaign, took place across multiple political arenas. The initial 
appearance of a confluence of interests between an international NGO and a group of 
African farmer leaders belied growing tensions within the West African farmers’ 
movement at regional and national levels. In their critique of the literature on 
transnational development networks, Henry, Mohan and Yanacopulos (2004, p. 851) 
                                                        
319 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
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point out that the same authors who have identified that within policy arenas, ‘the 
key strategy of the competing parties is to attempt to exclude opposing views from 
the frame of public discussion,’ nonetheless ‘do not seem to have applied this 
approach to analysing processes within networks, as they overlook the lack of 
consensus within many transnational development networks.’  
The campaign against subsidies facilitated the marginalisation of alternative 
perspectives through the framing of debate, which was fuelled by the interests of 
relatively powerful actors inside (and perhaps outside) the network, and through the 
ways in which the ‘tools’ of the campaign were used. Grassroots farmers were 
primarily concerned with their immediate needs and the security of their livelihoods; 
while West African farmer leaders sought to consolidate their positions within their 
national political contexts and in the global value chain; and international NGO 
workers were looking for the success of the campaign on its own terms or in terms of 
a general increase in civil society activity.  
In West Africa, petitions were used not to promote debate at local levels or 
within civil society, but to show support to political leaders and to legitimise the 
campaign by pointing to grassroots signatories. The international NGO’s insistence 
on promoting a ‘simple’ media-friendly message discouraged debate and obscured 
more subtle analysis of the problems facing African farmers. The international 
NGO’s tight grip on the campaign message slackened slightly in 2005 in the context 
of a worldwide trend towards plurality within the global justice movement. But, by 
then, the campaign – and the international NGO’s funding of it – had already served 
as a catalyst for a profound split in the West African farmers’ movement, 
consolidating a rift between the government-friendly export-oriented cotton elite and 
the movement for broad-based family farming. The campaign strategy of close 
collaboration with West African governments must be viewed in relation to this 
cleavage, which is a major feature of the wider national and regional contexts. 
The campaign against cotton subsidies responded to opportunities in the 
international arena rather than being grounded in local realities. This led to a low 
level of accountability to the most vulnerable stakeholders in the campaign, and to 
the campaign’s lack of independence from dominant ideas of free trade and export-
oriented commodity production. The fieldwork evidence shows striking parallels 
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between the campaign against cotton subsidies and the case of the campaign against 
Scott Paper described by Jordan and van Tuijl (2000) to elucidate their typology of a 
‘disassociated campaign’. In the Scott Paper case, the international campaign did not 
solve the local community’s real problem, that of structural powerlessness. Rather, 
by not involving local people in deciding the agenda and strategy for the campaign, it 
weakened the community’s relative bargaining power.  
One of the concerns raised by civil society actors wary of the cotton subsidies 
campaign was that if it were successful, the market shares of the United States and 
the European Union would be taken by other large producers such as Brazil and 
Australia, without any benefits accruing to African countries. In practice, the success 
of the cotton subsidies campaign at international level was largely limited to 
changing the terms of the debate about trade. In this, it exposed the hypocrisy of neo-
mercantilist practices that are antithetical to the hegemonic discourse of free trade, 
but it did not challenge the hegemonic discourse itself. Indeed, the campaign sought 
to empower African producers to have a greater voice in the governance of the cotton 
global value chain, but in so doing it marginalised calls from some sections of 
African civil society for policy-makers to ‘think outside the box’ of the cotton global 
value chain. 
Berry and Gabay (2009) consider Oxfam’s trade justice campaigns and argue 
that ‘Oxfam’s universalist pretensions mask more local or parochial concerns and 
identities’ (p. 340). This chapter illustrates the extent of the diversity of interests and 
perspectives within the campaign network and among the stakeholders in the 
campaign, and shows how some were promoted while others were marginalised 
through the campaign. Thus, the pertinent question is, ‘Who is empowered by 
transnational civil society action?’ The next chapter will look at the state of farmer 
representation within Mali in the period following the campaign against subsidies; it 
will consider the re-orientation of Oxfam’s advocacy work towards the local level 
there; and it will explore the work of another international NGO which attempted to 
link farmers in Mali’s cotton zone to transnational campaigns. 
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Chapter seven 
‘Capacity building’ Mali’s cotton farmers: 




This chapter looks at two cases in which Northern-based international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) sought to link with local producers in Mali’s 
cotton zone in order to improve accountability and legitimacy within transnational 
advocacy networks. Chapters five and six have shown the local level in Mali to be 
weakly linked to civil society activity in national and transnational arenas. The NGO 
initiatives examined in this chapter are situated in a slightly altered domestic context 
in Mali, which has seen the formation of producer co-operatives at local level and a 
federation of unions of co-operatives that stretches to national level. These reforms 
are part of a ‘top-down’ policy to promote ‘bottom-up’ development by building the 
capacities of Mali’s cotton producers to fulfil their roles in a privatised cotton sector. 
The first of the NGO initiatives to be considered in this chapter is Oxfam’s 
Cotton Programme 2007–2012, which focused on supporting the development of 
local cotton producer co-operatives in Mali, following recognition that poor 
accountability of national level farmer leaders to local farmers had undermined 
Oxfam’s recent work in this field, notably on the campaign against subsidies. The 
second is a partnership between the UK-based Environmental Justice Foundation 
(EJF) and a Malian NGO, AMADIP,320 to gather evidence from Mali to support 
international campaigns on pesticides and child labour in cotton, and to link with the 
local level through a proposed project to promote organic cotton production to 
Malian farmers. AMADIP featured in chapter five, as part of a civil society coalition 
which campaigned against privatisation of the national cotton company, CMDT. 
                                                        
320 L’Association Malienne pour le Développement Intégré et Participatif (Malian Association for 
Integrated and Participative Development), officially founded in 2004. 
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EJF’s proposed organic education project is considered through the lens of the global 
trend – evident in West African cotton sectors – towards promotion of organic and 
fair trade supply chains.321 
The reform of farmer organisation in Mali’s cotton sector, and the participation 
of NGOs both in supporting the development of producer co-operatives and in 
organic and fair trade supply chains, may be viewed as part of broader policy trends 
in development. These initiatives reflect the ‘good governance’ agenda promoted by 
the World Bank since 1992,322 which allots a vital role to civil society organisations 
as a counterbalance to the market and the state, within a context of economic and 
political liberalisation (Howell and Pearce 2001, p. 4). They also reflect a move – 
both by mainstream development thinkers and by those seeking radical alternatives – 
towards a focus on local civil society, participation and empowerment (Peet and 
Watts 1996; Mohan and Stokke 2000). Stokke and Mohan (2001) argue that this 
focus on the local has involved a tendency to promote one version of the local over 
other, more complex analyses of the local. Furthermore, there has been relative 
inattention to national, regional, and international structures and processes affecting 
the local arena (Stokke and Mohan 2001, p. 8). 
The NGO interventions at local level, considered in this chapter, were 
motivated in part by questions of organisational legitimacy and accountability within 
transnational networks. These are familiar themes in the literature on transnational 
advocacy networks, but Henry, Mohan and Yanacopulos (2004) point out that there 
is a lack of empirical research to investigate how these issues are managed in 
practice. 
 
One of the central claims of northern NGOs within transnational 
advocacy networks is that they link southern grassroots communities to 
northern policy makers. Although this claim is central to NGOs’ claims 
to legitimacy, its validity is rarely questioned and it is clear that some 
networks exhibit hierarchical tendencies. (Henry, Mohan and 
Yanacopulos 2004, p. 849) 
 
                                                        
321 For an overview of actors discussed in this chapter, see the influence diagram of campaign actors 
in 2007, in appendix two. 
322 The World Bank’s the notion of ‘good governance’ dates back to its 1992 report, Governance and 
Development. 
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This chapter explores how international NGO attempts to improve links to 
the local area within transnational civil society networks are affected by local 
dynamics and national level politics, while at once being shaped by, and feeding into, 
national and international policy orientations. The analysis presented here contributes 
to the debate around deconstructive approaches to development by unpacking the 
dynamic interaction between transnational civil society actors and local populations 
in the context of wider political processes. 
The argument of this chapter is that the local level of smallholder agriculture 
in Southern Mali is framed by national and international policy environments, and 
that this process, which is reinforced through the interventions of the international 
NGOs, exacerbates underlying inequality, exclusion and conflicts in the local arena. 
The political crisis at the heart of farmer representation in Mali has become an 
intractable problem, which affects development interventions in the cotton zone. The 
NGO initiatives considered in this chapter operate within the framework of export-
oriented commodity production, which does not offer a sustainable solution for the 
poorest and most marginalised farming families in Mali. In this context, the NGOs’ 
attempts to enhance their legitimacy and accountability by ‘building the capacities’ 
of farmers’ groups at the local level in Mali serve the interests of relatively wealthy 
farmers, the State, capital, and, indeed, their own organisational interests better than 
they serve the interests of the poorest farmers.  
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section examines the 
rationale for, and impacts of, the transformation of village associations to cotton 
producer co-operatives in Mali’s cotton zone. The second section considers the 
formation of unions of co-operatives from local to national levels, in a contentious 
political context. The third section looks at Oxfam’s Cotton Programme 2007–2012 
against the backdrop of changes at local and national levels. The fourth section 
explores the partnership between EJF and AMADIP, considering EJF’s proposed 
organic education project in terms of legitimating links to the local arena and in the 
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Co-operatives, entrepreneurialism and exclusion in the local arena 
A new law (Loi no 01-076 / du 18 juillet 2001) was passed in 2001 to enable 
the formation of producer co-operatives. This law provided the legal framework for 
co-operatives of cotton producers (SCPCs323) to replace village associations (AVs) as 
the first level of farmer organisation above farm level. The programme of 
transforming AVs to cotton producer co-operatives (SCPCs) was a top-down 
initiative, led by the Government and major donors. The World Bank’s Programme 
of Support for Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations (PASAOP) played a 
significant role in this process from 2001 to 2004. There are approximately 7,177 
SCPCs in Mali (Dia and Traoré 2011), spread across 6,345 villages and hamlets in 
the country’s cotton zone.324  
The transformation to co-operative status is a pre-requisite for 
implementation of the Government of Mali’s policy for reform of the cotton sector, 
and privatisation of the CMDT in particular, as was noted in chapter five. Whereas 
AVs were semi-formal groups organised by the CMDT with no legal stature, co-
operatives are independent legal entities, free to form partnerships with private actors 
other than the CMDT.325 Unlike an AV, a cotton producers’ co-operative would be 
able to enter into a business contract with a private ginning company, in the event of 
privatisation of the CMDT and the entrance of new private actors into Mali’s cotton 
market. Their independent legal status also allows for the formation of partnerships 
between co-operatives and NGOs. The legal status of co-operatives further entitles 
them to own shares in a private company. The plan for the privatisation of the 
CMDT envisages that producer co-operatives collectively would own twenty percent 
of the shares in the privatised company. In theory, this would give producers a voice 
in the governance of the company, and it would align the commercial interests of 
producers more closely with those of the company.  
Another aspect of the rationale for transforming AVs to co-operatives is to 
create the conditions for the resolution of some of the management problems 
                                                        
323 Sociétés Coopératives des Producteurs du Coton 
324 Source: www.maliagriculture.org/services_tech/cmdt/page-cmdt.html consulted on 02/04/12. 
325 Information on the transformation of village associations to cotton producer co-operatives in Mali 
comes from a fieldwork interview with Ampha Coulibaly, President of the regional union of cotton 
co-operatives of Koutiala and San, Koutiala, 23/02/08, and from Lacy (2008). 
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associated with AVs.326 In the event of mismanagement of a co-operative, such as 
embezzlement of funds, there can be a judicial process to resolve the matter if 
complaints are brought to the attention of the authorities. Both AVs and co-
operatives operate on a basis of collective liability. This means their members are 
collectively liable for any losses incurred once reimbursement of input credit is 
deducted from the sale of the group’s seed cotton harvest at the end of the 
agricultural year. There is no mechanism for recovering debts owed by individuals 
directly. The group is left to manage this process internally. Co-operatives differ 
from AVs, however, in that the former can have recourse to legal action and, because 
they are voluntary associations based on affinity rather than village-wide 
associations, co-operatives can exclude farmers whom they consider a bad risk.  
The transformation of AVs to co-operatives has the potential to resolve the 
free rider problems and indebtedness experienced by village associations, which 
have become chronic following the losses made in the 1999–2000 growing season.327 
It removes a disincentive that might have discouraged more successful and wealthier 
farmers from expanding cotton production. It also presents them with an opportunity 
to advance further through pooling resources with their economic peers. Indebted 
farmers who are considered a liability, on the other hand, could be pushed out of 
cotton cultivation altogether. Poorer farmers could be excluded from all co-
operatives and thereby cut off from the only significant source of input credit and 
agricultural extension services. The poor could lose out yet further if richer farmers 
choose to expand cotton production by encroaching on their land and disrupting their 
fallow systems, as discussed in chapter three.328 This would increase socio-economic 
inequality and worsen soil erosion yet further, deepening poverty and 
marginalisation for the most vulnerable rural producers.  
Girard et al.’s (2008) account of the formation of the Co-operative of 
Motorized Farms of Koutiala (CEMK) gives one example of how the shift towards 
producer co-operatives in Mali may represent an opportunity for wealthier farmers. 
A group of large-scale farmers established the co-operative in 2002 following the 
                                                        
326 Ibid. 
327 See chapter four for more details of farmers’ losses in 1999–2000. 
328 Moseley (2005) observed that wealthier farmers in Southern Mali expanded their cotton 
production, in years when prices were high, by leaning on their poorer neighbours to let them use their 
fallow fields.  
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closure of the CMDT’s service for motorised agriculture (ibid., p. 3). In 2007, the 
collective comprised ninety-two members across the Koutiala district, each 
cultivating between twenty-five and 160 hectares of farmland, with a total of 109 
tractors between them (ibid., p. 5). Initially the main aim of CEMK was to ensure the 
continued maintenance and repair of members’ tractors, which they had received 
from the CMDT on preferential terms. CEMK entered into a partnership with a 
branch of the French NGO, Agriculteurs Français et Développement International 
(AFDI), which helped them to gain access to larger scale credit and to source spare 
parts and better models of tractors. The co-operative’s 2007 strategic plan included 
the building of a grain store to stock their cereal surpluses to a capacity of five 
hundred tonnes. In this case, the opportunity afforded by co-operative status to form 
transnational partnerships with NGOs helped to consolidate the economic power of 
an already advantaged group of cotton farmers in Mali. 
The establishment of cotton producer co-operatives is part of a policy 
designed to make Mali’s cotton sector more business-like, by promoting capitalism 
at local levels. Dougnon et al. (2010, p. 12) suggest it is doubtful, however, that 
ingrained practices of village-level farmer organisation would change overnight. 
When SOFITEX introduced co-operatives in Burkina Faso, the initial plan was to 
limit their membership to ‘pilot’ farmers, each growing six hectares of cotton. The 
co-operatives that emerged in fact regrouped producers of all sizes, as it proved 
difficult to separate large-scale and small-scale farmers in localities where 
interactions were strong (Bonnassieux 2003, p. 48). Lacy (2008) studied the 
formation of cotton producer co-operatives in Dissan, southern Mali, in 2002. He 
observed that personal ties played a role in the division of the village association into 
two co-operatives, but he also noted that the result correlated with an economic 
divide within the community.329 
 
Membership in the smaller CPC was not directly based on production 
levels, but on family alliances and relationships. … [But] … the 
bifurcation of Dissan’s AV consolidated some of the village’s more 
                                                        
329 This is consistent with the points made in chapters two and three regarding the salience of kin 
group identity in Southern Mali, and the social pressure to prioritise the well-being of the corporate 
group, but also resistance to this pressure, which has gathered momentum since the late colonial era 
through the gradual integration of rural communities into a market economy. 
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wealthy households apart from the larger community. (Lacy 2008, p. 
219) 
 
Lacy also notes that Dissan’s smaller co-operative regrouped many of the more 
highly educated and experienced former AV office-holders, leading to a ‘new, 
localized manifestation of brain drain’, which cast more doubt on the survival 
prospects of the village’s larger co-operative (2008, p. 221). The process may be 
gradual, but the shift to cotton producer co-operatives is one factor in the exclusion 
of the poorest producers from the cotton value chain.330 
Exclusion from the cotton value chain may not be a negative outcome per se 
for poor farmers. Toulmin and Guèye (2003, pp. 41–42) argue, ‘Given the intensive 
inputs required for cotton, in labour, credit, inputs and management, cotton may well 
not be the most appropriate for small, poor farmers to adopt.’ The real problem is the 
lack of support for growing other crops and the knock-on effects of exclusion from 
the supply of cotton inputs. Farmers’ food crops are likely to suffer from no longer 
having soil fertilised by diverted cotton fertiliser.331  
 The policy of forming village level co-operatives may be regarded as part of 
a recent trend towards cultivating social capital at the local level, identified by 
Stokke and Mohan (2001). In theory, co-operatives promote trust and co-operation 
among members who unite voluntarily on the basis of affinity. In practice in Mali, 
any farmer who wishes to engage in commercial production of cotton is obliged to 
adhere to a co-operative. Furthermore, since they engender exclusion of indebted 
farmers, co-operatives promote social capital among their members while 
contributing to a breakdown of social capital in the wider community. In this regard, 
co-operatives are merely the newest stage in a series of top-down cotton-related 
                                                        
330 Another factor creating disincentives to growing cotton, particularly for marginal farmers, is price 
volatility linked to the price-setting mecahnism introduced in 2005. An IMF Country Report for Mali 
(2008) states that after three years of the new mechanism, the results have been “disappointing”. The 
CMDT has not responded to incentives to improve efficiency and quality, while producers have borne 
the risks of price volatility (IMF 2008, p. 7). Serra (2012, p. 8) notes that for the same reasons the 
price-setting mechanism has not been closely adhered to since 2008/09, prices being set once more 
through tripartite negotiations.  
331 See chapter three. An argument is made in OECD (2008) that donors should pay more attention to 
the mixed-cropping system in operation in Mali. 
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interventions to have shaken the social fabric of rural communities since colonial 
times.332 
Before the arrival of co-operatives, many village associations had already 
split up into sub-village associations due to internal conflicts, as noted in chapter 
three. The introduction of co-operatives based on affinity formalised these splits 
rather than healed them, and provided incentives for further splits. The possibility of 
recourse to legal action might in theory offer a less confrontational means to resolve 
disputes but in practice this method of conflict resolution is extremely unpopular in 
rural Mali.333  
One source of conflict in the local arena was the formation of district unions 
of cotton producer co-operatives because, according to Mamadou Konaté, ‘they put 
in place the structures that are called unions; so they put in place the co-operatives. 
So that too brought sagas. Everybody wanted to be on the board.’334 These district 
unions constitute the first layer in a pyramid of national cotton farmer representation, 
while village-level co-operatives form the base. Bamoussa Traoré, a cotton farmer in 
Fana, commented on what he saw as the detrimental impacts on grassroots farmers of 
the new structures of farmer organisation, which have reduced the flow of 
information into the local arena and increased conflicts within it. 
 
There was a time when information passed very well. But now it’s very 
little, it’s minimal. Information doesn’t get passed very much. They 
introduced a new change – the new union. Since it was introduced there 
has been a lot of arguing going on. That’s where the mis-information 
starts. It’s thanks to the arrival of the unions [of co-operatives]. … There 
is no information between farmers and the CMDT because the former 
trade union has been cut down by the newly arrived union, which is 
determined to destroy the old one. This is why it is very difficult to get 
information for everybody.335 
                                                        
332 See, for example, Danielle Jonckers’ (1994) analysis of the 1974 introduction of AVs, cited in 
chapter three. 
333 For a discussion of mechanisms of rural conflict resolution in West Africa, see Traoré and Lo 
(1996, § 2.1.4). 
334 Interview with Mamadou Konaté, cotton farmer and president of the Gigya district chamber of 
agriculture, Fana, 17/02/08. Original: ils ont mis en place des structures qu’on appelle unions. Donc 
ils ont mis en place des coopératives. Donc ça aussi ça a amené des histoires. Tout le monde voulait 
être membre du bureau. 
335 Interview with Bamoussa Traoré, cotton farmer, Fana, 17/02/08. Original: Ah, wati-do-la konafoni 
to beye. N’ga sisan a ka souma, a ka souma sisan. Miye information soumaya, ou nanani yelema 
bolocouranye consayina ni ahou yere kakan ka koumanai miye union koye. Kamini union koye 
kouma koni fora ni oko sigira seka, ni o sensibilisation kera manga doma ako djoukorolala ... Bon, 
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Co-operatives are the latest instalment in a long history of imposition onto the 
local arena of exogenous models of socio-economic organisation, which have 
precipitated a breakdown of the social fabric of rural communities in Mali. The co-
operatives policy may well give additional impetus to an emergent class of local 
farmer entrepreneurs. But the consolidation of this class into a new layer of local 
civil society – district unions of cotton producer co-operatives – may have brought 
out conflicts within the local arena336 and has certainly brought the local arena 
further under the influence of national level politics. This section has given an 
overview of processes at the local level, in which village associations have been 
transformed into cotton producer co-operatives. These co-operatives form the base of 




Civil society schisms and crony capitalism in the national arena 
By 2007, Mali’s cotton producer co-operatives formed the base level of a 
four-tiered pyramid-shaped federation of unions of co-operatives.337 Part of the 
Government’s cotton sector reform programme, the building of this new structure of 
cotton producer representation was facilitated by the Chamber of Agriculture 
(APCAM), with donor funds from the French Development Agency’s PASE 
initiative.338 The 7,177 local level co-operatives elect representatives to serve in a 
total of 288 unions communales. In turn, office-holders in these district level unions 
elect from among their number representatives to serve on forty-one unions 
sectorales; who in turn elect representatives for four unions regionales. At the apex 
of the pyramid, members of the four regional unions elect the office-holders of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
syndicat mounoutoubeye ni oulou chargeledo corikola ni kounafoni koubetenai oulouni CMDT tie 
bon counafoni te teme oulou ni cofelatie ouye oulou betike kada. Bon sisam au union kera coulou 
filaye, korolebeye donfana baadana. Couloudo moubeye okoni bifessa ka senekela ka djekoulou faga 
ka tonto a eyere kele doroye, o gueleya ba debe afaiya oh dekoson information perduledo afaiya, aka 
souma, ak soumayerede. Fadon konife nte otatchokodo. 
336 This would require further research but latent or overt conflicts are likely given that district unions 
unite co-operatives, many of which formed through village-level splits beginning either in the AV era 
or with the introduction of the co-operative system. 
337 See appendix two for an influence diagram of actors in 2007 discussed in this section. 
338 Programme d’Amélioration des Systèmes d’Exploitation en zone Cotonnière. 
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national union, who in turn elect the President of the Union Nationale – Sociétés 
Coopératives des Producteurs de Coton (UN-SCPC). Through this process of 
democratic filtration, the government-friendly cotton leader and President of the 
Chamber of Agriculture, Bakary Togola, was elected first president of Mali’s UN-
SCPC by the twenty or so office-holders in the national union. 
There is an important distinction to be made between unions of cotton 
producer co-operatives and unions of cotton and food crop producers (SYCOV, 
SYVAC, SPCK, SYPAMO and GSCVM). The distinction is clear in the French 
language: only the former are termed, union; whereas the latter are termed, syndicat, 
analogous to a trade union or a labour union. The French term for the type of 
organisation represented by the UN-SCPC is faîtière, the literal translation of which 
is a ‘rooftop ridge tile’. It is often rendered in English as an ‘umbrella organisation’, 
but it is more accurately thought of as the pinnacle of an all-encompassing pyramid 
structure. All farmers in Mali who produce cotton officially339 are required to be 
members of SCPCs, and they are therefore formally represented by the structure of 
unions of co-operatives. The UN-SCPC displaced the GSCVM (the group of cotton 
producer trade unions) as the official representative body for cotton producers in 
Mali.340 
The process of creating the national union of cotton producer co-operatives 
was highly political. In an interview in 2008, the General Secretary of SYCOV, 
Keifa Diarra, described how the State blocked an attempt by trade unionists, 
including him, to create an independent federation of unions of co-operatives, amid 
political tensions in the run-up to the 2007 presidential election. He said that many 
trade unionists who were marginalised in this process went on to question the 
legitimacy of UN-SCPC President, Bakary Togola.  
 
So another organisation had to be set up. They did everything to make 
sure the trade unionists weren’t in it. So- and if such an organisation is 
                                                        
339 Some rural people, mainly women, grow minuscule amounts of cotton to sell in local markets or 
directly to local weavers, or to use in domestic processing. This informal production and sale of cotton 
outwith the CMDT system was observed in Koutiala during fieldwork research in November 2007. It 
may be linked to low level leaks in the CMDT system, but that was not investigated. Informal 
production and processing of cotton still feeds a modest handicraft textile industry in areas outside of 
CMDT control, as was observed in the Dogon country in January 2007. 
340 Compare influence diagrams for actors in 2005 and in 2007, in appendix two. 




‘Capacity building’ Mali’s cotton farmers: national and international designs on 
the local arena 
167 
created by muscling out another- Some unionists managed to get into it, 
but everywhere the association went, they put their unionists aside. And 
in putting this organisation in order, there were those who were left out, 
people who were marginalised, who expected at one point to get together 
to form their own faîtière [top organisation] : they were confronted with 
one name, of Bakary [Togola]. So those who were confronted with that 
name and the unionists who were left out, when you ask them they will 
say that Bakary does not represent them legitimately. … Because we 
tried to create another federation. … I myself was the president of that 
federation. It was the national federation of unions of cotton producer co-
operatives, FNA-USCPC. We held the congress. We did everything right 
up to the application for a registration certificate. It was at that level that 
the Administration said it won’t give us the registration certificate, and 
that we had another, unapproved goal that it did not agree with.341 
 
Keifa Diarra went on to elaborate the political nature of this refusal to recognise an 
independent federation of unions of co-operatives in 2007.  
 
It happened during the period of the electoral campaign, when at the time 
Bakary had assembled the cotton growers so that they vote for ATT. So 
all who had a contrary idea at that time were considered as opposition, 
whilst that wasn’t true.342 
 
It is interesting to note that while he described cotton farmers being co-opted 
and political opposition being repressed, the surface-level thrust of Diarra’s 
complaint was not that these were illegitimate practices, but that his group was 
wrongly accused of being in opposition to President ATT. He was dismissive of 
residual opposition to Togola following this episode, asserting, ‘in a country, 
                                                        
341 Interview with Keifa Diarra, Fana Regional President and National General Secretary, SYCOV, 
Fana, 19/02/08. Original: Donc il fallait mettre une autre organisation en place. Ils ont fait tout pour 
que les syndicalistes ne soient pas là dedans. Donc- et si une telle organisation est créée en musclant à 
d’autre- Certains syndicalistes ont pu y accéder, mais partout où l’association a passé ils ont mis leurs 
syndicalistes à côté. Et dans la mise en- l’ordre même de cette organisation il y a avait des laissés pour 
compte, des gens qui ont été marginalisés, qui attendaient à un moment de se retrouver à un moment 
pour former leur propre faîtière : ils ont été confronté à un nom, de Bakary. Donc ceux qui ont été 
confronté à ce nom et des syndicalistes qui ont été laissé de côté, quand on les demande, ils vont dire 
que Bakary ne les représente pas légitimement. … Parce que on a tenté de créer une autre fédération. 
Tout ce qui ne va pas partir … moi-même j’étais le président de cette fédération, […] C’était la 
fédération nationale des unions des coopératives producteurs du coton, FNA-USCPC. On a fait le 
congrès. On a fait tout jusqu’à la demande de récépissé. C’est à ce niveau que l’administration a dit 
qu’il ne nous donne pas le récépissé, et que on avait d’autre but non approuvé qu’il n’est pas d’accord.  
342 Interview with Keifa Diarra, Fana Regional President and National General Secretary, SYCOV, 
Fana, 19/02/08. Original: C’est fait à la période de la campagne électorale où à l’époque Bakary avait 
réuni les coton-culteurs pour qu’on vote pour ATT. Donc tout ce qui avait une idée à ce moment 
contraire était considéré comme opposition, pendant que ce n’était pas réel. 
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everyone cannot be satisfied’.343 Keifa Diarra emphasised that he believes Togola 
legitimately represents cotton farmers because he was President of both SYCOV and 
GSCVM before the national union was created, and because he is ‘the biggest cotton 
producer in Mali’, with over one hundred well-maintained hectares of cotton.344 A 
photograph of Togola and Diarra shaking hands adorned a wall of the living room at 
Diarra’s home in Fana, where the interview took place.345 Whether conciliatory, 
resignatory, coded or co-opted, Keifa Diarra’s testimony is indicative of the murky 
character of relationships between actors in civil society and the State in Mali. 
Giving a slightly different version of these events, Alexis Roy (2010a) argues 
that the establishment of a rival federation of co-operative unions was opposed not 
by the authorities, but by Bakary Togola himself. Roy recounts accusations that two 
political challengers to Togola were imprisoned on trumped up charges, ‘one for 
having said in an interview that “we need to have done with Bakary Togola”, which 
was then interpreted by a judge as death threats, and the second for having criticised 
the judge’s decision’ (Roy 2010a, p. 309). These accusations were heard repeatedly 
during fieldwork research and were reported in the press.346 An interviewee who 
wished to remain anonymous said that it was common knowledge that Togola’s 
position at the head of all the major farming organisations was due to the influence 
of the Government, which sought a compliant leader at the top of the farmer 
movement. 
 
It’s Bakary Togola … The Government wanted to have someone easy to 
manage. It was him. But it was not to sort out the problems of the 
peasants. And all that, it’s political because the Government wants a 
leader who is easy to manage. … Everyone knows that he was backed to 
be the president of the cotton unions, to be the president of the chamber 
of agriculture, to be the president of the co-operatives. He has never done 
                                                        
343 Interview with Keifa Diarra, Fana, 19/02/08. Original: Dans un pays, tout le monde ne peut pas 
être satisfait. 
344 According to the CMDT website, farmers in Mali who supply cotton to the company cultivate on 
average two to three hectares of cotton. Source: www.maliagriculture.org/services_tech/cmdt/page-
cmdt.html consulted on 16/04/12. 
345 Fieldwork observation, Keifa Diarra’s house, Fana, 19/02/08. 
346  The challenge to Togola and the subsequent imprisonment of Tahirou Bamba were reported in Les 
Echos newspaper: ‘Tahirou Bamba, FNA-USCPC: Nous voulons en finir avec Bakary Togola’ 
08/05/07 and ‘Pour avoir mis en place la FNA-USCPC: Bakary Togola « emprisonne » Tahirou 
Bamba’ 23/05/07. 
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a single action that could put the Government in difficulty. He cannot do 
that.347 
 
The interviewee went on to say that, ‘the Government put in prison the 
peasants who wanted to create another organisation, for Bakary Togola’, naming the 
challengers as Tahirou Bamba and SYVAC President Mènè Diallo, and describing 
their imprisonment as ‘arbitrary detention’.348 Both Tahirou Bamba and Keifa Diarra 
had participated in the mass boycott of cotton production in the year 2000.349 The 
cotton sector reform process is likely one reason the authorities were particularly 
keen to have a compliant farmer leader at this time. In 2008, Bakary Togola, together 
with a handful of top level farmer leaders, finally gave their public support to the 
privatisation programme.350 
It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate the truth of specific claims 
of political imprisonment, but it was clear from formal and informal interviews, and 
from fieldwork observation, that some cotton farmers and farmer representatives 
were fearful of repression.351 It was also obvious that tensions ran high between 
some farmer representatives at both national and regional levels,352 as elaborated in 
chapter five and as these fieldnotes testify: 
 
Waiting for interview with Togola, in his secretary’s office. He was in a 
meeting with Seydou Coulibaly and Tahirou Bamba. Another APCAM 
worker (Moussa?) was there and I heard the secretary tell him this. They 
exchanged wide-eyed glances and murmured comments that pointed to 
                                                        
347 Interview with anonymous national level farmer representative, Bamako, 2008. Original: C’est- 
Bakary Togola … Le gouvernement a voulu avoir quelqu’un de facile à gérer. C’était lui. Mais c’était 
pas pour régler les problèmes des paysans. Et tout ça c’est politique parce que le gouvernement veut 
un leader facile à gérer. … Tout le monde sait qu’il a été soutenu pour être président du cotonniers, 
pour être président de la chambre d’agriculture, pour être président des coopératives. Il n’a jamais fait 
une action qui peut mettre le gouvernement en difficulté. Il ne peut pas le faire.  
348 Interview with anonymous national level farmer representative, Bamako, 2008. Original: Le 
gouvernement a mis en prison les paysans qui voulaient créer une autre organisation, pour Bakary 
Togola. … détention arbitraire. 
349 Roy (2010a, p. 305) cites an interview with Tahirou Bamba in which he talks of his leadership role 
in the 2000 boycott. When asked in a fieldwork interview in Fana on 19/02/08, Keifa Diarra said that 
he had participated in the 2000 boycott.  
350 Le Républicain, 22/07/08 ‘Privatisation de la CMDT: Bakary Togola a-t-il trahi les paysans?’ 
351 Some farmers were scared to speak up against Togola; others organised a petition against his 
holding of multiple positions, a petition which was ignored by the authorities (see chapter four). The 
farmer representative who requested anonymity in connection with the interview cited above was 
initially wary of discussing the matter, expressing skepticism about my identity as a research student 
and consenting to continue the interview only once satisfied that I was not a spy.  
352 Fieldnotes, Koutiala, 20–24/02/08. 
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the heated nature of the situation. A little later, the three came out of the 
meeting, Bamba looking very intense and smoking a cigarette. The other 
man (Moussa?) said something along the lines of: ‘Ah, Bamba, tu as été 
avec ton serpent! Il n’est pas facile, deh. Il ne respecte pas la loi, lui.’ 
[‘Ah, Bamba, you have been with your snake. He’s not easy, eh. He does 
not respect the law, him.’] At first this comment seemed to be about 
Togola, but then he repeated it, making it clear he was talking about 
Bamba smoking. I wasn’t sure if the confusion was deliberate.353 
 
The anonymous interviewee, cited above, said that he suspected all the top 
cotton farmer leaders were implicated in illegitimate behaviour and were double-
crossing one another.  
 
I don’t get involved because I think that they have all been doing dodgy 
dealings together. All of those people [including the two allegedly 
imprisoned for opposing Togola] were with Togola. … All those people 
have been with the Government. They have muzzled the peasants, the 
cotton producers. They have manipulated people. I don’t want to have 
anything to do with their affair.354 
 
Another possible take on the controversy surrounding the establishment of 
the UN-SCPC, then, was that it was a battle of competition among the top farmer 
leaders for the most lucrative positions in the hierarchy of the peasant movement for 
the pursuit of their rent-seeking ambitions. 
Before the creation of the UN-SCPC, Togola had already been implicated in 
at least two corruption scandals involving the over-invoicing of agricultural inputs, 
together with other top cotton leaders in the GSCVM, as mentioned in chapter 
five.355 This puts in context Keifa Diarra’s comments, cited below, on how Bakary 
Togola extracts benefits from his proximity to power. 
 
Bakary, his problem is that he is too glued to the powers that be today. 
Well, everyone has their own idea about it. When you ask Bakary 
himself, he is close to the authorities so that he is better able to get what 
he is looking for – powers for the cotton growers. As evidence even, the 
day before yesterday when we were in a meeting in Bamako, there was a 
                                                        
353 Fieldnotes, APCAM office, Bamako, 13/02/08. 
354 Interview with anonymous national level farmer representative, Bamako, 2008. Original: Je ne me 
mélange pas parce que je pense qu’ils ont fait des magouilles tous ensemble. Tous ces gens-là étaient 
avec Togola. … Tous ces gens ont été avec le gouvernement. Ils ont muselé les paysans, les 
producteurs du coton. Ils ont manipulé les gens. Moi, je ne veux rien avoir dans leur affaire. 
355 Citing Roy (2010a, p. 307) and Le Républicain, 22/07/08. 
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blockage because the cotton growers took on the responsibility for the 
supply of inputs. The CMDT did not agree. And the CMDT which 
guarantees us said that it would guarantee us no longer. The State itself 
had to put its hand in its pocket so as to guarantee the inputs to the order 
of multi-billions [francs CFA], which was given to Bakary the other day. 
He came to show us the document. Well, perhaps for him, to be in 
agreement with power is to better extract benefits from power. Well, the 
extremists find that when one is close to power, it’s that one is bought. 
So everyone interprets in his own way.356 
 
Similarly, in response to a question about Bakary Togola’s involvement in 
ATT’s electoral campaign, Keifa Diarra argued that Togola merely saw in ATT a 
presidential candidate who had a proven track record of improving the lot of Mali’s 
rural producers. 
 
He [Togola] asked all the cotton-growers to support ATT because ATT 
had already taken action for the cotton-growers, for the peasants. It’s for 
all the peasants, it’s not only for the cotton-growers. Because we just 
received three hundred tractors, which he gave to producers on very very 
advantageous terms. And he converted hundreds and hundreds of 
hectares in the Office du Niger and which he gave to producers on very 
favourable terms.357 
 
There are very different perspectives on this claim of benefits accruing 
equitably to producers. Smallholders’ complaints of land grabs at the Office du Niger 
were heard during fieldwork research,358 and have become the subject of policy 
                                                        
356 Interview with Keifa Diarra, Fana Regional President and National General Secretary, SYCOV, 
Fana, 19/02/08. Original: Bakary, son problème est qu’il est trop collé au pouvoir d’aujourd’hui. Bon 
certains- bon chacun à son idée là dessus. Quand tu demandes Bakary même, lui il est près aux 
pouvoirs c’est pour mieux obtenir ce qu’il cherche – des pouvoirs pour les coton-culteurs. Pour preuve 
même, avant hier lorsqu’on était en réunion à Bamako, il y avait un blocage parce que les coton-
culteurs s’est chargés de l’approvisionnement en intrants. La CMDT n’était pas d’accord. Et la CMDT 
qui nous garantie dit qu’il ne nous garantie plus. Il fallait que l’état même mette sa main dans sa poche 
pour garantir les intrants à multi-milliards, qu’on a donné l’autre jour à Bakary. Il est venu nous 
montrer le papier. Bon peut-être pour lui être d’accord avec le pouvoir c’est pour mieux tirer profit du 
pouvoir. Bon, les extrémistes trouvent que quand on est au près du pouvoir c’est qu’on est acheté. 
Donc chacun interprète de sa manière. 
357 Interview with Keifa Diarra, Fana Regional President and National General Secretary, SYCOV, 
Fana, 19/02/08. Original: Il a demandé à tous les coton-culteurs de soutenir ATT parce que ATT avait 
déjà posé les actes pour les coton-culteurs, pour les paysans. C’est pour tous les paysans, ce n’est pas 
pour les coton-culteurs seulement. Parce qu’on vient de recevoir trois cents tracteurs, qu’il a donné à 
les conditions très très advantageux aux producteurs. Et il avait amenagé des centaines de centaines 
d’hectares dans l’Office du Niger et qu’il avait donné aux conditions très favourables aux producteurs.  
358 Field observation, meeting of SEXAGON rice farmers’ union, Niono, 25/07/07. 
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research (The Oakland Institute 2011) and civil society mobilisation.359 The history 
of inequitable distribution of new technologies linked to cotton in West Africa was 
mentioned in chapter three.  
Notwithstanding the CMDT’s record of giving preference to relatively 
wealthy farmers in the supply of new technologies, in an unrelated comment in 
defence of the National Co-ordination of Peasants’ Organisations’ (CNOP) call for 
technology appropriate to family farming, Ibrahima Coulibaly criticised a CMDT 
programme which supplied tractors on credit to farmers who were subsequently 
unable to maintain them and repay the debt. 
 
If you give a tractor, there is now the tractor, there is the cost of farming, 
the fuel, the driver, and all that. You put all that weight on a family 
which has got problems already just to have the minimum. … ask people 
how the CMDT’s Tractor Programme went. Tractors were given on 
credit to peasants. All those peasants have been ruined. I know people 
who have lost their whole herd in the tractor. Is that a good 
development?360 
 
The take-over of the national union of cotton producer co-operatives has 
exacerbated the marginalisation of producer representatives, like Ibrahima Coulibaly, 
who advocate for agricultural policy to be oriented towards broad-based family 
farming.  
Unlike the cotton-centric UN-SCPC, the cotton trade unions were at least 
nominally committed to defending the interests of cotton and food crop producers, in 
recognition of the reality of farmers’ mixed cropping strategies. The creation of the 
cotton faîtière has promoted the single-commodity paradigm over the integrated 
farming approach, and it has involved a thorough cleansing of potential opposition 
                                                        
359 Source: www.fian.org/news/news/nyeleni-mali-a-global-alliance-against-land-grabbing/pdf 
consulted on 16/04/12. 
360 Interview with Ibrahima Coulibaly, President CNOP, Bamako, 17/01/08. Original: Si tu donnes le 
tracteur, il y a maintenant le tracteur, il y a le coût de l’exploitation, le carburant, le chauffeur, et tout 
ça. Tu mets tout ce poids sur une famille qui a des problèmes déjà pour avoir le minimum. … 
demandez aux gens comment le projet- le programme Tracteur de la CMDT s’est passé. On a donné 
les tracteurs à crédit aux paysans. Tous ces paysans ont été ruinés. Je connais des gens qui ont perdu 
tous leurs troupeaux dans le tracteur. Est-ce que c’est ça qui est un bon développement? 
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from the only section of the farmer’s movement which the authorities now recognise 
as the official spokesbody for farmers who grow cotton.361 
The manipulation of the farmers’ movement in Mali would seem to be less a 
matter of a monolithic State against society and more a case of a network of people 
in power, in the bureaucracy, in commerce and now in civil society. When President 
ATT formed a political party, Parti pour le Développement Économique et la 
Solidarité (PDES) in 2010, in preparation for the 2012 election at which he was due 
to stand down, the party’s twenty-two vice-presidents included Bakary Togola, 
President of the Chamber of Agriculture; Jeamille Bittar, President of the Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry; and Mamadou Minkoro Traoré, President of the 
Chamber of Craft Professions. Alexis Roy’s (2010b, pp. 95–96) account of a donor-
backed government initiative to develop Mali’s rice farming found that Togola was 
one of the suppliers of rice seeds to the highly dubious development project, and that 
he made large profits from cultivating vast areas of rice as part of the project. 
The impact of the political crisis in farmer representation at national level 
was felt at local level, as is evident in the perspectives of farmer interviewees. Like 
Bamoussa Traoré, cited at the end of section one, Seydou Touré, a cotton farmer in 
Fana and SYVAC representative at regional level, argued that consultation with 
farmers in the local arena had paradoxically reduced to zero following the advent of 
the union pyramid, which in theory would incorporate the concerns of all farmers at 
all levels within a single system of representation. Touré said that in practice the 
president of the UN-SCPC unilaterally signed agreement to a producer price for 
cotton which was rejected by so many farmers that production levels for the 2006/07 
season were dramatically reduced. 
 
The cotton producers do not have a real voice now compared to before 
when they had a real voice with the participation of all the 
representatives and their organisations, the trade unions and the chambers 
                                                        
361 AOPP actively campaigned for the family farming perspective to be incorporated into the national 
agricultural policy which was adopted in 2006 (Loi d’Orientation Agricole, LOA). The AOPP was 
supported in this by Oxfam NOVIB (Netherlands) through a capacity-building project 2004–2007 
(Sources: www.novib.nl/id.html?lang=EN/id=8785&pid=MAL-503528-0004650 consulted on 
15/07/08; www.aopp-mali.org/spip.php?article220 consulted on 31/07/12). The Oakland Institute 
(2011, pp. 13–14) observes that while mention of the family farming perspective is included in the 
LOA policy, the text of contains contradictions which relfect conflictng viewpoints, and practice has 
little to do with policy. 
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of agriculture. But as there are a fair number of meetings that take place 
in the absence of the trade unions and chambers of agriculture, that has 
cut the voice of the cotton producer at national level. Otherwise, in the 
past, if a cotton producer said his idea in his field to a village leader, so 
the information climbed hierarchically from the village to the ZPA 
[CMDT agricultural production zone], from the ZPA to the sector, from 
the sector to the region, and from the region right up to national level. 
But now the producer does not have a voice, because decisions are taken 
without even informing the producer and they are implemented 
directly.362 
 
It should be noted, however, that Seydou Touré was a trade unionist at 
regional level, and may be somewhat biased against the co-operative union pyramid 
if he was one of those marginalised in the process of its creation. But he was not 
alone in his views: already mentioned in chapter five was the Fana farmers’ petition, 
ignored by Government, against Togola’s holding of all the top positions in farmer 
representative structures. 
Two farmer interviewees who were not directly involved in any trade union 
argued that direct links between the grassroots farmers and independent national or 
international civil society were more effective than official representative structures 
in terms of serving the interests of farmers.363 Bah Kissiman Traoré of Wolodo, near 
Fana, expressed his suspicion of all purported farmer representatives.  
 
Those who have large means, it is they who do the business of 
government. … If you see the trade unions, it’s the educated people, it’s 
the strongest, the richest. During the meetings, we attend, but what we 
say there is never taken into account. Only what the educated say is taken 
into account. Never mind the fact it’s we who know the difficulties that 
are there. … But we are never consulted. Even if we go to the meeting, 
we are never listened to. … For me, it is through this interview that I will 
                                                        
362 Interview with Seydou Touré, SYCOV regional representative, Fana, 17/02/08. Original: Les 
producteurs de coton n’ont pas actuellement une voix réelle parce qu’auparavant ils avaient une voix 
réelle avec la participation de tous les responsables de leurs organisations, les syndicats et les 
chambres d’agriculture. Mais comme il y a pas mal de réunions qui sont fait à l’absence des syndicats 
et des chambres d’agriculture, donc cela a coupé la voix du producteur du coton au niveau national. 
Sinon auparavant si un producteur du coton disait son idée dans son champ à un responsable du 
village, donc l’information montait hiérarchiquement du village à la ZPA, de la ZPA aussi au secteur, 
du secteur à la région, et de la région jusqu’au niveau national. Mais actuellement le producteur n’a 
pas de voix, parce qu’on prend des décisions sans informer le producteur même et on l’appuis 
directement. 
363 The opinion that foreign reserachers or NGOs are more effective that farmer representatives in 
attending to the concerns of farmers was echoed by CMDT extension agent and NGO worker, 
Fousseyney Coulibaly (interview Koutiala, 21/02/08). 
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be heard even higher up. … The trade unions, the government, they want 
the fruit of the peasants. So it is always the peasants who are the most 
exhausted. And they profit without meanwhile the profits coming to the 
grassroots. There are people who have profited a lot on the backs of 
peasants. But they are not real peasants. We have seen CMDT workers 
who have built multi-storey buildings; trade union members have even 
got cars. But we who produce cotton, we don’t even have a bicycle.364 
 
The view that nominal farmer representatives are ‘not real peasants’ is 
supported by Roy’s (2010a) observation of their career paths. 
 
A study of the career path of several of the leaders of the Village 
Association, unions and umbrella organisation shows that most of them 
belonged to groups that were already dominant within the rural context – 
former civil servants, people elected to local councils, traders, customary 
authorities, NGO staff, with many of them falling into several of these 
categories. Furthermore, a number of them were not cotton producers, 
and sometimes paid for a labourer to cultivate a small area to give them 
legitimacy. (Roy 2010a, p. 311).  
 
Similarly to B K Traoré, Michel Dembele, a cotton farmer in Moribila, near 
San, asserted that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were more effective 
channels of communication for farmers than were their elected representatives. 
 
In our opinion it is the NGOs such as [AMADIP] which are best placed 
[to pass information to farmers]. Otherwise, the trade unions, when we 
choose the union leaders, they never come back to us with information. 
They are always in Bamako. So the information comes belatedly. In our 
opinion to get good information, it’s with the NGOs.365 
                                                        
364 Interview with B K Traoré, cotton farmer, Wolodo nr Fana, 18/02/08. Original: Sica fagan be 
mogo mounouna oulou de dala kouma beme.. Aoufe niyaye cindicat ibitasor kalanba debara aou 
doufe kalanbaye famaouye. Pareke nafora tonsikibike sica aou mounoube ni aou yebi tiekalaou 
yeredeye, ni nogoya do aou debe anogoya soro ni gueleyado aou debe agueleya soro aou tatilame 
faido bitafo oke bekaye walima oke guelya kasoro moubi aouna o ni ote keleye . Bon ode kama ni 
yaye oko nisodiara nebeke ka dala kafo aouh nali mifleniye obe sekake sababouye ka ne ka koumakan 
sey a seyorola. Nekoube niyokona yini a tia cent moukaye maseka soro. Peut etre ni bara moufle, ni ni 
sikira seka mogo bi seka fo naye kouma fefe soro aou dah na tara olakaler abe sekake djama tiekela 
nietaye, mais ton nounou , kouma dode mais kouma were ba yai, mounou boufo ni mogo ba lamai 
koumadode a be sekake a bora tiekela dan mais o ni kouma yere yere ti keleye. Parce que aou kan 
diatela mogo nounou beka sorobe aou tiekela deka wasila, on mais bara damine nisica tie doye soro ke 
mais a be sekafo tiekela tala, parce que aou ye mogo doye CMDT mogo doye doye etage dio, syndicat 
mogoye voituri sa mais cori mibe aou mounou bolo aou be tiokodi? O koro ko bara tike tiekan.  
365 Interview with Michel Dembele, cotton farmer Moribila nr San, 23/02/08. Original: Kounafoni 
mika souroula o fousseny nounouka barayokonaye si ca ha kan cindicat, niko syndicat ka aou 
kounafoni ya ni o syndicat akata mounoumounou kama d'ailleur niye mani mouke mabaye eyere yein 
tida okable aw ka voter mana nouyele kaba ni o tara obe ta sigui bamakoye aou yere yai tida okable, 
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These comments may have been unduly inspired by the presence of the 
foreign researcher (in the Dembele case, a researcher introduced by the NGO cited), 
and may reflect an attempt to elicit further interaction. The comments correlate, 
nonetheless, with a general sense among the farmers interviewed that they have lost 
confidence in national structures of farmer representation.  
This section has elaborated the nature of the political crisis affecting farmer 
representation at national level, and has shown some ways in which this has affected 
farmers at the local level. As noted above, the legal statute of co-operatives gives 
them scope to form direct partnerships with NGOs. This raises questions of whether 
those farmers who can afford to be members of co-operatives are set to gain yet 
further through links to national or international NGOs, and of whether farmers 




Oxfam’s Cotton Programme 2007–2012: deepening downward 
accountability or perpetuating a flawed development paradigm? 
In 2007, Oxfam began a five-year cotton programme, which included support 
for the development of cotton producer co-operatives in Mali (SCPCs). The 
programme, entitled, ‘Empowering Producers to Secure Livelihoods in Cotton 
Growing Regions in Mali and West Africa’ was developed by Oxfam America and 
Oxfam Great Britain, funded by Comic Relief, and was initially designed as a joint 
programme with Mali’s Association of Professional Peasants’ Organisations 
(AOPP). For Oxfam, the programme formed part of its Economic Justice Campaign 
in Mali.366 This campaign was co-ordinated for the West Africa region from the 
NGO’s regional headquarters in Dakar. Other strands of the campaign, which 
preceded the cotton programme, include advocacy on Economic Partnership 
                                                                                                                                                             
kounafoni besoro tiokodi? Fousseny mounou bi djiki kana, Fousseny yina, nalekera sababouye kato 
aou bora faimou kalama, ni aletou teya kounafoni koube soro tiokodisi. Aouni o mogo soukou ka 
djekabarake o deka kousa aouma kosebe. 
366 Interview with Gilles Marion, Oxfam GB Country Programme Manager for Mali, Bamako, 
04/07/07. 
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Agreements (EPAs) and on labour rights in the gold mining industry. Dia and Traoré 
(2011) present the rationale for the cotton programme as filling gaps in support for 
newly-created cotton producer co-operatives (SCPCs), following the cessation of 
projects, including PASAOP, funded by major donors (including the World Bank 
and the Agence Française de Développement). The initiative may also be seen as a 
move to ground Oxfam’s advocacy work in Mali more firmly at local levels. An 
Oxfam interviewee who was centrally involved in drawing up the proposal for this 
programme identified the need for Oxfam to work with Malian cotton farmers at 
local levels as a key learning outcome of the campaign against US and EU cotton 
subsidies.367  
In an interview in 2007, Cotton Programme Officer, Fousseynou Diabaté 
outlined the programme’s four advocacy themes: for a cotton price support fund; for 
literacy education, especially for women, in the transformation of AVs to co-
operatives; for alternative financing for agriculture; for equitable access to and 
control of resources for agriculture, especially land and credit.368 A review of the 
programme published in 2011 indicated that its implementation focused largely on 
supporting the development of cotton producer co-operatives (SCPCs), particularly 
in terms of their entrepreneurial capacities and in terms of women’s participation in 
co-operatives (Dia and Traoré 2011). The programme was motivated in part by the 
low level of understanding of the co-operative law among members of co-operatives 
(Dia and Traoré 2011, p. 4). Some national level lobbying activities featured in the 
cotton programme (ibid. p. 121, box 3.8). In total, 526 SCPCs were directly affected 
by Oxfam’s cotton programme between 2007 and 2011, a fraction of the 7,177 
SCPCs in Mali (ibid.). 
At local level, Oxfam’s cotton programme was geared principally towards 
‘developing entrepreneurial performance’ of SCPCs (Dia and Traoré 2011, p. 4). It 
recognised the need for farmers to diversify but while a shea nut processing unit and 
an organic manure production unit were set up as part of the programme (ibid., Box 
3, p. 10), diversification was largely limited to specific niches within the cotton 
market, notably organic cotton and better quality cotton (ibid., p. 5). Nonetheless, the 
                                                        
367 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
368 Interview with Fousseynou Diabaté, Oxfam Cotton Programme Officer, Bamako, 04/07/07. 
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programme succeeded in establishing a new system whereby three hundred co-
operatives were able to access credit directly from a private micro-credit company, 
which constitutes a step towards de-linking access to agricultural credit from the 
cotton supply chain (ibid., p. 10). 
By focusing on SCPCs, Oxfam’s cotton programme did little to address the 
problems of indebted farmers excluded from co-operatives. It did, however, support 
the economic inclusion of another marginalised group: women. Programme Officer 
Fousseynou Diabaté explained that the programme gave communities a choice: 
either men and women could join the same co-operative on an equal footing or, if 
that solution were deemed socially unacceptable, men and women could set up 
separate single-sex co-operatives.369 Dia and Traoré (2011) present convincing 
figures for the success of the gender equity dimension of the cotton programme. 
 
From 2007/08 up to the project’s mid-term evaluation in 2009/10, […] In 
first-generation co-operatives producing conventional cotton, women’s 
involvement increased from 1 per cent in 2006/07 to 35 per cent in 2010. 
In the same period, women’s representation on the governing bodies of 
co-ops increased from zero to 24 per cent. (Dia and Traoré 2011, p. 6) 
 
The question of gender equity was a controversial issue, however, in the 
relationship at national level between Oxfam and its main implementing partner, the 
AOPP, as is detailed below.370  
The account of the development of the pyramid structure of unions of cotton 
producer co-operatives, presented above, casts a long shadow over the optimistic 
assertion of Oxfam worker Fousseynou Diabaté in July 2007 that, ‘With the co-
operatives at the base right up to the National Union of Cotton Co-operatives, we 
have got a good structure for doing lobbying.’371 One of Diabaté’s colleagues, who 
wished to remain anonymous, was less naïve about the potential of the UN-SCPC to 
engage effectively in lobbying and advocacy activities at national level. This 
                                                        
369 Interview with Fousseynou Diabaté, Oxfam Cotton Programme Officer, Bamako, 04/07/07. 
370 An interesting question for further research would be whether Oxfam’s intervention conflated the 
complex social dynamics of gender equality with women’s access to export-oriented cash crop 
agriculture, but it is beyond the scope of this study to interrogate the complexities of gender in rural 
Mali. 
371 Interview with Fousseynou Diabaté, Oxfam Cotton Programme Officer, Bamako, 04/07/07. 
Original: Avec les coopératives à la base jusqu’à l’Union National des Coopératives du Coton, on a 
une bonne structure pour faire le plaidoyer. 
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interviewee argued that the creation of the National Union of Cotton Producer Co-
operatives had not resolved the problems associated with the cotton trade unions, and 
particularly their leadership. 
 
There are certainly a lot of people who appear to have at different points 
in time become quite prominent in those cotton farming unions whose 
real connection to grassroots farmers are somewhat doubtful to put it, er, 
mildly, and who clearly have all sorts of other kind of political agendas 
going on. … now they have the national union of co-operative societies 
but there are lots of problems around the leadership of that, and which 
essentially is: the same people have been recycled into the leadership.372 
 
This point is echoed in the testimony of Wolodo farmer, B K Traoré, cited 
above, who complained of those who purport to represent farmers that ‘they are not 
real peasants’. 
When questioned on how Oxfam chose which organisation to partner with for 
its 2007–2012 Cotton Programme, the informant pointed to the lack of alternative 
options, discounting the UN-SCPC as a direct partner. 
 
How many other farmer organisations at the national level do you see? I 
mean, you have the AOPP, you have the CNOP, and then you have the 
unions. Well, um, you have the Groupement, which still has no legal 
existence as far as I know. And now you have the National Union. So 
you could say, are you planning to work with the national union? Um, 
well, apart from the fact that it’s being run by Togola, which for me is 
already a problem. I mean, our strategy at the moment is to work 
indirectly with the national union, through AProCA primarily. … 
Supporting AProCA to support strengthening of the national cotton 
farmers’ union. I mean strengthening in the sense of helping them 
developing a bit more of an autonomous and independent vision of what 
they’re supposed to be doing. But, you know, whether that can actually 
happen-373 
 
As indicated at the end of the previous chapter, this lack of confidence in 
national level farmer organisations was a motivating factor in the re-focusing on 
intervention at local levels which the cotton programme represents: ‘you have to 
                                                        
372 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
373 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 




‘Capacity building’ Mali’s cotton farmers: national and international designs on 
the local arena 
180 
strengthen the grassroots because ultimately that’s what’s going to demand more 
accountability at the national level’.374  
 Oxfam’s cotton programme encountered further, unanticipated problems 
when its chosen partner organisation, the AOPP, began to manifest crises similar to 
those experienced in the cotton producer organisations: divisive campaigns for 
elected office and accusations of corruption. This placed enormous pressure on staff 
at the international NGO ahead of a visit by the cotton programme’s funding body, 
Comic Relief. 
 
Talked, too, about worsening difficulties working with the AOPP. In a 
meeting … the previous day, AOPP reps basically admitted that they are 
in crisis. It looks as though the president will be removed before the end 
of his term in office, even though he doesn’t have long to go. A few 
others are likely to be pushed out with him. It looks like issues of 
financial mismanagement. Some funders have pulled out – said they are 
no longer happy to fund AOPP.375 
 
The Oxfam staff member said he/she would not cover up these problems 
during the inspection, not least because he/she had heard an Oxfam team had got into 
trouble for that in the past, with a project in Tanzania funded by Comic Relief: 
‘There were a lot of warning signs but the Oxfam staff acted as if all were hunky-
dory, then it all fell apart’.376 
Oxfam also found the AOPP to be paying only lip-service to a main advocacy 
theme of the cotton programme, that of gender equality. 
 
Also said that [speaker] and Oxfam colleagues are fed up asking AOPP 
folks where their women reps are. There are never any women present at 
their meetings. There is a women’s officer, but she is now being 
politically challenged. [Speaker] says some people in AOPP claim 
[speaker] and the women’s officer are conspiring together, yet [speaker] 
has hardly ever seen or spoken to the woman. [Speaker] said the AOPP 
men have to either embrace women’s representation or have it imposed 
on them.377 
 
                                                        
374 Interview with anonymous Oxfam (GB/America) worker, Bamako, 17/09/07. 
375 Fieldnotes, informal interview with INGO informant, Bamako, 21/10/07. 
376 Fieldnotes, informal interview with INGO informant, Bamako, 21/10/07. 
377 Fieldnotes, informal interview with INGO informant, Bamako, 21/10/07. 
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This raises serious questions as to how the AOPP can promote gender 
equality in the local arena when many of its staff in the capital do not themselves 
accept it. Moreover, it raises the delicate question of how Oxfam as an international 
NGO can support any endogenous moves towards women’s emancipation in the 
local arena when it finds itself imposing its own vision of gender equality on its 
national level partner organisation. In terms of deepening demand for accountability, 
the cotton programme’s work at local level may advance gender equality but this is a 
long process. In the meantime, the NGO imposing it under pressure of its funder’s 
expectations would seem to be a high risk strategy. Constructive debate on gender 
equality is suppressed, from one angle, by the INGO’s sensitivity to the international 
funder’s expectations and, from another direction, it is obscured, along with many 
issues of real concern to farmers, by fierce competition over elected positions in the 
Malian civil society organisation, and access to all the development rent that comes 
with them.  
Given the problems at national level, even within the AOPP in 2007, it is not 
surprising that limited advance was made by Oxfam’s Cotton Programme in terms of 
its national level lobbying activities. Dia and Traoré’s (2011) report mentions that 
the programme successfully supported farmers to lobby at national level for a 
generous fertilizer subsidy, and that plans for future work include national level 
lobbying to scale up the programme’s alternative financing initiative, which links co-
operatives directly with a private micro-credit agency. However, little was achieved 
in terms of national level lobbying for a cotton price support fund, which had been 
presented by Oxfam Programme Officer, Fousseynou Diabaté, interviewed in 2007, 
as a priority objective of the programme. 
The Oxfam Cotton Programme is one example of the new framework of co-
operatives attracting international NGO support into the local arena. However, the 
Oxfam intervention operated through a national level partner, the AOPP, which itself 
succumbed to the same sort of crisis of legitimacy affecting the cotton farmer 
movement. Furthermore, by retaining a focus on cotton, the programme did not 
address the exclusion of indebted farmers from the support channelled through 
cotton producer co-operatives. 
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EJF and organic cotton: justice for Malian farmers or justifying a role for 
Northern NGOs? 
In 2007, UK-based international NGO, Environmental Justice Foundation 
(EJF), enlisted the support of Malian NGO, AMADIP, to contribute towards three 
initiatives. Two of these initiatives were global campaigns, one on child labour in 
cotton farming, and the other on the use of pesticides in cotton production, both 
targeted at consumers and decision-makers, principally in Europe. The third initiative 
was a bid for funding for an education project promoting the idea of switching to 
organic cotton among farmers in Mali. The initial planning stages for this potential 
partnership, which to date has not been established, were observed during fieldwork. 
EJF sought research data, interview testimony, photographs, and film footage from 
Mali to support these initiatives. 
AMADIP initially encountered EJF through UK-based international NGO, 
Friends of the Earth.378 AMADIP’s president, Moctar N. Coulibaly, had submitted a 
funding proposal to Friends of the Earth for a small project in his home village of 
M’Pessoba, in Mali’s cotton zone. The village women’s group had asked him, as 
president of AMADIP and son of the village, for equipment and other support to 
develop their production and marketing of shea butter and derivative soap products. 
The proposal was rejected, but Friends of the Earth commissioned AMADIP to 
report on the effects of climate change in Mali. It was in connection with this work 
that Moctar Coulibaly met staff from EJF at a conference in London in May 2007. 
According to EJF Campaigner, Duncan Copeland, the NGO’s cotton 
campaign ‘developed somewhat in reverse to [the NGO’s] other campaigns.’379 
 
It has started at the international level, with lobbying, etc. This has been 
due to funding. … EJF is now looking for partners with whom to work at 
local level, to do more ‘concrete’-type work, especially in West Africa 
and in India.380 
 
                                                        
378 Fieldnotes, AMADIP research tour on child labour in cotton farming, Southern Mali, 27/07/07. 
379 Email communication, 02/01/08. 
380 Fieldnotes, EJF–AMADIP meeting, Bamako, 24/11/07. 
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Just as the activities of the Malian NGO were determined by the availability 
of funding, the agenda of EJF’s campaign was set by its funders. The main funder of 
EJF’s cotton campaign was the Open Society Institute. 
In an interview, Duncan Copeland described how EJF views its role in 
advocacy work in relation to its local partners. 
 
Very often we act as an international voice for our partners on the ground 
so we’ll lobby at the European level or even the UN level on issues that 
our partners are feeding us information for and might be unable to 
represent them themselves. [Why might they not be able to represent 
themselves?] A lot of the time it just comes down to basic resources. [To 
fly there?] To fly there, and again we will as much as possible- we’ll 
facilitate the participation of member organisations in whatever is- they 
feel is key… But in terms of on-going campaigns it’s much easier for us 
to do it from the UK if it means going over to Brussels every two months 
than for someone from Bamako to be doing it or wherever. So in that 
way we’re just acting as a voice.381 
 
In EJF’s ways of working, the global level is viewed as the realm of 
Northern-based international NGO expertise in contrast to the local level, which is 
the source of legitimacy for its campaigns. EJF’s proposed organic education project 
in Mali is motivated in part by the NGO’s sense that it needs to draw a link, albeit 
retrospectively, between its international cotton campaign and the local level in West 
Africa. 
Conventional cotton production uses very high levels of pesticides,382 and 
pesticides used on cotton have been associated with environmental damage and 
negative impacts on human health (Eddleston et al. 2002; EJF 2008). Evidence of 
some of the problems with the use of cotton pesticides in Mali was found during the 
EJF–AMADIP tour of the cotton zone in November 2007, as shown by the following 
excerpts from fieldnotes.  
 
Found pesticide bottles under a tree – Endosulfan – one that EJF 
campaigns against. Very interesting interview with the man who sprays 
the pesticides. I was shocked (and a bit tearful) when he said he knew of 
                                                        
381 Interview with Duncan Copeland, EJF, London, 01/10/08. 
382 Pesticides include insecticides, herbicides and fungicides. Cotton accounted for 18.9 percent of 
worldwide insecticide sales in 2000 and pesticide use per hectare is greater for cotton than for grains 
and oilseeds (Townsend 2010, p. 3). 
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five cases of adults in his village and ten cases of children who had fallen 
ill from pesticides. He said children weed in the cotton fields at the same 
time as the spraying is done. He said he noticed that children got ill after 
the wind changes direction, blowing the spray towards them.383 
 
While having a late lunch in our hosts’ compound, I spotted an old 
pesticide bottle that had a carry string attached. The father of the house 
told us it was for his child to take water to school.384 
 
These observations draw attention to the incompatibility of pesticide use with 
family farming, especially in resource-poor contexts. 
In the year after the EJF–AMADIP tour of the cotton zone, the material on 
pesticides was the most used by the NGO out of all the material it gathered in Mali. 
In early 2008, EJF Campaigner, Duncan Copeland, reported that the NGO was part 
of the EU parliamentary process working to ban certain pesticides.385 In an interview, 
cited below, Duncan Copeland described what he regarded as the positive impacts of 
this work on cotton-farming families in Mali. 
 
When we went down to Mali, pesticides was definitely part of the remit. 
But the fact that it was so blatantly Endosulfan and it was being produced 
in Europe and everything else has really given us quite strong material to 
use in the argument of getting the pesticide ban. So that in the immediate 
is the main focus. … [What would Endosulfan ban mean for the farmers 
in Mali you interviewed?] Well, it would be the end of the use of 
Endosulfan which of the pesticides we saw – other than monocrotophos, 
which is being phased out anyway in Mali that last season, the season we 
were there – is by far and away the most dangerous pesticide that’s being 
used there right now. So that’d be a huge step forward in terms of health 
impacts and that sort of a thing both for adults and for kids.386 
 
A global ban on Endosulfan was indeed achieved in 2011, through an 
amendment to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.387 The 
distribution and use of the pesticide was banned in Mali by the Sahelian Pesticide 
Committee prior to this, in 2007–2008 (the agricultural season after the EJF–
                                                        
383 Fieldnotes, Kassorola, between Moribila and Kimparana, 13/11/07. 
384 Fieldnotes, Miena, near M’Pessoba, 17/11/07. 
385 Email communication, Duncan Copeland, Campaigner, EJF, 02/01/08. 
386 Interview with Duncan Copeland, Campaigner, EJF, London, 01/10/08. 
387 Source: www.ejfoundation.org/page242.html consulted on 10/07/12. 
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AMADIP tour), though it was not clear that this ban was implemented in a timely 
fashion at national level.388  
One obstacle to effective implementation of the ban on Endosulfan, identified 
by the Pesticide Action Network (PAN), is the existence of stockpiles of obsolete 
pesticides in West Africa (PAN and IPEN 2009, p. 14). This gives some context to 
the following excerpt from an interview with Ampha Coulibaly, president of the 
regional union of cotton co-operatives of Koutiala and San, in which he discusses the 
politics of cotton pesticides in Mali. 
 
The cotton producers always want to have insecticides that will kill the 
insects. But in other parts of Mali, the State, the Ministry of Health, do 
not agree with that because they say that we can kill the insects here but 
in Mopti that can have repercussions because it can be carried by the 
river. So now it is about reconciling these two points of view. We know 
we have to protect the environment. But the producer, at the time of 
growing, has but one notion in his head—to kill the insects. But we can’t 
let them do that. That’s why the State often sends pesticides that are not 
as powerful, which are ten or fifteen years old, because the toxicity has 
greatly decreased, always to protect the ecology, to protect the 
environment.389 
 
The desire of farmers to eliminate pests was echoed by Koutiala cotton 
farmer, Bourama Goita. 
                                                        
388 Fieldnotes, M’Pessoba, 16/11/07: A CMDT agent reported that they were in the process of 
withdrawing certain pesticides, such as Endosulfan, which have been proscribed by the Sahelian 
Pesticide Committee. According to PAN and IPEN (2009, p. 16), the Sahelian Pesticide Committee 
recommended that there be no more supply or distribution of Endosulfan after 13 November 2007, 
and no more use of the pesticide after 31 December 2008, but by October 2008, no regulatory action 
had been taken at the State level to implement the ban. 
389 Interview with Ampha Coulibaly, President of the regional union of cotton co-operatives of 
Koutiala and San, Koutiala, 23/02/08. Original: Bon doni dokoma do ni be tchikela gnefai doni 
dokama dodai, hey haou ye ni kelekai, an ko bagadji moubigla a taka cori toumoufaga… bamakoyere, 
fasiteye nama amakakai, ate toumoufaga ouka produit dogla moubaga toumou faga. Ayiwa, mais 
sante mogo, kenegna mogo, nibe yemongoyala ibina kode famou, dja mogo yerebe oulou te cori 
dronfle oulou be adamadey ni faiyenema fana ni nimoube malikono do fanaka kolochili selebai oma. 
Oulou fana be barake, oh cori senenawou oukouka cori soro mais  oukana dakarike faiwairaila, 
siguidala. Est ce que iye korofo famou? Ahou tara niye aka yemogoya kono ko oubai haou ka ni yere 
deh lakana. Ahou ko aka cori hali aka tchikela donko akaga poisoni gla akaga faiyenemaou faga aka 
faga yala abai houlou de faga wa?houya djabi. Houkou ahou djera na ka sayaye n’ga mopti ahouka 
poisini nibe saisai aka bafai aka tienike ouloufeye mais oulou ma djeni ouka sayaye. Mopti kaou ko 
ayakai amassiba kana se ama, oulou bai ouka gardevous ta, sabou dobeye oulou desigilodo ka 
djamana kakeneya kolochi, donc situation bai mogo koumaka soumaya, dan dode sigira aka dan ika 
danyorola. Ahou tchikela  yemogo mounoube ni ko I be ni fo ika tchieke yorola, atifamoudey? Donc o 
dan mou sigira, ahou baibai chariya de kon ani keneya tigui mana moulayini okakai. Ahou taye bi 
mais chini ahou baye. Ahou bese kafo aouka posini yenemadi, peutetri aka keneya bi moutie ahou 
centmouga kono ayete ola n’ga centmouga kono abe moutie ahouye oulou bebo o akalama. 
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If we didn’t have these pesticides to treat our cotton, what would we 
have? Ha! There would be damage. Whether or not they are good for 
health, in any case to make money from cotton now, it is necessary to 
buy these pesticides.390 
 
In Fana and nearby Dien, however, three farmer interviewees complained of 
the high cost of pesticides and synthetic fertilizers, and said that they wanted the 
opportunity to try growing organic cotton.391 
For AOPP and CNOP representative, Ibrahima Coulibaly, farmers’ 
dependence on harmful pesticides was part of broader problems with the policy of 
export-oriented commodity production. 
 
The peasants must first produce their food. They must find other products 
to sell on the local market that can bring them money, and not be 
dependent on a product the production of which requires pesticides, 
fertilizers that destroy the soil, that destroy health. And the peasant earns 
nothing, and the country earns nothing. We find that it is an aberration of 
a policy.392 
 
Indeed, three farmers interviewed sought support to diversify their production 
away from cotton towards food crops, which could be consumed and surpluses sold 
on local markets.393 
The citations from fieldwork, presented above, give an insight into the 
complexity of the issue of cotton pesticides in Mali, from the tension between 
farmers’ immediate economic needs and their families’ health to the orientation of 
national agricultural and environmental policies, and the possible supply of obsolete 
pesticides. Malian producers were involved in the EJF campaign against cotton 
pesticides in a very minimal and passive way, and it is far from clear that many of 
them would have chosen to take an active role had they been given the opportunity, 
                                                        
390 Interview with Bourama Goita, cotton farmer, Koutiala, 21/02/08. Original: Si on n’a pas eu ces 
pesticides pour traiter notre coton, qu’est-ce qu’on va avoir ? Hah ! Il y aura des dégâts. C’est bon ou 
c’est pas bon pour la santé, en tout cas pour avoir de l’argent dans le coton maintenant il faut acheter 
ces pesticides. 
391 Interviews with A N Fomba, Dien; T Fomba, Dien; and S Touré, Fana; all conducted on 17/02/08. 
392 Interview with Ibrahima Coulibaly, President CNOP, and AOPP External Relations Secretary, 
Bamako, 17/01/08. 
393 Interviews with A Bagayogo, Fana, 17/02/08; D Traoré, Fana, 17/02/08; and S Coulibaly, 
Koutiala, 20/02/08. 
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though some farmers interviewed sought practical support to reduce their 
dependence on pesticides and switch to organic cotton. At the time of extracting 
material from Mali for its campaign, EJF planned to undertake future work, which 
would involve educating farmers of the benefits of organic farming practices, which 
will be discussed below. But the EJF campaign did not address the root causes of 
pesticide use in cotton farming in Mali, where the supply of inputs is still organised 
at national level, or consider how a ban on Endosulfan might be implemented in 
practice. EJF Campaigner, Duncan Copeland, defended the limited scope of the 
campaign in terms of the NGO’s comparative advantage vis-à-vis other NGOs: ‘It’s 
about finding where you can add the most value as an organisation.’394 
The phenomenon of child labour in cotton farming in Mali proved to be even 
more complex than that of pesticides. Overall, EJF staff who travelled to Mali 
concluded that what they witnessed in the cotton zone was not so much an issue of 
exploitation of children but rather one of general poverty.  
 
There’s a huge difference between child labour and forced child labour. 
The main thrust of our campaign work is on forced child labour, which 
again ties into Uzbekistan and actually in terms of the work we’ve done 
in India as well, where it’s far more relevant than it is in Mali. Now, we 
didn’t see directly on that trip that we were with, but we know from other 
organisations and news reports that there is some forced child labour in 
West Africa as well. There is smuggling of kids across borders to work in 
cotton and that sort of thing. But in terms of our main focus, Mali 
actually has been a little bit difficult because from what we’ve seen, it’s 
not a forced child labour issue, it’s an economics one. And no-one in this 
organisation is ever going to argue that no kid should ever be helping 
their family out. … that’s been a little bit of the reason why we haven’t 
gone hugely forward with using Mali as a case study for our cotton 
campaign [on child labour]. …it’s probably more effective to address it 
within the supply chain than in the courts of Brussels or the UN. So in 
terms of advocacy, we haven’t really touched on Mali at all.395 
 
Photographs and data from the EJF–AMADIP tour of Mali’s cotton zone 
nonetheless appeared in the NGO’s campaign report, The Children Behind Our 
Cotton, released in December 2007. The report included a brief mention of some of 
                                                        
394 Interview with Duncan Copeland, EJF Campaigner, London, 01/10/08. 
395 Interview with Duncan Copeland, EJF Campaigner, London, 01/10/08. 
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the economic factors that contribute to the high incidence of children working in 
cotton production in Mali. 
 
In Mali, where in some areas children represent approximately half of the 
workforce in conventional cotton production, farmers can’t access credit 
facilities, lack sufficient adult labour and suitable machinery, and make 
little money from the crop, with prices pushed down due to developed-
world subsidies. (EJF 2007, p. 11) 
 
Fieldwork interviews with farmers confirmed that economic pressures were 
part of the reason that parents gave their children farm work to do,396 but three 
farmer interviewees specified that children would only be given farm work once they 
reached a suitable age or physical condition,397 and two of these farmers emphasised 
that children follow their parents to the fields from an early age and help out 
voluntarily.398 
The latter points were echoed by national farmer representative, Ibrahima 
Coulibaly, who regarded the participation of children in farm work as a form of 
apprenticeship in farming skills, a normal contribution to the household, and even a 
fun task for children working alongside their peers. He found the term, ‘child labour’ 
‘too Western’ and inappropriate to the context, and was concerned that its use could 
give a negative image to Malian producers.399 Souleymane M Keita, Vice President 
of the CNOP, was similarly astounded to hear of NGOs doing research in Mali for a 
campaign on child labour: he viewed it as a case of development rent-seeking. 
 
you know that in our country, people often do campaigns for the sake of 
doing campaigns. … I could get involved to get a bit of money… but that 
is not good for the very ethics of our countries. … There are real 
                                                        
396 Interviews with Bourama Goita, Koutiala; Alphonse Kone, Moribila; Bakary Fomba, Dien; and 
Mamadou Konaté, Fana; all conducted 17/02/08–24/02/08. 
397 Interviews with Bakary Fomba, Dien; Mamadou Konaté, Fana; and B K Traoré, Wolodo; all 
conducted 17/02/08–18/02/08. 
398 Interviews with Bakary Fomba, Dien; and B K Traoré, Wolodo; both conducted 17/02/08–
18/02/08. Indeed, it was on B K Traoré’s farm in Wolodo, during the AMADIP–EJF tour, that EJF 
interviewed a boy who was harvesting cotton, who said that he was working because he wanted to 
help his parents (fieldnotes, Wolodo, nr Fana, 22/11/07). 
399 Interview with Ibrahima Coulibaly, President CNOP, and AOPP External Relations Secretary, 
Bamako, 17/01/08. 
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development problems. Together, we can identify them and apply 
ourselves to that.400 
 
Both Ibrahima Coulibaly and S M Keita were surprised, however, to hear that 
during the NGO’s research tour of the cotton zone in July 2007, AMADIP 
discovered some less benign forms of child labour, including the practice of sending 
a child to work for another family for a period of seven to eight months in exchange 
for a young ox.401 AMADIP’s report of the research trip cites a CMDT agent who 
explained this practice as ‘an alternative solution to the cessation of the system of 
credit for equipment for cotton producers’ (AMADIP 2007, section 3.2.3).402 As 
noted in chapter three, use of the plough was vulgarised in Mali in the 1970s and 
1980s through a credit scheme for buying ploughs and oxen, organised by the CMDT 
with the National Agricultural Development Bank. This type of support ended in the 
early 2000s as part of liberal reform of the CMDT. 
The choice of child labour as a topic for research and campaign activity was 
very much driven by the UK-based NGO and its funders; it was not one that arose 
from concerns within Mali. It would be inaccurate, however, to portray AMADIP’s 
involvement in the project as merely an exercise in development rent-seeking. 
Rather, AMADIP’s Moctar Coulibaly took the opportunity to attempt to ‘broker’403 
the transnational NGO encounter and tailor it to his own analysis of the underlying 
development problems, informed by research in the cotton zone. During their 
research tour in July 2007, he and his colleague, Lamine Togola, commented that 
they found the phenomenon of child labour to be much worse than they had 
anticipated.404 Moctar Coulibaly said that he wanted to investigate why children 
work, and why they seem to work more now than in his youth, in the 1970s and 
                                                        
400 Interview with S M Keita, Vice President, CNOP, Bamako, 12/02/08. Original: vous savez que 
dans notre pays les gens font souvent les campagnes pour faire les campagnes. … Je peux me mettre 
dedans pour avoir un peu d’argent… Mais ce n’est pas bon pour l’éthique même de nos pays. … Il y a 
des vrais problèmes de développement. Ensemble on peut les identifier et se mettre à ça. 
401 A boy who had been sent to work in exchange for an ox said he had been made to work hard and 
was ill-treated during that time. Fieldnotes, Farakala between M’Pessoba and San, 27/07/07; 
AMADIP 2007. 
402 Original: une solution alternative à l’arrêt du système de crédits d’équipements aux producteurs de 
coton.  
403 The notion of ‘brokers’ and ‘brokerage’ in development was developed by Bierschenk et al. 
(2002). 
404 Fieldnotes, AMADIP research tour on child labour in cotton farming, Southern Mali, July 2007. 
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1980s, when he worked on his own family’s cotton and subsistence farm in 
M’Pessoba, near Koutiala.405 
In addition to the loss of credit for equipment, two explanatory factors that 
AMADIP identified for the apparent increased incidence of child farm labour in the 
cotton zone were the break up of extended family households, which resulted in a 
shortage of adult labour and equipment for many nucleated families, and an 
increased incidence of food security crises among poorer households, in response to 
which children may be sent to work for a neighbour in exchange for grain (AMADIP 
2007).  
In the process of distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable levels of child 
farm labour, AMADIP, EJF, and many of their informants distinguished between 
children who work in the fields after school and in the school holidays from those 
who are sent to work in the fields during school hours, whether permanently or 
temporarily. In the small research sample taken by AMADIP in July 2007, fifty-nine 
percent of the children found working on farms were not enrolled in school.406 A 
primary school teacher in Yanfolila, a small town south west of Bougouni, 
commented that children between seven and twelve years of age are greatly solicited 
for farm work, and many are absent from school either side of the school holiday, at 
the time of sowing (June) and harvesting (late September onwards).407 
The teacher at Yanfolila commented that parents think they can do what they 
like with their children; that they have no notion of child rights.408 He also noted that 
there were a number of NGOs in the area working on child welfare now, whereas 
there were none in the past. Mali’s organic movement (MOBIOM409), which 
produces organic fair trade cotton, is operational in the Yanfolila area. MOBIOM’s 
                                                        
405 Fieldnotes, AMADIP research tour on child labour in cotton farming, Southern Mali, 26/07/07–
27/07/07. Moctar Coulibaly commented that when he was young, adults worked to an older age, but 
now they retire and oversee only. He suggested this may be because the older generation has been 
weakened by years of hard work without enough to eat, noting that the farm workers he observed 
appeared to be eating moni (millet porridge) as a main meal, which he said was not substantial enough 
to sustain that level of work. Fieldwork interviewee, Mamadou Konaté, also commented that in the 
past, old people did farmwork, whereas children did not. He attributed this change to the introduction 
of the ox-drawn plough, which a child is able to guide; previously this work was done with a daba 
(hand-held hoe), which a child could not manage. Interview, Fana, 17/02/08. 
406 Figure extrapolated from data in AMADIP (2007). 
407 Fieldnotes, Yanfolila nr Bougouni, 01/08/07. 
408 Fieldnotes, Yanfolila nr Bougouni, 01/08/07. 
409 Mouvement Biologique Malien 
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director, Sidi N’Guiro, said that the Bamako office of the Senegal-based 
international NGO, Enda, had done a lot of awareness raising work with parents on 
the benefits of sending their children to school rather than sending them to work in 
the fields: ‘At the time it was not even possible to speak of this subject. But now it is 
no longer taboo. The peasants have understood a bit.’410  
In the Koutiala area, where conventional cotton is grown, the CMDT regional 
director said that the CMDT had been educating peasants about child labour.411 
When two local farmers were questioned about this later the same day, they said that 
the CMDT had indeed educated them about child labour – the CMDT agent had told 
them that children get too much debris mixed in with the cotton they pick and should 
be taught to be more careful.412 The pertinence of seed cotton quality to the world 
market was discussed in chapter three.  
Child labour presents a specific problem in the MOBIOM zone because it is 
incompatible with international organic and fair trade standards, as was explained by 
Emmanuel Tobo, co-ordinator of Agri Multi Service, which supports organic fair 
trade cotton farming in the Yanfolila area. 
 
The organisations of fair trade cotton come on mission to check. If they 
see children in the cotton fields, that is not ok. … We cannot hide the 
children and let them return afterwards. It is necessary to do something, 
hence the programme of awareness-raising.413 
 
Blowfield (2004, p. 19) observes that the expansion of ethical sourcing in the 
tea, coffee and cocoa industries means that smallholders are increasingly required to 
abide by ‘codes that were originally developed for large workplaces and that include 
criteria on overtime, freedom of association and child labour which may not be 
suited to application to small family-operated farms’. Similarly, Bassett (2010) 
                                                        
410 Fieldnotes, Bougouni, 30/07/07, orginal: À l’époque ce n’était même pas possible de parler de ce 
sujet. Mais maintenant ce n’est plus tabou. Les paysans ont compris un peu. These points were echoed 
by two informants at Agri Multi Service in Yanfolila nr Bougouni, which supports organic cotton 
farming in the area; fieldnotes, 13/07/07. 
411 Fieldnotes, Koutiala, 19/11/07. 
412 Fieldnotes, farm outside Koutiala on road to Kimparana, 19/11/07. 
413 Fieldnotes, Yanfolila, 31/07/07. Original: Les organisations du coton équitable viennent en mission 
pour vérifier. S’ils voient les enfants dans les champs de coton, ça ne va pas. On ne peut pas cacher les 
enfants et les laisser retourner après. Il faut faire quelque chose, et alors, la programme de 
sensibilisation 
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points out that fair trade is part of an ‘international moral economy’, driven by values 
held by consumers in the global North.414 
The issue of children working in cotton farming highlights the disjuncture 
between the world cotton market and the realities of family farming in West Africa. 
On one hand, transnational civil society co-operation on the subject is coloured by 
divergent cultural values and practices, while on the other hand, changing patterns of 
children’s involvement in farm work may be indicators of socio-economic stress. 
Having found no evidence of systematic exploitation of children in cotton farming in 
Mali, EJF used the material it gathered as part of a general portrayal of child labour 
in global cotton production to bolster its international campaign for tighter 
international regulation of child labour, and for consumers and retailers to buy only 
cotton that is certified as free of child labour (EJF 2007). Without any connection to 
the cotton sector or farmers in Mali, it is hard to see how EJF’s intervention might 
translate into benefits for farming families; indeed, Ibrahima Coulibaly’s concern 
that the campaign might tarnish the reputation of Malian cotton would seem to be 
valid. However, EJF’s Duncan Copeland argued that their work helps to create a 
market for organic and fair trade cotton.415 EJF’s proposed organic education project 
will be considered next, in relation to the potential of organic and fair trade cotton 
initiatives as alternatives for farmers in Mali. 
EJF’s proposal to carry out a project to educate Malian farmers on the 
benefits of organic over conventional cotton production416 was motivated by the 
NGO’s agenda and capacities, and showed little understanding of the needs and 
desires of Malian farmers or of the set up of the cotton value chain in which they are 
embedded. The proposed project was first mentioned to AMADIP in an email from 
                                                        
414 “FLO fairtrade standards state that payments should go directly to women cotton growers, ‘not to 
the husband.’ This criteria tells more about the culture of the promoters than the participants of 
fairtrade. One Dagara woman from the Dano region of Burkina Faso who participates in the Helvétas 
program informed us that when she received her cotton money, she gave it to her husband because ‘‘if 
you keep it yourself you will die.” When asked to elaborate, she explained that ‘‘cotton money is hot; 
it has to be cooled.” It is hot due to the nyama or powerful life force that inhabits both living and 
inanimate things. … To neturalize or cool the nyama, a woman gives her money to her husband who 
takes it to the family shrine (mane) and covers it with ashes. At the end of this ritual, the husband can 
give some or all of the money back to his wife. At the very least, he knows how much money she has 
earned.” (Bassett 2010, p. 53) 
415 Interview with Duncan Copeland, EJF Campaigner, London, 01/10/08. 
416 EJF made a bid for funding for the project in 2008 (email comm, D Copeland, 02/01/08), but to 
date the proposed project has not been realised. 
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one of the NGO’s directors in October 2007, before the EJF team travelled to 
Mali.417 The director sought AMADIP’s collaboration as a partner in the project, the 
proposal for which assumed that Malian farmers needed to be convinced of the 
benefits of organic farming methods. The project was to use the NGO’s technical 
expertise in film-making. 
 
Primary project would be the production of a training film on organic 
cotton cultivation, and a program of ‘training trainers’ who would be able 
to travel from community to community showing the film and working 
with local farmers towards a switch to organic.418 
 
As mentioned above, the project would represent part of EJF’s ‘grassroots 
capacity building efforts’, on which it usually bases its campaigns.419 Effectively, the 
project would be an exercise in retrospectively acquiring legitimacy for EJF’s use of 
material from Mali in its international campaigns on pesticides and child labour in 
cotton. 
In persisting with its project proposal, EJF overlooked feedback from some 
farmers it met in Mali who were already convinced of the virtues of organic farming 
and sought not a training film, but the practical and institutional support required to 
make the switch.420 Conventional cotton farmers might benefit from instruction on 
how to make and apply organic manure,421 compost, and pesticide (from the Neem 
tree).422 However, they could not make their cotton production fully organic, through 
acquisition of organic cotton seeds and organic certification of their produce, or 
benefit from the price premium associated with organic status, without the support of 
the cotton company. If it were to be effective in supporting farmers to switch to 
organic cotton production, EJF would need to work with the actors already 
operational in the field, notably MOBIOM and the organisations it works with: Swiss 
NGO Helvétas, the CMDT (which currently gins all of Mali’s cotton, including 
                                                        
417 Fieldnotes, Bamako, 08/10/07. 
418 Email communication, Duncan Copeland, EJF, 02/01/08. 
419 Email communication, Duncan Copeland, EJF, 02/01/08. 
420 For example, the EJF team heard from farmers in Ouroun, near Bougouni, that they had sought to 
grow organic cotton but had been put off by the CMDT and were not given organic cotton seeds, 
though some were given organic sesame seeds instead, fieldnotes, 21/11/07. 
421 The CMDT already instructs conventional cotton farmers to use organic manure. 
422 Even these inputs depend on having access to a certain level of resources, such as livestock 
(Bassett 2010, p. 52–53). 
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organic and fair trade), Geocoton (the French company which part-owns the CMDT), 
and international cotton trading companies (e.g. Reinhart, which sells all of 
MOBIOM’s cotton) (Bassett 2010).423 During the EJF tour of Southern Mali in 
November 2007, the NGO sought to take film footage of organic cotton farming to 
use in its bid for project funding. The NGO was not transparent with MOBIOM staff 
about the purpose of filming, arousing their suspicion and non-co-operation.424 
If it were to realise its project, EJF would work with cotton producer co-
operatives through a Malian partner NGO, such as AMADIP. In this way, EJF would 
be linked into the local and national level processes of co-operative formation and 
representation described in the first and second sections of this chapter. In relation to 
ethical supply chains, Blowfield (2004, p. 21) argues that ‘co-operatives as an ideal 
type are being promoted to companies as a means of monitoring social and 
environmental performance’ and notes that ‘the benefit of co-operatives to small 
producers can be questioned.’ Promotion of the co-operative organisational form in 
organic and fair trade supply chains is another way in which the local arena is 
disciplined by policy orientations emanating from the international arena.  
Bassett (2010) examines organic and fair trade cotton initiatives in Mali and 
Burkina Faso, and argues that ‘the programs’ almost exclusive focus on the producer 
level (e.g. the organization and operation of producer cooperatives, and cotton 
quality) and its limited attention to the ginning and trading links in the cotton 
commodity chain reveals fair trade’s weak potential for truly “changing trading 
practices”’ (Bassett 2010, p. 44). Producers benefit from organic and fair trade price 
premiums, but these premiums originate solely from the consumer end of the supply 
chain, while the power dynamics within the supply chain remain unaltered.  
 
West African cotton stands out for its high quality but farmers rarely reap 
its market benefits. The added value is captured instead by cotton 
companies and traders. Fairtrade can thus be viewed as just 
compensation for a very small number of producers for the cotton they 
                                                        
423 Indeed, Bassett (2010, p. 50) notes that Helvétas and Geocoton embarked on a five-year project to 
expand organic fairtrade cotton production in Mali and other countries in West Africa. 
424 The Director of MOBIOM refused to let EJF film or interview producers. One reason for this was 
that there was an inspection taking place at the time. The Director complained that EJF had not fully 
explained the purpose of the filming and interviews. Duncan Copeland told me that he could not tell 
the Director that the footage was for use in the project funding bid as this might be regarded as 
competition for MOBIOM. Fieldnotes, Bougouni, 20/11/07–21/11/07.  
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produce. This does not involve, however, a redistribution of profits from 
cotton companies and traders to producers. It is the consumer who pays 
the higher price that makes fairtrade work. The unequal exchange 
relations that define the conventional commodity chain continue to be 
reproduced in the fairtrade chain. (Bassett 2010, p. 52) 
 
Although fair trade certification demands a certain degree of transparency 
within the supply chain, Bassett (2010) found that the price-setting process and the 
distribution of profits among actors in the supply chain were more obscure to 
producers in the case of organic and fair trade cotton than in that of conventional 
cotton in Mali and Burkina Faso. Bassett points to a direct contract for organic cotton 
between US lingerie company, Victoria’s Secret, and the national cotton farmers’ 
union in Burkina Faso (UNPCB, equivalent to Mali’s UN-SCPC) as a new 
arrangement of the supply chain that has the potential to empower farmers, but he 
also notes that farmers did not find the UNPCB any more transparent or trustworthy 
than the cotton companies (Bassett 2010, p. 51).425 In light of the problems with 
national level farmer representation in Mali, discussed above, it is clear to see that 
the potential for organic and fair trade supply chains to make supposedly ‘direct’ 
links with producers through the UN-SCPC would not be regarded as a positive 
development by many Malian smallholders. 
A further limitation of EJF’s proposed organic education project is the 
unsuitability for organic cotton production of some areas where conventional cotton 
is currently grown, especially around Koutiala and San, where the soil appears to be 
severely degraded. As touched upon in chapters three and five, the causes of soil 
degradation in these areas are disputed, and may be due to too many years of 
unsustainable cotton production or to climate change or to a combination of these 
and other factors. The areas of Mali where organic cotton has been grown 
successfully are located farther south and are relatively new to cotton farming. 
AMADIP staff member, Fousseyney Coulibaly, was particularly concerned that 
through discussion of the proposed organic project, the expectations of farmers in the 
Koutiala and San areas, where he worked, were being raised by EJF without any 
                                                        
425 The contract between Victoria’s Secret and UNPCB became the subject of controversy in 2011, 
when a US media company reported that cotton for this contract was being grown using forced child 
labour (Bloomberg, 15/12/11, www.bloomberg.com/news-media/clarisse-kambire-victorias-secret-
child-labor-cotton-picker consulted on 20/07/12).  
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guarantees that they would be met: ‘They [EJF] shouldn’t come and get them [the 
farmers] excited and then leave them like that.’426 Furthermore, Bassett (2010, p. 53) 
notes that even in organic fair trade cotton programmes, which promote the 
participation of women, it is mainly women from middle-income households who 
participate because of the resources required to do so. The resource requirements for 
successful cotton growing and the low potential for profitable cotton farming in 
Koutiala and San – whether organic or conventional – demonstrate that while the 
focus of development interventions and agricultural policies rests narrowly on 
cotton, they do little to help the most marginal farming families in Mali. 
Finally, a limitation of the proposed organic project, which was recognised 
by EJF’s Duncan Copeland in an interview in 2008, is the risk of insufficient market 
demand for organic cotton.427 While organic fair trade cotton from Mali and Burkina 
Faso has been more successful in finding buyers than non-organic fair trade cotton, 
the organic premium is only paid to producers if the cotton is successfully sold at 
that premium on the world market; if no buyer can be found at the premium price, 
the cotton will be sold alongside conventional cotton at lower prices (Bassett 2010). 
This situation justifies the role played by EJF in trying to increase demand for 
organic and fair trade cotton in Northern markets; however, it also highlights the 
point that being dependent on export-oriented commodity production means that the 





The local arena is framed by policy which is decided in national and 
international arenas. The local arena of farming communities in southern Mali has 
been disciplined into conformity with the single-commodity paradigm. At the 
national level, top cotton farmer representatives have become embroiled in electoral 
politics, while a donor-backed government policy to construct a pyramid of unions of 
co-operatives abruptly curtailed any semblance of independent farmer representation. 
                                                        
426 Interview with Fousseyney Coulibaly, AMADIP, Koutiala, 21/02/08. Original: Il ne faut pas venir 
exciter les producteurs et les laisser comme ça. 
427 Email communication, Duncan Copeland, EJF, 02/01/08. 
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Indeed, at all levels, processes of representative democracy have been manipulated in 
a competitive quest for access to development rent and a stake in crony capitalism. 
Linkages between the international and local arenas may bring some benefits, 
most likely for those able to sustain membership of cotton producer co-operatives. 
However, despite some brokerage by Malian civil society actors, international NGOs 
still tend to promote their own perspectives on the local and how it should be 
developed (entrepreneurial producers of commodities of which Northerners are 
consumers). Furthermore, the disarray of civil society at national level in Mali cannot 
easily be circumvented since transnational links are often channelled through NGOs 
or other civil society structures at national level, and above all because, regardless of 
transnational interventions, rural producers still have to deal with the donor-backed 
national policy frameworks in which they are situated. 
This chapter supports Stokke and Mohan’s (2001, p. 12) analysis that the 
trend towards focusing on the local arena, of which Mali’s cotton co-operatives are a 
part, ‘allows the major lenders to sidestep the state and its relation to the global 
economy since the economic basis is not rendered problematic, simply the 
shortcomings of local society in inserting itself into economic life in a cohesive and 
co-ordinated manner.’ Furthermore, this chapter validates the authors’ assertion, 
inspired by Tarrow’s (1996) critique of Putnam’s work on civil society, that 
‘Following from this cultural internalism comes a tendency to ignore the state’s role 
in enabling or destroying social capital.’ (Stokke and Mohan 2001, p. 11). 
The continued focus of Oxfam (specifically, Oxfam America and Oxfam 
Great Britain) on cotton reflects the NGO’s analysis that problems in the 
transnational network stem from corruption of national actors, which can be rectified 
by strengthening processes of downward accountability within the Malian farmers’ 
movement. Oxfam does not define the problem as with the cotton value chain as 
such, and does not look at the interests behind the corruption. Nor does it give 
sufficient reflexive consideration to the impacts of its own power and values. Rather, 
it sees local level entrepreneurialism as a motor for market-oriented development. In 
this way, Oxfam’s view is in line with the World Bank’s good governance agenda, 
and the NGO’s intervention in this case added to processes through which national 
and international policies frame the local arena. Moreover, Oxfam’s intervention 
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supported a top-down reorganisation of village level farmer organisation, which is 
set to exacerbate socio-economic inequality and exclusion of the most marginal 
households in the local arena.428 
The model of co-operative capitalism attracts transnational support as it is 
readily comprehended by foreign NGO workers, far more so than are the complex 
social realities of rural Malians. Furthermore, ‘cotton’ is an attractive subject matter 
for civil society actors from the global North because it is a commodity that is 
ubiquitously consumed in the North. EJF’s proposed organic cotton project reflects a 
tendency among international NGOs to work towards improved versions of the 
global cotton value chain, principally by engendering changes at local levels. Again, 
the model of export-oriented commodity production goes unquestioned. Meanwhile, 
EJF falls short of its own claimed standards of accountability to local populations in 
its international campaigns. 
 
                                                        
428 Analysis of the gender equity dimension of the intervention would require further research. 
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This thesis set out to examine the phenomenon of transnational campaigns 
and advocacy networks through the relationships between network actors and 
through the impacts of their interventions on grassroots actors who have most at 
stake in the interventions. It is a study of how transnational civil society networks are 
constructed and how African civil society actors interact in this process of network 
construction.  
The thesis illustrates the ways in which actors in transnational civil society 
networks are rooted in their own political, social, economic and cultural arenas. 
Their multiple subjectivities in these arenas condition their interests, perspectives, 
values and modes of political participation. It is in order to link civil society action 
across different political arenas that actors network with one another. As one 
northern-based international NGO worker put it, ‘It’s about finding where you can 
add the most value as an organisation’.429 Networking enables organisations to 
augment the impacts of their work by scaling up and transnationalising civil society 
action. However, if networking is to be successful and coherent, a major challenge 
for actors is to understand where their counterparts are ‘coming from’, as this helps 
to make sense of differences between them in terms of their perspectives and ways of 
working.  
In the cases examined in this thesis, there was a very low level of 
understanding of other actors’ relationships to their own political arenas. In 
particular, the diverse subjectivities of Malian actors, and how these influenced their 
perspectives and approaches, were misunderstood, overlooked or obscure. Their 
perspectives were obscure because of (i) a lack of understanding of the Malian 
                                                        
429 Interview with Duncan Copeland, EJF Campaigner, London, 01/10/08. 
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political arena, and to some extent of Mali’s position in the world trade system, on 
the part of international NGO actors; and (ii) a lack of reflexive awareness on the 
part of international NGO actors of their own values and relative power within 
transnational networks, and (iii) more overt processes of domination in which the 
international NGOs’ framings of issues were given priority in the face of alternative 
framings put forward by Malian actors. 
The implications of these imbalances in the transnational network were the 
instrumentalisation of transnational civil society action to consolidate the power of 
elites in civil society, the State and the cotton value chain, and a missed opportunity 
to network with more independent civil society activists. The argument put forward 
in this thesis takes on board the point, made by Crewe and Harrison (1998) and 
Mosse (2005), that the policy and actions of international NGOs are not central to the  
explanation of the actions of other actors; rather, actors act according to their own 
agendas and strategies. However, through their interventions, international NGOs 
feature in the field of possibilities open to other actors. International NGOs 
participate in the dynamic interaction that takes place between the whole range of 
actors and, in turn, this dynamic interaction impacts on the wider context. In this case 
study, the participation of the international NGOs – two northern (Oxfam and EJF) 
and one southern (Enda) – involved relative dominance within transnational 
networks, through which they (inadvertently) facilitated dominance by other actors 
in the wider context. The phenomenon in which transnational civil society action 
served to empower an elite rather than the majority of farmers in Mali’s cotton zone 
cannot be explained without reference to these processes of dominating power. 
Therefore, while the non-normative approach advocated by Mosse and Lewis 
(2006) enhances the subtlety of explanation of the phenomenon, it misses a crucial 
point: that the dominance of international NGOs is a major part of the explanation. 
Through deepening our understanding of the roles of power and values in shaping 
transnational campaigns and advocacy networks, and in producing some of the 
lesser-known impacts that they have on the people they claim to empower, this thesis 
contributes a more accurate analysis of transnational civil society action than is 
currently found in the literature. In so doing, the thesis contributes to debates around 
‘global civil society’ by showing that the practice of transnational campaigns and 
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advocacy on cotton in Mali bears more resemblance to the neo-Gramscian model, 
which emphasises contention and links to political power, than to the neo-
Tocquevillian model, which emphasises association and independence from political 
power. Furthermore, the thesis contributes to academic debate on civil society in 
Africa by showing that blurring between civil society and the state, rather than a 
peculiarly African phenomenon, may be more usefully viewed as one form of what 
Fox (1996) identifies as processes of mutual constitution the state and a civil society 
that features both clients and independent voices. 
 
 
Peasants, producers, clients, and activists in Mali 
This thesis has shown that farmers in Mali’s cotton zone developed a sense of 
dependence on the State and the cotton company, as well as a sense that this 
dependence is to some extent reciprocal. Farmers expected the State and the cotton 
company to provide a means for them to earn an income. The liberal reform process 
threatened this relationship of unequal reciprocity, hence the notion that privatisation 
meant ‘leaving farmers as orphans’ (Dougnon et al. 2010). Some farmers who 
viewed themselves as subordinate nonetheless expected to be consulted over the 
liberal reform agenda, in line with cultural norms of good governance. They did not, 
however, expect to be consulted over factors affecting the world cotton market, such 
as US and EU subsidies. As a mode of political participation, consultation was 
distinguished from more adversarial methods such as strike action and lobbying, as it 
involved a sense of deference to authority and was contrasted with the pursuit of 
private interests. It was a government actor who, in seeking farmers’ acquiescence 
with the reforms, reminded farmers of their partial autonomy. It was perhaps the 
combination of the encounter with this discourse and the availability of alternative 
livelihood strategies (notably, talk of an organic cotton project) that facilitated 
reluctant acceptance of the reforms by farmers in Fana. The livelihood strategies of 
farmers in Koutiala and San, by contrast, were rather more uncertain due to their 
different ecological contexts and less hope of inward investment.  
More highly capitalised farmers and those whose social positions were 
elevated through association with the cotton company felt they had a relatively high 
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degree of bargaining power vis-à-vis the State and the cotton company, while also 
being highly motivated to invest in these relationships as a route to further social and 
economic advancement. For the most part, these actors were highly responsive to 
efforts by the cotton company and the State to ‘educate’ their perspectives in line 
with the workings of the world cotton market, and to engender a collaborative 
relationship between producers and other actors within the cotton value chain. 
Although different in content, their interests were aligned initially with those of the 
cotton company in terms of opposing the liberal reform agenda. However, exogenous 
pressure on the State (from the World Bank) to implement reform put strain on the 
relationship between the State and the cotton union leaders. To the extent that union 
leaders resisted, they engaged in passive resistance, which slowed down the liberal 
reform process but did not divert it. The complicity of cotton union leaders in the 
reforms was secured – just as it had been in relation to strike action – through an 
opaque negotiating process with government actors, which appears to have been 
linked to practices of fraud, bribery and clientalism. When these tactics were not 
sufficient to ensure control of the farmer movement, state actors pursued strategies of 
repression against farmers who challenged them, as happened in the violent 
suppression of the 1998 Koutiala strike and, with the complicity of the top union 
leader, in the imprisonment of political challengers during the construction of the co-
operative union pyramid in 2007. 
The degeneration of the peasant movement in Mali inspires analyses typical 
of pessimistic views associated with the ‘Western exceptionalism’ approach (Lewis 
2002) to civil society in Africa, which tend towards over-determinism and fatalism, 
like that of Alexis Roy (2010a). 
 
Mali appears to be moving into a patrimonial or clientalist state, or even 
into ‘uncivil society’. Whereas a dominant position was dependent on the 
state or on trading, and often on the combination of the two, a third 
option – that of participation, given the label of ‘civil society’ – is now 
open to actors. The dominant class would seem to be made up of three 
pillars (with some confusion and overlap among them): the bureaucracy 
pillar, the trader pillar and the civil society pillar. The elites, both old and 
new, move according to circumstance and strategy between these 
different pillars. … The diversification of vectors of access to the 
dominant pillars, … far from ensuring better distribution of wealth, can 
be seen rather to demonstrate flexibility and adaptability of the power 
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relations in Mali, which to a great extent ‘digest’ or absorb the processes 
initiated exogenously (such as privatisation, decentralisation, and civil 
society). (Roy 2010a, pp. 311–312) 
 
Roy’s (2010a) analysis of farmer representation in Mali reflects an overall 
pattern of clientalism that featured strongly in the research findings. However, it does 
not reflect adequately the diversity among farmers or the agency of state and civil 
society actors in the degeneration of the peasant movement, which feature in both his 
own account of the peasant movement in Mali and in the account presented in this 
thesis. While the pattern of clientalism is pertinent to understanding the 
instrumentalisation of, for example, the transnational campaign against cotton 
subsidies, it does not fully explain the participation or non-participation of farmers 
and their representatives in contentious politics within Mali or in transnational civil 
society networks more broadly. 
In Mali, farmers’ responses to authoritarian attempts to co-opt or repress 
them varied. Farmers interviewed in outlying villages clearly felt intimidated; 
whereas pockets of militancy were found in Koutiala, a stronghold of the opposition 
party, SADI. It was also noted, in chapter three, that Kita farmers who sought to 
form an independent union were discouraged from doing so, due in part to historical 
party political opposition in the area (Bingen 2000). This is consistent with what 
Tarrow (2005, p. 47) describes as ‘the familiar finding from social movement 
research’ that ‘the best predictor of activism is past activism’. The research findings 
are also consistent, however, with Fox’s (1996) suggestion that different actors react 
to repression in different ways: some yield to it, while others intensify their 
resistance. In the cases examined in this thesis, those actors who resisted most 
overtly and intensely tended to be those who perceived themselves as being engaged 
not only in a struggle over cotton sector policy and practice, but in a broader and 
deeper, counter-hegemonic struggle against the incumbent regime and the 
transnational regimes of governance and commerce to which it was connected. 
Among these actors, there were links between farmers and urban activists, and some 
links to transnational alter-globalisation networks. They differed in their perspectives 
but, overall, focused on two concerns: government accountability for 
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mismanagement of the cotton company and the marginalisation of broad-based 
family farming.  
The thesis highlights some shortcomings of the literature on peasant 
resistance. Scott (1990) rejects the notion that peasants internalise subordination, 
citing the juxtaposition of peasants’ public and hidden transcripts as evidence that 
they routinely resist domination, and claiming that their passive resistance has 
merely been overlooked by theorists. The research findings support Lukes’ (2005) 
criticism of Scott’s approach as ‘oddly monolithic’, overlooking ‘the gamut of the 
remaining human responses to conditions of powerlessness and dependence, or the 
range of forms these conditions can take’ (pp. 131–132). Isaacman (1993) identifies 
the ‘partial autonomy’ of the peasantry as a condition that is key to explaining the 
phenomenon of passive resistance observed by Scott (1990): 
 
It is this partial autonomy [derived from the labour process not being 
divorced from the means of production and thus of subsistence] as well 
as the realization of their limited power which helps explain why 
peasants were prone to engage in localized or hidden forms of resistance 
rather than in broader social movements. (Isaacman 1993, p. 208) 
 
The fieldwork findings suggest that forms of farmer resistance or 
acquiescence are indeed related to the complex balance of farmers’ autonomy and 
powerlessness, but that there is scope in the literature for further research on this 
balance and how farmers’ political activity relates to it.  
In Mali under the CMDT system, the prospects for successful cultivation of 
subsistence crops was linked to the cotton system through the provision of inputs, 
credit and extension services. Bingen’s (1998, p. 275) comment that the cotton 
system fostered a consciousness among peasants akin to that found among factory 
workers suggests that a partial ‘proletarianisation’ of the ‘peasantry’ may have 
contributed to the emergence of the farmers’ movement in Mali in the 1990s. 
However, farmers’ approaches varied from asserting themselves within structures of 
dependence, to inserting themselves into positions of relative dominance within 
those structures, to assertively or passively contesting that very dependence. Indeed, 
a major tension that emerged in the research centred on competing constructions of 
the identity of farmers as ‘peasants’ or as ‘producers in global value chains’.  
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Academic debate around the nature and conditions of peasant resistance does 
not take adequate account, therefore, of the complex realities of rural populations 
whose livelihood strategies are deeply and contentiously entwined in wider economic 
and political processes of globalisation, which pass through and are conditioned by 
regional, national and local political arenas. It is only through deeper understanding 
of this complexity, and of farmers’ diverse multiple subjectivities in relation to it, 
that farmers’ participation or non-participation in transnational civil society networks 
can begin to be understood. 
 
 
Power and values in transnational civil society networks 
By contrast to some of the more radical activist stances found in Mali, the 
main international NGO actors considered in this thesis sought to reform, rather than 
oppose, transnational systems of governance and commerce, which they saw 
themselves as capable of – and justified in – influencing. These actors included the 
staff of northern-based NGOs, Oxfam Great Britain, Oxfam America, and the 
Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), and southern-based NGO, ENDA. They 
focused primarily on influencing policy-making processes in international arenas, for 
example, on US and EU subsidy regimes and international regulation of pesticide use 
and labour standards. In this process, Oxfam, in particular, worked closely with 
national level farmer organisations in Mali, but without fully understanding the 
realpolitik of relations between the State and civil society in Mali. The local level of 
farmer organisation in Mali became a secondary focus of attention for Oxfam and 
EJF, with a view to enhancing accountability and their own organisational 
legitimacy. 
These activities of transnational civil society contributed to the empowerment 
of an elite of cotton farmers whilst marginalising the interests and perspectives of the 
majority of farmers in Mali’s cotton zone. An examination of how this happened 
contributes to the debate around deconstructive approaches to development. In 
support of the focus on dominating power associated with the deconstructive 
approach, and against the non-normative approach advocated by Mosse and Lewis 
(2006), the dominance of international NGO actors within the network was one 
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relatively significant explanatory factor in this phenomenon. To give credit to the 
non-normative approach, however, it was more complicated than that.  
While at the micro level of a development intervention – the level of analysis 
with which ethnographic studies tend to concern themselves – donors do not 
dominate in an intentional or straightforward way, when we look at the aggregate 
picture, it is evident that there is a gulf between donor agencies (NGOs, state 
agencies, bilateral or multilateral aid agencies) and local populations in terms of who 
sets the agenda in the first place. Although a partially autonomous peasantry can to 
some extent opt out of the options presented to them by state and donor agencies, it 
is nonetheless largely these agencies that structure the sphere of possibilities within 
which local populations make their livelihood choices. This is evident throughout 
this thesis, from the micro level example of the M’Pessoba women’s group’s thus-
far-fruitless quest to secure funding for its shea butter processing initiative to the 
pervasive dominance of the cotton cash-crop framing of farmer livelihoods in 
southern Mali. This is why the dominance/resistance frame is appealing; because it 
captures the inequality of the relationship between donors or NGOs and local 
populations.  
The dominance/resistance frame certainly does not capture the whole story, 
but so long as non-normative ethnographic studies of development interventions fail 
to show how millions of these development interventions add up to the reinforcement 
of dominant power relations, the workings of the development ‘machine’ will remain 
mysterious. But, in fact, those studies, together with this thesis, do unravel the 
apparent mystery: ‘development’ and ‘justice’ are symbols that are instrumentalised 
in the operation of power, while power operates as it always has done: in ways that 
are obvious and subtle, intentional and unintentional, and multidirectional but – 
crucially – not equally so. 
It is through a more critical examination of the roles of power and values in 
the construction of transnational civil society networks, called for by Henry, Mohan 
and Yanacopulos (2004), that the workings of the ‘campaign machine’ and its 
‘instrument effects’ (Ferguson 1990) may be revealed. But this critical examination 
must be informed by the wider contexts in which actors and their relationships are 
embedded. Transnationalising civil society action is particularly challenging because 
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it requires analyses of how power operates, perhaps differently, in multiple arenas. 
The fieldwork findings draw attention to a major challenge that arises in attempting 
to address this complexity through currently pervasive modes of political 
participation – such as through the media, petitions, and lobbying – where alternative 
framings of debate compete with one another, and simpler framings often mobilise 
support more readily than complex ones. 
The research findings confirm Jordan and van Tuijl’s (2000) observation that 
actors in transnational advocacy networks ‘primarily act upon incentives which 
emerge in their own space’ (p. 2062). In their choice of campaign priorities and 
timing, Oxfam staff working at international level responded to opportunities that 
arose in the international political arena, such as the case brought by Brazil against 
the United States at the World Trade Organisation and the Norwegian Government’s 
interest in challenging conditionality attached to World Bank and IMF funding at a 
meeting of donor governments. Staff working within the same organisation but in a 
different political arena – in West Africa – argued for different campaign priorities 
and timings in light of incentives that arose in the West African political arena. In 
Mali, this tendency for actors to operate first and foremost in relation to their own 
political arena was summed up by one farmer’s comment, ‘we only see our 
government.’430 It may go some way towards explaining why there was competition 
between framings of the problem as primarily national level or as primarily 
international level. 
In several ways, international NGO actors demonstrated ‘an insufficiently 
sophisticated understanding of how power operates and is constituted and thus of 
how empowerment may occur’, one of the broad criticisms of participatory 
development identified by Hickey and Mohan (2004, p. 11). Misunderstandings 
arose between actors when modes of political participation were not understood in 
relation to actors’ multiple subjectivities, including in terms of their power in relation 
to their own political arenas. Clearly, Oxfam staff were not sufficiently aware of the 
clientalist strategies of cotton farmer representatives and government actors. What is 
more, Oxfam staff did not understand why Malian farmers did not overtly challenge 
                                                        
430 Interview with Bourama Goita, cotton farmer, Koutiala, 21/02/08. Original: On ne voit que notre 
gouvernement. 
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their union leaders, and mistook a lack of overt resistance for acquiescence. 
Conventional and organic cotton producer co-operatives were mistakenly assumed 
by international NGO actors to be a route to empowerment for grassroots farmers, 
overlooking the economic, political, social and cultural contexts in which these 
forms of organisation were situated. International level NGOs involved in the 
campaign against cotton subsidies also showed themselves to have an insufficiently 
critical analysis of how power operates in the world trade system. 
At the international level, the campaign against subsidies appeared to be 
counter-hegemonic in that it challenged the mercantilist practices of the dominant 
world powers. But viewed from the national level in Mali, the campaign was clearly 
not counter-hegemonic in that (i) it participated in the dominant discourse of free 
market economics; (ii) it did not fundamentally challenge the structure of global 
trade, seeking instead empowerment for farmers within the global value chain; and 
(iii) it played into the hands of the cotton company, the State and elite Malian farmer 
leaders. Oxfam attempted to avoid being ‘ideological’ through economic 
‘rationality’, but in reality it participated in the dominant discourse (although not 
practice) of neoliberal economics, which appears rational, apolitical and 
incontestable precisely because it is hegemonic or, at least, dominant.  
Thinking back to Jennings’s (2001) case study of Oxfam’s highly 
ideologically-driven intervention in Tanzania in the 1970s, Oxfam’s organisational 
history and culture may have contributed to its current tendency to strive to avoid 
overt ideology and politics. This perspective suggests that the deconstructive view of 
‘development discourse’ as monolithically technical is mistaken, since organisations 
and their discourses vary over time. So, the seemingly less ideological character of 
Oxfam’s current discourse does not in itself explain why the campaign was to a 
certain extent co-opted. Oxfam attempted to avoid ideological politics by sticking 
dogmatically to a discourse of economic rationality and development, but its 
campaign was subverted by real politics both at the national level in Mali and the 
international level at the WTO. Oxfam acknowledged that the blockage at the WTO 
revealed the power-based nature of the world trade system and asserted that this 
revelation was an achievement of the campaign. The majority of farmers and farmer 
The stakes of transnational civil society action 
 
 
Chapter eight: Conclusion 
209 
representatives interviewed in Mali, however, viewed this as obvious anyway, and 
sought tangible, material change instead.  
There was a comparative lack of will, however, among many – though by no 
means all – farmers and farmer representatives in Mali to challenge head-on the 
realpolitik operating at national level than to criticise the realpolitik at global level, 
probably because they perceived the personal risks to be higher, a perception which 
was reinforced by the mobilisation of ‘cultural’ norms that discouraged overt 
questioning of authority. Oxfam Great Britain and Oxfam America drew the line at 
intervening more directly in domestic politics, viewing the challenging of domestic 
politicking as the remit of the national farmer representatives. However, in a bid to 
redress its own instrumentalisation and to re-orient the NGO’s intervention in the 
Malian cotton sector, Oxfam, mainly through an individual staff member, turned its 
attentions to the local level – but, again, working through an institutional structure 
that was co-opted and controlled by the patron–client network bridging the State and 
civil society.  
In the transnational network interactions considered in this thesis, differences 
between actors in terms of their values and interests were mediated in a number of 
ways. Common ground was found when Oxfam, ENDA and West African farmer 
leaders identified a common campaign target; that of US and EU cotton subsidies. 
These international NGOs supported the farmer leaders to be taken seriously by their 
own governments; and a transnational civil society network made development of 
the WTO cotton case possible. However, what emerged strongly from the research 
was that there were many differences between actors in terms of their values and 
perspectives which were not amenable to negotiation and to the finding of common 
ground. These differences were mediated mainly through unequal power relations 
between actors. This finding presents a critical challenge to Keck and Sikkink’s 
(1998) thesis that transnational civil society networks ‘both reflect and help sustain 
shared values, beliefs and projects’ (p. 213). 
Henry, Mohan and Yanacopulos (2004) identify the use of common symbols 
with different meanings for different actors as one strategy that is employed to 
reconcile individuality and commonality within transnational civil society networks: 
‘Symbolic matters can be central to the maintenance of networks because they allow 
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people to behave differently while retaining membership of the network.’ (ibid., p. 
852). This usage of symbols to unify a diverse network was seen in the case of the 
Global Call to Action Against Poverty’s use of a white band as a campaign symbol 
and in the use of the campaign slogan, ‘Make Trade Fair’ in 2005. However, this 
analysis of the usage of symbols within networks does not consider the effects on the 
balance of power between actors within the network of the interpretation of the 
symbol by actors outside the network. As was shown in chapter six, ‘Make Trade 
Fair’ was the symbolic headline under which there passed two petitions in West 
Africa, each with different content. While this appeared to diffuse conflict within the 
transnational network, and it certainly increased the numerical strength of the 
campaign, what is less clear is how the content of the petitions related to the message 
ultimately conveyed to policy-makers. The risk with such a strategy is that signatures 
to one petition are counted in support of a quite different policy position. Thus, rather 
than diffusing power, and reconciling diversity with unity, the use of symbols may in 
practice serve as a vehicle for the external promotion of one perspective over all 
others. 
Covert contestation between actors over values occurred in the case of the 
engagement of AOPP representatives in incongruous public and hidden transcripts 
regarding gender equality. A non-normative approach would resist analysing this 
scenario in terms of the dominance of the northern NGO over its southern partner, 
emphasising instead the multi-directional character of power relations that are 
evident. It seems strange to consider the northern NGO’s stance on gender equality 
as domination, since this stance is aimed at countering male domination; and strange 
to think of the behaviour of AOPP staff as resistance, since it seem to be more a case 
of consolidating male domination. This is because power is multi-directional and 
relational, but it is still pertinent to ask whether, overall, power is dominating or non-
dominating in the context. Here, the context is network relations and the dominance 
of the northern NGO’s position within those relations is evident in the fact that its 
own discourse is the public transcript, not the hidden one. It is the NGO’s dominance 
in this relationship, together with the dominance of the discourse of gender equality 
in transnational civil society, that helps to explain why differences between network 
actors in terms of values ‘went underground’. This outcome is not constructive in 
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terms of the health of working relationships between network actors, nor, indeed, in 
terms of addressing power inequality in the wider context; in this case, that of male 
domination over women. 
Child labour and child rights were another focus of differences over values 
seen in the fieldwork. One interviewee pointed to the potential for engagement in 
contradictory public and hidden transcripts regarding child labour, whereby Malian 
civil society actors might participate in a development intervention on the issue in 
order to profit from development rent, without believing that child labour is a 
genuine problem in the Malian cotton zone. However, the Malian NGO, AMADIP, 
whose participation in a development intervention on child labour was studied in 
chapter seven, did not engage in contradictory public and hidden transcripts, but 
rather made an attempt to broker and translate the intervention by re-interpreting the 
phenomenon of children working on cotton farms as significant as a symptom of 
socio-economic stress, while acknowledging cultural values surrounding the topic. 
This was a constructive way to reconcile different values within the network, and it 
did influence the perspectives of the northern NGO staff to some extent. However, 
since EJF was more interested in its own discourse of environmental justice and 
exploitation than socio-economic stress, and because this was reinforced through the 
funding chain, the ‘partnership’ did not continue on the basis of AMADIP’s framing 
of the issue. 
Typical of cases in which apparent consensus belies significant differences of 
perspective is that of the interest in organic cotton farming. EJF’s policy was driven 
by its own norms of environmental justice, and was very little if at all motivated to 
consider the independent perspectives of farmers themselves. EJF’s viewpoint 
appeared to be affirmed by farmers’ interest in organic cotton, but the farmers’ main 
interest in switching to organic was financial. This supports the critique of 
deconstructive approaches to development which asserts that recipients pursue their 
own agendas and strategies; their participation in a development intervention does 
not necessarily indicate that they share the same vision of development – or indeed 
of ‘justice’ – as the donor, or that they engage in subversive strategies of resistance 
against the donor’s vision of development. The farmers’ interest in organic cotton 
growing was not just about seizing the opportunity presented by the donor; it was 
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one of many livelihood strategies farmers interviewed were considering, weighing up 
the expected inputs and outputs of each option. Alternatives to organic cotton 
farming considered by farmers included cultivating maize, beans or sesame, 
transforming raw products on-farm to add value, and pursuing off-farm work. EJF’s 
promise of support for organic cotton farming, however, tipped the balance in favour 
of this option over the others. A local extension/development agent who did contract 
work for both the CMDT and AMADIP expressed concern at EJF’s raising of 
farmers’ expectations without any guarantee of follow-up. This is indicative of the 
unequal power aspect of the relationship between the international NGO and the 
local population, in which the NGO is one of the actors that shapes the field of 
possibilities in which farmers define their agendas and strategies. 
One significant way in which unequal power was evident in transnational 
network relations was in the contestation of values and perspectives through 
competition between different framings of debate; most notably, between emphasis 
on US and EU subsidies compared with emphasis on liberal reform or CMDT 
mismanagement, and between the competing discourses of single commodity 
agribusiness and family farming. Contestation over these opposing frames extended 
to processes of legitimisation and de-legitimisation of Malian and West African civil 
society organisations. Cotton-specific organisations were constructed – by 
themselves, by the State, by the cotton company – as the only legitimate 
representatives of farmers in Mali’s cotton zone. This social construction of the 
legitimacy of cotton-specific organisations and de-legitimisation of broad-based 
peasant organisations was accepted and internalised by international NGO actors 
considered in the research, and even by some actors within Malian civil society who 
were associated with the broad-based farming camp.  
Contestation between actors over values and perspectives was perhaps most 
pervasively played out through the allocation of resources, including through the 
funding chain. Examples include the choice of Geneva (World Trade Organization) 
rather than Washington (World Bank) for the location of an Oxfam advocacy office 
in 2002; Oxfam’s funding of AProCA, which allowed continuation of the campaign 
against subsidies despite the concerns of other actors in the West African farmers’ 
movement; and funding offered by the pro-democracy Open Society Institute as the 
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origin of EJF’s concern over child labour in cotton, with a particular focus on 
undemocratic Uzbekistan.  
More overt conflict arose, however, when some Malian civil society actors 
took a stand against what they regarded as domination within the transnational 
network, for example, when Aminata Dramane Traoré of Le Forum Pour Un Autre 
Mali organised a rival forum on the subject of cotton as a challenge to the dominance 
of Oxfam in the campaign against US and EU cotton subsidies; when the regional 
farmers’ network, ROPPA expressed serious concerns about the subsidies campaign; 
and when Ibrahima Coulibaly of the AOPP and CNOP stopped working with Oxfam 
actors on the subsidies campaign. But the transnational network and the campaign 
survived the breakdown of relations with ROPPA because AProCA formed and 
served, on the basis of a narrower interest group and with funding from Oxfam, to 
replace it as the main West African partner organisation in the network. Similarly, 
even after Ibrahima Coulibaly’s withdrawal, the AOPP continued working with 
Oxfam on the campaign. Another AOPP staff member described the organisation’s 
work with Oxfam on the subsidies campaign as a strategic alliance up to a point. It is 
unclear how strategic this alliance is for the AOPP in the long term. 
The continuation of the campaign for the elimination of US and EU cotton 
subsidies despite overt conflict within the network is an indication both of the 
existence of the narrow support base for the campaign within West Africa and of the 
dominance of the international NGO in the network. Overt conflict did in time lead 
to some revisions and learning by the NGO, which demonstrates one way in which 
NGOs can be reflexively aware of their own power and ‘give up’ some power within 
networks for the better functioning and accountability of the network. However, 
among the most striking examples of NGO dominance in transnational networks 
seen in the case study was the manipulation that occurred when petitions were used, 
and organic cotton projects proposed, in order to give an appearance of grassroots 
participation and downward accountability for the enhancement of the socially-
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Ongoing theoretical and empirical weaknesses 
The findings of this thesis call for a research project that looks thoroughly at 
transnational networks, at the interactions between actors, at the multiple political 
arenas in which actors and stakeholders are situated. The scale of such a research 
project would require a team of researchers, including members that have 
background in the different political arenas and access inside the network. As 
mentioned in the introduction, access was a problem for me. This was the case both 
in Mali, where access was restricted in politically sensitive contexts and to some 
extent by security risks, and at NGO headquarters, where staff reported that they 
were constrained by their supervisors with regards to sharing information that was 
regarded as sensitive in terms of the NGOs’ reputations and their on-going work. 
This approach could be applied to investigate more radical transnational civil 
society networks, in order to contribute further to the debate around deconstructive 
approaches to development. One argument made here is that actors taking a more 
radical political line will not necessarily avoid instrumentalisation by realpolitik. In 
practice, being ‘more politically radical’ often means following a more radical 
political ideology, which Jennings’ (2001) case study and indeed, world history, has 
shown can facilitate, rather than prevent, abuses of power. However, it would be 
interesting to see whether the links being forged between advocates of the family 
farming perspective in Mali and the transnational network calling for ‘food 
sovereignty’, involving the transnational social movement, Via Campesina, are any 
more robust than the ‘trade justice’ and ‘environmental justice’ networks in terms of 
insulating themselves from contradictory ‘instrument effects’. 
Theories of ‘peasant resistance’ could be expanded through studying the 
participation or non-participation of farmers in contentious politics in the context of 
globalisation (beyond fair trade schemes), in which the complex reality of farmers’ 
livelihoods may not be adequately represented by the definitions of ‘peasant’ that are 
currently prevalent in the literature, and where the very definition of farmers’ 
livelihoods is the subject of contention. It would be particularly interesting see 
whether, in this context, there are changes in terms of attitudes among rural African 
populations towards gender relations. 
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The conclusion of this thesis is that we need to tread a middle path between 
deconstructive critiques of development and non-normative approaches, and to apply 
this analysis to transnational civil society action. One danger with simple 
deconstructive approaches is to assume that by being more overtly political – as 
NGOs are when they engage in campaigns and advocacy – civil society actors can 
master the field of power and finally satisfy the deconstructivists’ own ‘will to 
improve’ (Li 2007) or, indeed, ‘will to bring about justice’. While being more overtly 
political may help, it is not enough. Non-normative approaches locate causal power 
with the actors and structures of the wider context, including that of international 
NGO actors. Crewe and Harrison (1998) and Mosse (2005) resist making normative 
judgments about the interventions of international NGO actors: they seek to avoid 
over-estimating the level of intentionality (and therefore of culpability) involved in 
their actions that have power effects; and they seek to avoid over-estimating the level 
of control (and therefore of responsibility) that they have. Following these non-
normative approaches provides a more balanced and accurate analysis of how it 
happened that transnational civil society action ended up empowering a West 
African farming elite at the expense of the majority of farmers in Mali’s cotton zone. 
But, while adopting a ‘blaming approach’ is not constructive, the analysis presented 
here shows clearly that power, including the relative dominance of international 
NGOs, is a significant feature of interaction between actors in the on-going processes 
of constructing transnational civil society networks, and that the actions of network 
actors, including international NGO ones, can facilitate unequal and unjust 
operations of power in the wider context. 
The bottom line is that all actors involved in transnational civil society action 
have a political responsibility to the people who have most at stake in the 
intervention (Jordan and van Tuijl 2000) – a responsibility to be critically aware of 
how power operates in the multiple political arenas in connection with which they 
work, and a responsibility to be reflexively aware of their own power and values – 
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because, as one farmer representative put it, ‘For us, … it is not a campaign – not just 
a campaign; it is our lives that are at stake.’431 
 
                                                        
431 Interview with Ibrahima Coulibaly, President of the CNOP, Bamako, 17/01/08. Original: Pour 
nous, … ce n’est pas une campagne – ce n’est pas qu’une campagne ; c’est nos vies qui sont en jeu. 







List of formal interviews conducted during fieldwork 
 
1. Salif Foulani Sissoko, CNOP Technical Coordinator, 04/10/06, Bamako. 
2. Jean Coulibaly, AOPP President, 04/10/06, Bamako. 
3. Aliou Maiga, CCA-ONG Communications Officer, 04/10/06, Bamako. 
4. Gilles Marion, Oxfam GB Country Programme Manager for Mali, 04/07/07, 
Bamako. 
5. Fousseynou Diabaté, Oxfam GB & America joint Cotton Programme Officer, 
04/07/07, Bamako. 
6. Issa Coulibaly, AOPP Cotton Advisor, 27/08/07, Bamako. 
7. Lassine Sidibe, AOPP Executive Secretary, 29/08/07, Bamako. 
8. Anonymous, Oxfam (GB/America) worker, 17/09/07, Bamako. 
9. Moctar Coulibaly, AMADIP president; CAD-Mali activist, 22/10/07, Bamako. 
10. Ibrahima Coulibaly, AOPP External Relations Secretary; CNOP President, 
17/01/08, Bamako. 
11. Souleymane Diarra, AOPP Commissions Coordinator, 17/01/08, Bamako. 
12. Ismael Coulibaly, CNOP Vice President, 21/01/08, Bamako. 
13. Dominique Jenkins, Oxfam America Popular Mobilisation Coordinator, 
02/02/08, Dakar. 
14. Mamadou Barry, PEACE Coordinator, 04/02/08, Dakar. 
15. Alexis Anouan, Enda Prospectives Dialogues Agriculture Policy Coordinator, 
12/02/08, Bamako. 
16. Souleymane M Keita, CNOP Vice President, 12/02/08, Bamako. 
17. Modibou G Coulibaly, CAD-Mali Press Officer, 13/02/08, Bamako. 
18. Siaka Traore, cotton farmer, 17/02/08, Fana. 
19. Mamadou Konate, cotton farmer and President of Chamber of Agriculture in the 
commune of Gigya, 17/02/08, Fana. 
20. Seydou Toure, cotton farmer and Regional SYVAC representative, 17/02/08, 
Fana. 
21. Drissa Traore, cotton farmer, SCPC Secretary, and Secretary of communal 
Chamber of Agriculture, 17/02/08, Fana. 
22. Bamoussa Traore, cotton farmer, 17/02/08, Fana. 
23. Aziz Bagayogo, cotton farmer and trader, 17/02/08, Fana. 
24. Amadou Nekita Fomba, cotton farmer, President of Dien SCPC and local 
SYVAC representative, 17/02/08, Dien nr Fana. 
25. Amadou Fomba, cotton farmer, 17/02/08, Dien nr Fana. 
26. Bakary Fomba, cotton farmer and SCPC Accountant, 17/02/08, Dien nr Fana. 
27. Tarafan Fomba, cotton farmer, 17/02/08, Dien nr Fana. 
28. Bah Kissiman Traore, cotton farmer, 18/02/08, Wolodo nr Fana. 
29. Michel Daou, retired CMDT agent, 18/02/08, Fana. 
30. Bafing Diarra, cotton farmer and local SYCOV President, 18/02/08, 
Kodabougou nr Kouroukoro nr Fana. 





31. Keifa Diarra, SYCOV Secretary-General (national level), 19/02/08, Fana. 
32. Fode Sumunu, retired CMDT agent, 20/02/08, Koutiala. 
33. Sidiki Coulibaly, cotton farmer and local councillor, 20/02/08, Koutiala. 
34. Seydou Traore, cotton farmer and former SYCOV member, 21/02/08, Koutiala. 
35. Bourama Goita, cotton farmer and former SYCOV member, 21/02/08, Koutiala. 
36. Fousseyney Coulibaly, AMADIP staff member and CMDT extension agent, 
21/02/08, Koutiala. 
37. Adama Bocoum, CAD-MALI activist and Fulani herder, 21/02/08, Koutiala. 
Also present was Yusuf Coulibaly, CAD-MALI activist. 
38. Kadija Traore, CAD-MALI activist and home-maker in a cotton-farming 
household, 21/02/08, Koutiala. 
39. Ampha Coulibaly, President of Regional Union of Cooperatives of Koutiala and 
San. Also present were: Bakary Dembele, Vice-President and Mamdou Sangare, 
Co-ordinator of the Regional Union of SCPCs, 23/02/08, Koutiala. 
40. Michel Dembele and Joseph Dembele, cotton farmers, 23/02/08, Moribila nr 
Koutiala. 
41. Alphonse Kone, SCPC Vice-President, 24/02/08, Moribila nr Koutiala. 
42. Aminata Touré Barry (known as “Mme Barry”), President of CAD-Mali, 
25/02/08, Bamako. 
43. Aminata Dramane Traoré, civil society activist, President of Le Forum pour un 
Autre Mali, and former government minister, 28/02/08, Bamako. 
44. Duncan Copeland, Campaigner, EJF, 01/10/08, London. 









































        Organisation    Population         Event 
 
  Relationships between actors/elements, including partnerships, funding  
  flows, and membership/participation (directions of influence unspecified  
  for simplicity). 
 
  Entities in the wider political environment. 
 
  Advocacy relationships with entities in the wider political environment. 
 
Figure 3: Influence diagram of Mali cotton campaign actors in 2003. 




































Figure 4: Influence diagram of Mali cotton campaign actors in 2005.  
N.B. It is difficult to achieve clarity as there was a high degree of overlap 
between organisations. 
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Appel commun des producteurs de coton de l'Afrique de 
l'Ouest 
 
Au moment où il est question de lutter contre la pauvreté, les producteurs 
de coton de l'Afrique de l'Ouest ont tout de suite compris que ce n’est 
qu’au prix de leurs efforts qu’ils peuvent venir à bout de cette pauvreté. Ils 
se sont mis à la tâche, et au moment où ils obtiennent un nouveau record 
de production, voilà que subitement les cours du coton s’effondrent.  
Nous en arrivons à nous interroger sur la volonté réelle des pays riches à 
faire reculer la pauvreté dans les pays pauvres. Les subventions dont 
bénéficient les agriculteurs de l’Union Européenne (U.E.) et des Etats-Unis 
(U.S.A.) leur permettent de mieux résister à ces chutes de prix.  
Mais ce n’est pas tout. Ces subventions ont des effets pervers sur les 
économies des pays pauvres, car elles stimulent artificiellement la 
production et entraîne une surproduction, et donc la chute des cours sur le 
marché mondial. En subventionnant leurs producteurs de coton les U.S.A. 
et l’U.E. menacent gravement le coton africain, et donc l’avenir de millions 
de producteurs, et les économies de nombreux pays comme celles du 
Bénin, du Burkina Faso et du Mali.  
Aussi, nous demandons solennellement aux U.S.A. et à l’U.E. de supprimer 
leurs subventions aux producteurs de coton.  
Nous demandons à tous ceux qui veulent construire un monde plus juste et 
fraternel de se joindre à nous pour faire pression sur les Etats-Unis et 
l’Union Européenne pour qu’ils suppriment ces subventions. 
Fait à Bobo-Dioulasso le 21 novembre 2001  
Signatures :  
Le Président de l’UNPCB (du Burkina)   Monsieur François Traoré 
 Le Président de la FUFRO (Bénin)          Monsieur Issa Ibrahima 
 Le Président du SYCOV (Mali)               Monsieur Ampha Coulibaly  
La  Maison des Paysans de la région du Sud-Ouest de Madagasgar, et son 
représentant                                                                Monsieur Risoja Filiha 
Source: www.abcburkina.net/content/view/418/44/lang,fr/ consulted on 06/05/11. 
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